12.26 Seoul Drone Incursion from North Korea

(Source- 언론 알아야 바꾼다 youtube 1.5.23)
Downward arrow on left shows contended flight route of four drones crossing the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) from North Korea heading southwest over Gangwha Island, South Korea. Red line on right shows southeast heading of one other drone which also crossed the MDL, passed near Kimpo and followed a course along the Han River, entered Seoul airspace, proceeding to Yongsan and skirting the P-73a shootdown prohibited airspace before returning toward NK on a reverse course.

(Source- 언론 알아야 바꾼다 youtube 1.5.23) This second graphic also shows the contended route of the single drone which crossed the MDL, entering Seoul airspace and approaching P-73a before it turned back.


The actions of Yoon Seok-yeol have served to escalate military tensions on the Korean peninsula. His domestic public support is down at about 30 percent and stuck there. He is compensating with his faux military tough guy posturing (see our previous 12.28.22 post Screwing Up the Tension in Korea) and tit for tat retaliatory responses to North Korean "provocations." The truth is he’s incompetent in diplomatic and national security matters. His initial move of the Presidential Office from the Blue House to the former Ministry of National Building, has had a disruptive impact on domestic security as well contributing to the 10.29 Itaewon disaster. The terrain around the Blue where the prior prohibited "shootdown" airspace was centered was more conducive to early detection and interception because of its elevation and zoning (far less urban sprawl around the Blue House in the center). The presidential office move arbitrarily initiated by Yoon, had a cascading effect on emergency military readiness, by abandoning the already well organized and secure Blue House compound where the national command center was located. Moving onto the Yongsan compound where the MND building was located bumped the Ministry of Defense from their offices and caused the service chiefs of the armed forces to move from their building next door to other more remote locations. Movement of radars, ECM, and firing positions was required by the presidential move, which disrupted the preexisting air defenses. It also necessitated movement of the P-73a prohibited airspace over central Seoul to the south. That movement created a gap in the shoot down zone, that allowed the North Korean drone's flight to approach the presidential office in Yongsan and then return to North Korea.

Yoon has been lying about the situation and claiming that the shortcomings were caused by the previous administration not having a drone command nor practicing for such a contingency. Both assertions are untrue. The presidential office also blamed the Air Defense Command of the Army for the lapse. The ROK Army shot back with an argument similar to that above and a map of the critical airspace involved. At the outset of the presidential move, the Army ADC had objected to the movement of the prohibited zone to the south, recommended increasing its size from 3.7km radius to 5.7 km, and disputed contentions that new or different weapon systems could compensate for the gaps created over the critical national command center area by the move. While recent criticisms of the quality of North Korean reconnaissance had been made beforehand, particularly their photoreconnaissance, the flight path of the drone buzzing Seoul suggests they anticipated exactly where the gaps were.

So Yoon escalated by sending a drone into North Korea in retaliation and told his generals not to be afraid of nuclear war. The US never really supported the military agreements made by South Korea with North Korea to defuse tensions along the DMZ, the best that could be said was that they acquiesced at the time, reluctantly. The Yoon administration allowed propaganda balloons to be sent over the MDL into North Korea on at least two occassions, although this was made illegal after the military agreements were concluded with the north, and represented relevant provocations. It may be that some ROK/US military exercises, artillery firing near Paju, rocket-artillery firing in Cheoran County (both near the DMZ), air force exercises in the West Sea, etc., may have already violated the agreement, namely, in the buffer zones around the maritime Northern Limit Line and MDL restricting military operations. The joint use of artillery in Paju and rockets in Cheoran violates the spirit of agreement if not the letter. It's clear that the North regarded ROK and US artillery firing, and artillery rocket activities so close to the DMZ as provocations and responded with missile tests, artillery firings into the maritime buffer zones, and aircraft operations near the dmz all regarded as violations of the September 19, 2018, Comprehensive Military Agreement.

The Military’s Response to North Korean Drones Was “Altogether Incompetent,”
By Park Eun-kyung, Kyunghyung Sinmun, 1.6.23;
http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=202301061304427&code=710100&utm_source=livere&utm_medium=social_share

S.Korea begins major Hoguk field training exercise amid N.Korea’s saber-rattling; Korea Herald, Oct. 17, 2022;
https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20221017000637

Explainer: What exactly is the inter-Korean military pact that might be suspended?
Hankyoreh, Jan.5,2023
https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/1074576.html

Military Flight Restrictions Agreement Between Koreas Irks US, 10.13.18
https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2018/10/military-flight-restrictions-agreement.html

"Screwing Up" the Tension in Korea, 12.28.22
https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2022/12/screwing-up-tension-in-korea.html

"Screwing Up" the Tension in Korea

The US and its allies, Japan and South Korea, had publicly discussed "preemptive attacks" on North Korea, whether "de-capitation attacks" or "pre-emptive strikes on missile bases." So the North Korean launch of two ICBMs in November represented an expected continuation of the North Korean response. The discussion of this essentially US strategy by the right in South Korea has been ongoing for some time. South Korean president Yoon Seok-yeol appears to have adopted it. Prime Minister Kishida has promoted a "counterstrike" policy which is essentially the same thing but the wording is different because the notion of pre-emptive strike is politically unpalatable in Japan.

The return of so called strategic US assets to the South Korean region, featured B1-b strategic bombers, in operation Vigilant Storm in late October and early November and fighter aircraft from both South Korea and the US in major air operations involving hundreds of aircraft. Earlier in September, aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and its associated strike group visited Pusan, South Korea ahead of joint exercises. On Sep 8 Kim Jong-un adopted a policy of an automatic nuclear response, if the leadership of North Korea was subjected to an attack. This announcement by the North's leader was preceded by US-ROK joint military exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield, described as the largest in five years in an August 29th report of Stars and Stripes. The ROK air force exercised jointly with two B-52s and 4 F-22s on December 20. The return of US strategic assets including strategic bombers and the USS Ronald Reagan to South Korea after a five year hiatus are a violation of the understandings reached at the Singapore Summit. Likewise North Korean, ICBM testing is a violation of that summit agreement as well. North Korean ballistic missile tests and nuclear tests are generally proscribed by UN resolutions 1874 (12 June 2009) and 2387 (22 December 2017).

North Korea regards the return of large joint US-ROK military exercises as a threat and preparation for war. It has launched an unprecedented number of ballistic missile tests so far this year. Three of these launches were ICBMs, one in March, and two in November. The earlier November ICBM launch was considered a failure. The North Korean missile program is regarded as cost effective compensation by North Korea to offset its inferiority in conventional military capability.

A South Korean defector group launched helium balloons across the DMZ on July 6 and October 2, despite the new law passed during the Moon Jae-in administration prohibiting such activities. The Moon administration was criticized for curtailing "free speech," by conservatives, including Yoon Seok-yeol supporters and VOA Korea. The criticism is absurd as pointed out in prior posts. No one has the right to shout fire in a theater or provoke the North Korean or UNC guards at the Joint Security Area. No one has the right to fly things over the DMZ or its continuation, the Northern Limit Line (NLL) into the East or West Seas. As part of the military agreements between North and South Korea, loudspeaker propaganda from the North had stopped as well. The North Koreans felt that not only were the prohibited balloon flights regime change propaganda, but that they also represented a biological threat (covid-19). Ironically, at least one expert commentator has noted that the five un-intercepted drone flights this week from North Korea over the DMZ into South Korean airspace potentially represented a" weapons of mass destruction" threat, in addition to their apparent mission of reconnaissance, and harassment.

The Unification Ministry had requested the defector group to stop their balloon activities before the October 2 event. This is somewhat ironic considering the minister's "free speech" position expressed before the Yoon Seok-yeol administration took office.

On October 4, a North Korean intermediate range ballistic missile was fired into space over Japan and landed in the Northern Pacific. The South responded with a Hyunmoo II ballistic missle firing, which failed catastrophically and frightened the public near the scene of the accident. The US and South Korea each fired two ATACSMs; one of the South Korean launches failed.

When three North Korean missiles were fired across the MDL into the East Sea on November 2, this was a violation of the military agreement between North and South Korea which established buffer zones where military exercises are prohibited. A KF-16 intended to respond by firing 2 SPICE missiles, after the first firing, the aircraft returned to base, for low fuel reasons. A sortie by an F-15K, planned to launch two SLAM ER missiles. Only one missile fired, the other missile was defective. A second F-15K in reserve fired the second SLAM missile.

So there has been a considerable escalation in military and propaganda activities in the tense military zones in and around the Korean peninsula, which has led up to the December 26 launch of 5 (unmanned) drones by North Korea into South Korean territory. A KA-1 light attack aircraft taking off from Wonju as part of the ineffective South Korean military response crashed with both crew members surviving. As the drones meandered around the area south of the DMZ near Paju and Gangwha island, and one ventured over northern Seoul, the public was left uniformed about what was happening for several hours resulting in much social media speculation as to whether the south was under attack. This also occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Hyunmoo II failure and explosion in early October.

As late as November 10, the Unification Minister submitted a statement to the South Korean Supreme Constitutional Court that restrictions on balloon flights were a violation of "free speech."

The unification minister also stressed that terms in the law, including those banning any acts at border areas that could trigger "harm to the lives and bodies of people and grave dangers," is so vaguely worded that the law could be enforced "arbitrarily."

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221110004400315

Earlier in late September a spokesperson for the ministry had asked the defector groups to refrain from such acts:

SEOUL, Sept. 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry urged local activist groups to refrain from sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border amid lingering concerns that such a campaign could lead to the escalation of tensions on the peninsula.

The ministry also made clear Seoul will take a "strong and stern" measure in case Pyongyang carries out its threat of retaliatory action against those who seek to spread those leaflets, usually using large-scale balloons.

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220923003951325


During the Hoguk training exercise, South Korea conducted artillery exercises near Paju, and the US fired tactical missiles in Cheoran county, also close to the DMZ. If not violations of the Sep 2018 military agreement between North and South Korea, they violated the spirit of the agreement, and were part of a pattern of escalatory military moves by North and South Korea and and the United States. S.Korea begins major Hoguk field training exercise amid N.Korea’s saber-rattling, Oct. 17 Korea Herald, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20221017000637

Deja vu- Decapitation Strategy

The "preemptive attack/decapitation scenario" will be played out during the summer US-ROK CFC summer military exercises according to an article in the Daily Beast, US to Enrage Kim Jong-un with Assassination Dry Run.*

For the first time in years, joint exercises between the U.S. and South Korea this month will culminate in a trial run of decapitating the North Korean leadership.

According to David Maxwell, retired Special Forces Colonel, "If you get the head of the military forces (which is Kim Jong-un) theoretically you gut (sic) the head of the snake."

Several questions arise in connection with the preemptive attack scenario. Namely, how do US forces ascertain the location of Kim Jong Un? Second how do they move into position without being detected crossing the maritime northern limit lines and the extended buffer zones around them? Third how do they succeed in obtaining permission from South Korean political and military leadership to carry out such a risky attack? Fourth, how do they avoid the risk of a nuclear retaliation against US targets in South Korea and the region? How do they avoid the risk of a conventional retaliation against urban areas such as Seoul? Fifth, what preparations have they made for a Chinese military intervention when their security interests inside North Korea are jeopardized? It should be noted that even right wing experts on the situation in North Korea, such a Victor Cha, and Thae Yong-ho, have warned against preemptive military attack on North Korea as a means to resolve the denuclearization stalemate in the past.

It's quite likely that a target of the new "tactical" nuclear warhead on the submarine launched ballistic missile is North Korea. The weapon appears to be specifically designed to destroy a deeply hardened target in a tactical environment. The US conventional military tactic of “decapitation” of North Korean leadership has been discussed openly in South Korean media in recent years. It never seemed practical, a special operations tactic to resolve a strategic problem.

In any case, if one were to consider the response from North Korea due to a “decapitation” attack with a small yield weapon like the W-76-2, let’s assume it succeeds with the precision and accuracy the new weapons are believed to have. Then in the aftermath of such an attack there remains a nuclear armed North Korea with unknown military commanders in unknown bunkers deciding what the response, if any, should be. Perhaps following US game theory they would decline to escalate the nuclear conflict. Or perhaps they wouldn’t. On the other hand, if the location of the bunker, or Kim Jong-un, was not precisely ascertained, and consequently the chairman or his successor survived, even for only for a brief time, a question arises about what would happen at that point. If one considers the desperation of the moment, the uncertainty, the confusion, and the likelihood of total destruction at the hands of the US military's vastly superior nuclear forces, what is the likely reaction of the North Korean leader? This thought arises, “Even though futilely suicidal, would he not respond in kind with nuclear armed ballistic missiles capable of reaching US bases in the region, where US and allied forces and command and control elements were plainly vulnerable?” Is this not in fact, exactly what would occur, given the ideological basis of North Korean communist doctrine and its self conscious role as the sacrificial victim of great power imperialism? Does the current deployment of US anti-ballistic missile forces in the region really give 100 percent assurance that this wouldn't be an effective response?

This is why Thae Yong-ho refers to the North Korean strategy as a "doomsday machine."

*US to Enrage Kim Jong-un with Assassination Dry Run, by Donald Kirk, The Daily Beast, Aug 3, 2022.
https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-to-enrage-kim-jong-un-with-assassination-dry-run

Notes on Kim Jong-un's Victory Day speech published at KCNA Watch.

I noticed a couple of things about Kim Jong-un's speech published at KCNA Watch. Most notably:

"I have already made it clear that we should be ready both for talks and confrontation and more fully for confrontation in particular in order to reliably guarantee the security of our state."

Criticism of the new Yoon Seok-yeol administration in South Korea, in Kim Jong-un's speech is not too far off the mark. How does one strike a nuclear North Korea preemptively with conventional forces? There is no conventional military solution to the unresolved war in North Korea. South Korea is conventionally superior. North Korea compensates for its relative weakness with new missile designs capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Yoon's openly provocative approach to the North is off the mark. Yet, North Korea has itself to blame because it conducted extensive missile testing during the South Korean presidential campaign earlier this year, lending credibility to Yoon's outdated and impractical cold war approach. This contributed to Yoon's election victory by a razor thin margin, substantially comprised of the overwhelming vote in favor of Yoon by the elderly (over 60 voters).

Another portion of the speech that directly deals with "nuclear weapons" threats:

They are brazen-faced enough to advocate "peace based on strength" and "security based on strength," and have put up a bold front, claiming that they would not hesitate in launching a "preemptive strike" to neutralize the war deterrent of our state.

At this very moment, south Korea is growing more frantic to develop weapons and strengthen its defence industry in a bid to recover, even a little, its military inferiority as compared with ours, and it is planning to bring in nuclear strategic weapons of the United States in large numbers and expanding war drills under various pretexts.

However, we should see that the more frequent vainglorious remarks and various hues of shameful conducts recently made by the south Korean authorities with regard to their security come from their inevitable sense of uneasiness that they have to live under the very nose of a nuclear state.

https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1659013975-413691703/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-makes-speech-at-celebration-of-69th-anniversary-of-great-victory-in-war/

It's interesting that the AP article on the Victory Day "speech" finds it necessary to refer back to an April speech to find more threatening remarks from the North Korean leader. I tend to agree with the analysis of this Korean Herald article:

No saber-rattling for N.Korea ‘Victory Day,’ but US repeats warning over nuke test
By Ji Da-gyum
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220727000697

North Korea held a politically charged event to mark its “Victory Day” in the Korean War, though its celebrations were notably absent of saber rattling and bellicose rhetoric from the country’s leader.

Last comment: This remark was made by academic expert quoted in the AP article:

.“Kim’s rhetoric inflates external threats to justify his militarily focused and economically struggling regime...”

Kim threatens to use nukes amid tensions with US, S. Korea
By HYUNG-JIN KIM
https://apnews.com/article/covid-health-seoul-south-korea-nuclear-weapons-e285be60ef404092fe3324748fa60707

The same can certainly be said for the struggling Yoon Seok-yeol administration in the south, which is remarkably absent of any meaningful policies to address the current economic hardships there. Yoon's policies thus far consist of red baiting, persecuting political rivals, constructing an authoritarian state, pursuing privatization of state assets, and blindly deferring to US and Japanese policy. He is widely regarded as an amateur statesmen. The prior administration's policy toward North Korea might be summarized as putting South Korean national interests first while strengthening its military and the alliance with the US. The Yoon faction's policy might summarized as a default mode opting for outdated cold war rhetoric and unilateral concessions to the US and Japan damaging to South Korean interests. As one former South Korean four star general put it, "Yoon is driving forward while only looking in the rear view mirror."

North Korea didn't need the Ukraine war to remind them of anything

The US unilaterally abandoned the nuclear negotiations with North Korea at the Hanoi summit. To placate neocons and US national security opposition to negotiations with North Korea, then President Trump said, "Sometimes you have to walk."

At the Hanoi summit, the US negotiating team, led by John Bolton, officially adopted the "one bundle" approach to denuclearization in North Korea. This is also known as the all or nothing approach, and the "Libyan approach." North Korea didn't need any more examples of US unwillingness to negotiate. The national security sector of the US economy, and the associated think tanks, academic endowments, and their spokesmen in the media, know that any success or rapprochement with North Korea jeopardizes the US alliance with Japan, which contrary to their public statements is adamantly opposed to negotiations with North Korea that are anything short of a total surrender. Therefore, no intermediate "step by step" process that relies on reciprocity and trust building among the parties can be allowed. Russia, China, South Korea, and North Korea, all favored the step by step approach.

The US military complex in northeast Asia has no raison d'etre without the ongoing 70 year conflict with North Korea. Proposals for negotiations with North Korea are just not taken seriously in the US. Claims that the US is open to negotiations with no conditions are just posturing for public relations purposes. Efforts by South Korea's Unification Ministry were vilified in US media during the entire Moon Jae-in administration while they were threatened with sanctions and told to get in "lock step" with the US and Japan which have zero consideration for Korean national aspirations. Regardless of the improvidence of the recent North Korea ICBM launch, the recent US-Japanese carrier strike force operating in the East Sea/ Sea of Japan merely cements North Korean perception of the hostile intent of both nations toward them. It's the same old gunboat diplomacy from both countries during the imperialist era of the 19th Century that they know so well after it culminated in two million or more deaths in Korea during the Korean conflict, and a brutal and oppressive Japanese occupation long before that.

Koreans didn't need Ukraine to remind them of anything. Japan wants to whitewash its past. The US ignores any Korean history before June 20 1950 and its saturation bombing campaigns thereafter that destroyed virtually everything in North Korea. US diplomats ask stupidly "why can't they get over it?" Koreans will never forget.

North Korea's missile testing blunder

The North Korean ICBM testing program appears to have begun before the March 9 presidential election with elements of the launch vehicle being tested before the election. Those launches were on Feb 25 and Mar 5 at the height of the election campaign in South Korea. The launches followed a a very active series of short range missile tests. In effect, the missile testing program bolstered the hardliner ( 강경파 ) viewpoint in South Korea, which Yoon Seok-yeol represents; the timing of the tests was very poorly considered by North Korea because it probably played a role in Yoon's razor thin election victory. Therefore, the increased missile launches pushed South Korea in the direction of the US-Japan alignment. Yoon is pro-Japan ( 친일파 親日派 ); his father as a professional academic was patronized by Japan. Yoon wants more THAAD missile batteries deployed and participation in the Quad, etc. Yoon rejects the Moon Jae-in "three no's policy" adopted after the first THAAD battery was deployed to repair relations with China. Yoon's proposed policies will provoke a breach in South Korean-Chinese relations and further prolong deadlocked relations with North Korea. This development is ideal from the neo-con perspective in the US.

North Korea's foreign policy analysts failed miserably. China and Russia should have discouraged Kim Jong-un from these missile tests or at least convince him to postpone them until after March 9. A change in South Korea's alignment in northeast Asia is now underway. It is deleterious from the point of view of those in South Korea who sought a step by step trust building approach to negotiations with North Korea rather than the "all or nothing" or "one bundle" or Libyan approach promoted by neo-cons dominating US foreign policy. The latter approach has no chance of success and only encourages greater instability in east Asia. What is lost in most analysis of North-South relations is the natural economic compatibility of the two portions of the Korean nation. The problem isn't just about nuclear weapons. Opening up limited social, cultural, and commercial exchanges between the two Korean states would have tangible diplomatic and security advantages. Unfortunately, South Korea is now back in "lock step," with the US, in a quasi-protectorate posture, where it will play little more than than the role of a US proxy.

A New International Security Structure Needed for Korea

An international security structure to replace the outdated cold war/civil war arrangements in Korea is needed. Until that structure is built step by step over time by difficult negotiations among the affected parties, some manifestation of the seventy year old US/UNC commitment that brought the Korean conflict to the stalemate currently in place needs to be maintained. The phrase "you broke it, you bought it" comes to mind.

There is a conceptual model of truth and reconciliation, in the current South Korean approach to North Korea, according to historian Bruce Cummings. Understanding the pathways of the civil war, and consideration of the perspectives of each party relative to the capacity for good or evil of each player in it, could allow a process of reconciliation. The US and Japan seem incapable of this approach, and are unable to depart from their mythology about who did what to whom in Korea or their anti-communist ideological obsession. Without breaking the cold war ideological framework in the US/Japanese/western perspective there will be no resolution. This is especially difficult now with the added nuclear dimension of the North Korean "threat," which is essentially a deterrent to guarantee DPRK survival.

It is not unrealistic to expect, that ultimately both Koreas would be inclined to have a security relationship with the US that permitted them to offset not only Chinese dominance, but that of Japan as well. A balanced US approach, that left commerce and other peaceful pursuits as the priority rather than incessant planning for the next war is desirable.

Instead of moving in this direction, the US moves toward another cold war.

Bruce Cummings, author of The Korean War, A History, is regarded as a "revisionist" by critics. To the contrary, the book portrays the historical currents in their ugly reality, outside the good guy, bad guy myth of the Korean conflict that satisfy US propaganda requirements. The US is overly reliant on wartime economics and the purported international legitimacy to which they are allegedly directed. Cummings points out, especially in the latter chapters, how the Korean Conflict generated the wartime state economy that we in the US, subsequently, were never really able to escape.

Without the expectation of some miraculous breakthrough, it would nevertheless be best if the US would allow South Korea to pursue the initiatives that they feel provide promise for a new future relationship with the North. Instead, what we see from the new administration is reflected on their updated web site yesterday:

Innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. We will continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime domain, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas. We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, and also confirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees.*

* Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad," MARCH 12, 2021: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/

The statement of the "Quad" represents a very one sided adoption of the Pompeo doctrine on China, and the Far East, by the Biden administration. The White House has tried to dress it up as some humanitarian endeavor, to try to make it more palatable to South Korea and others. The statement reflects the US/Japanese interpretation of UNCLOS and UN resolutions and explicitly adopts the Japanese approach to China and North Korea. Naturally, these documents and their application are interpreted differently in the Far East by the other parties.

There are recent quotes elsewhere from Ned Price at the State Department fixated on a "lockstep" approach from allies and that they all get on "the same page."* This in fact, is the formulaic attack on the South Korean view, previously directed by Pompeo. Mr. Price's allusions to the former administration's other expectation of "no daylight" among views of the "allies," means South Korea specifically. The dilemna, is more accurately described as more akin to an "I can't breathe" problem for Korean sovereignty.

* Blinken's trip to Asia will provide 'key ingredient' for U.S. policy toward N. Korea: Price, Yonhap Mar. 13. Byun Duk-kun: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210313000400325?input=tw

Biegun's last tour in Seoul characterized by self serving posture; US media's flaky leaflets campaign

In a December 10 article Yonhap News Agency described a talk given, in Seoul, by Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun who played a significant role as the US envoy for negotiations with North Korea. In the talk Biegun made self serving remarks blaming North Korea for the failure of nuclear talks with the US to go forward:

Reflecting on the deadlocked negotiation process, he expressed regrets over North Korean counterparts missing opportunities just in "search for obstacles."

"Regrettably, much opportunity has been squandered by our North Korean counterparts over the past two years, who too often have devoted themselves to the search for obstacles to negotiations instead of seizing opportunities for engagement," he said.*

*Biegun says diplomacy 'best' and 'only' course to resolving N.K. challenges, Yonhap News, Dec. 10; https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201210007900325

Let's look at how Reuters characterized the state of negotiations between the US and North Korea on Dec. 4, 2020:

Talks over reducing international sanctions on North Korea in return for concessions from Pyongyang broke down in the wake of a summit between Trump and Kim in Vietnam in February 2019, which ended with no deal.

Biegun’s visit comes as incoming U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has promised to reset relations with Seoul, which have been strained by Trump’s demand that South Korea pay billions of dollars more for maintaining the U.S. troop presence on the peninsula.

Relations between the allies were also complicated by South Korean frustrations with U.S. objections to some of its efforts to engage with North Korea.*

*U.S. envoy to visit South Korea next week: sources, Reuters staff, Dec. 4, 2020: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-northkorea-biegun/u-s-envoy-to-visit-south-korea-next-week-sources-idUSKBN28E1Y7


Note the use of the passive voice, talks "which ended with no deal," rather than the US walked out of the Hanoi Summit in a stunt designed for world wide media play. The US showed up at Hanoi to present a list of expanded demands not previously discussed, basically throwing Beigun's hints at a flexible negotiating posture out the window. The US posture presented a transparent bait and switch manuever designed to bring Kim Jong Un to the table for another momentous photo op for Trump with no substance. The US walk out embarrassed and humiliated the North Korean leader and gave the leadership group in North Korea a lesson in US duplicity it will likely never forget. The following June 2019 summit at Panmunjom was similar media stunt less embarrassing for Kim, but similarly conducted on the US side as a media event for Trump with no substance. Clearly Beigun bears some responsibility for this.

Beigun's role as the head of the US negotiating working group which ostensibly was to lay the groundwork for negotiations with North Korea, essentially devolved to blocking or otherwise frustrating South Korean initiatives with North Korea. The South Koreans were warned "not to get too far out in front," and "to get on the same page," as the US. US envoys said there can be "no daylight" between US and South Korean approaches. South Korean initiatives to open the liaison office with North Korea, and their military agreements to lower tensions along the DMZ, Joint Security Area, and Northern Limit Lines were criticized. North-South plans to survey, restore, and use the east coast and west coast railways were effectively blocked by US sanctions threats. Obviously, South Korea wanted to reopen the joint production facility at Kaesong, and the Geumgansan resort in North Korea. At one point a South Korean envoy was told by Washington, "don't bother coming to Washington" if you are going to bring up these plans.

The current wave of US "human rights" manufactured propaganda aimed against North Korea, and indirectly at South Korean diplomatic initiatives that present the prospect of success in relations with North Korea, involves US dismay that the North Korean defectors it sponsors in South Korea can no longer send balloons, drones, or other materials over the DMZ to North Korea. According to US propaganda, the prohibition on these dangerous activities impairs the "free speech" of South Koreans in general. This is absurd. No one has the right to go to the JSA and yell or otherwise transmit their personal political messages to North Korea. One could imagine the response of guards at the JSA to such activities. Is that restriction a "free speech" violation? Obviously not. Military and civilian activities along the DMZ and NLL are subject to severe restrictions. All flights within 20 km of the DMZ are restricted, and in the Eastern region of the DMZ the restrictions are extended to 40 km.

The notion that private individuals have a right to send airborne objects over the DMZ is absurd and militarily provocative. One cannot use their own loudspeakers along the DMZ either. Neither can the South Korean government according to the agreements it has made with the North. These are reasonable time, place and manner restrictions rather than an encroachment on free speech. These restrictions were negotiated by the freely elected government of South Korea and the criminal offenses related to these acts were legislated by the National Assembly. These laws serve the end of reducing the tensions along the DMZ and reducing the chance of incidents that may result in deadly escalations. US criticism in the Congress, executive branch, VOA and other venues represents blatant US interference in South Korean sovereignty.

The notion that the US knows better how to reach to North Korean people, or even that it cares about the North Korean people is simply not credible. In any case, no one is stopping the US from broadcasting its incessant propaganda to North Korea via VOA Korea or RFA. Worse, the US position on this issue, presumes that it and its paid North Korean defector NGOs know better how to negotiate with North Korea than the freely elected government of South Korea. Direct contact with South Korea and South Koreans, through diplomatic channels, limited economic projects, tourism, cultural exchanges, sports events, humanitarian aid, and public health cooperation, represent the best way to open North Korea to initiatives to encourage peace, prosperity, human rights and a path to denuclearization in the North. This is obviously the preferable course rather than the coercive US maximum pressure approach which punishes the North Korean people, encourages hostility, and has as its ultimate object, regime change. One thing the Hanoi summit clearly demonstrated is that the US has no genuine interest in negotiation but essentially is stalling for time while praying the North Korean communist regime will collapse from the "maximum pressure" being applied.

The blog has reviewed in several instances the "step by step approach" to negotiations favored by four of the original six parties, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and China. Reciprocity in step by step negotiations builds mutual trust in contrast to the all or nothing, "one bundle" or so called "Libyan approach" favored by the US and Japan. The outcome of the Libyan approach is demonstrably predictable. Mr. Biegun's feigned US flexibility portrayed in his public statements proved to be little more than window dressing for a hypocritical US regime change policy of maximum pressure. Blaming North Korea is the go to position for failed US negotiators.

Addendum 12.22

Ironically 38North.org published an article by Olli Heinonen Dec. 18, disputing the contention that there is a Uranium enrichment facility at Kangson. The article suggests the facility could be for manufacturing centrifuge components but is not an enrichment facility. Oddly, the article states in an aside that there must be such a "third facility" somewhere, but doesn't provide a basis for this assumption.*

New Evidence Suggests Kangson Is Not a Uranium Enrichment Plant, OLLI HEINONEN, Dec. 18; https://www.38north.org/2020/12/kangson201217/

I'm taking note of the article because according to Thae Yong-ho a well known North Korean defector in South Korea, and now a conservative National Assembly representative, the existence vel non of the so called Kangson secret enrichment facility was a dealbreaker at Hanoi. (See our discussion: Thae Yong Ho Says Secret Uranium Enrichment Facility Dealbreaker in Hanoi, March 14, 2019). In Beigun's January 31, 2019, presentation at Stanford, during the question and answer period, Beigun noted the pitfalls of confusing intelligence assessments and priorities with diplomatic policy goals. Noting the potential problem beforehand seemingly had no impact on the outcome of the summit. Allegedly, the US side's eagerness to test a dubious intelligence theory nevertheless resulted in the Hanoi Summit's theatrical denouement.

Art of Deception - conflicting US objectives in North and South Korea

A new article at Donga.com (Dong A Ilbo) implicitly confirms Donga Media original reports from April 23 onward that US reconnaissance aircraft identified Kim Jong-un moving about without assistance at his retreat near Wonsan, North Korea between April 14 and 20.

Both countries agree that the U.S.’s reconnaissance resources have played a role in identifying Kim Jong Un’s movements since he went under the radar after a Political Bureau meeting on April 11. ...

...A total of four reconnaissance planes were deployed last Friday when Kim appeared at the fertilizer plant. Some of the findings from such tight monitoring were shared with the South Korean government, which is why the South Korean government could confidently say that there was no unusual development in the North in addition to its internal intelligence. “The majority of the U.S.’s reconnaissance resources dedicated to Northeast Asia were deployed to the Korean Peninsula to identify Kim Jong Un’s movements,” said a diplomatic source.

*

*U.S. reconnaissance resources could increase pressure on S. Korea’s defense burden, by Gi-Jae Han and Kyu-Jin Shin; May. 06, 2020 07:42, Updated May. 06, 2020 07:42; http://www.donga.com/en/home/article/all/20200506/2055581/1/U-S-reconnaissance-resources-could-increase-pressure-on-S-Korea-s-defense-burden

According to the new Donga report, the US is now arguing that the intense reconnaissance effort is a basis for increased payments from South Korea for its share of US military costs in South Korea. This is main thrust of the new DongA article. Leaving the stalled SMA US- ROK negotiations aside for the moment, the key revelation is that US reconnaissance assets showed that Kim was alive and well. All this while the usual suspect assets, the defector groups, the think tanks, their web sites and flacks in the pliable media, asserted in all platforms available to them in South Korea, the US and Japan, as well the world generally, that Kim was critically ill after a heart procedure, in a coma, dying, or already dead. Not a word of this based upon a reliable source.

Due to the effectiveness of US reconnaissance the "Kim is dead" narrative was known to be false inside the US and South Korean governments, virtually the entire time, while mainstream media in the US pushed the story that Kim was a goner as hard as they could. This was a psychological warfare operation supplementing the usual regime change, maximum pressure campaign ongoing against North Korea. It's purpose was to foment instability in North Korea in the form of a potential succession crisis. That this duplicitous strategy should now be used to pressure South Korea to fork up a larger share of US military costs in South Korea is very unlikely to be successful.

Unfortunately for them, two well known North Korean defectors recently elected to the South Korean National Assembly on April 15, have been pilloried in South Korean political circles and press for their dubious contribution to the misinformation campaign about Kim's incapacity and demise, pressed primarily by the US and Japan. (The Japanese press went so far as to publish photo-shopped imagery and video of Kim Jong-un's face pasted onto his father's glass casket in the Palace of the Sun.) The South Korean perception of the credibility of Thae Yong-ho and Ji Song-ho have been seriously damaged by the episode. The question of their loyalty to South Korea is openly raised by politicians asking whether or not they are "spies." Ji had gone so far as to say "I'm 99 percent certain Kim Jong-un is dead," which essentially means he's either dumb or dishonest. Thae made a public apology to the people of South Korea in an attempt to redeem his impaired reputation.*

*North Korea defectors criticised over speculation Kim was ill or dead, Hyonhee Shin, Sangmi Cha Reuters May 4, 2020;
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-kim-defectors/north-korea-defectors-criticised-over-speculation-kim-was-ill-or-dead-idUSKBN22G0FS

One seriously has to question why South Korea would consider rewarding the US for efforts that did not actually lead to increased security on the peninsula but were neutralized simultaneously by a US effort that was, in effect, an agit-prop operation, designed to cause instability in it's nuclear armed neighbor to the north. At one and the same time it attempted unsuccessfully to undermine the credibility of the South Korean government. The latter now has a historic new mandate from the April 15 general election. Ambassador Harris' appearance in a May 1 video, demonstrating his interest in cooking skills during the conundrum, added a ridiculous patina to another serious US public relations failure in South Korea. Or was the effort to destabilize the North with disinformation plausibly deniable?

Channel A News S.Korea shows satellite images of Kim's Yacht offshore Wonsan

(Source- Channel A News, Political Desk, 4.29 youtube; original image source NK News/NK Pro) https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=13&v=zOULbSzNfmQ&feature=emb_logo

This report was televised April 29 on Channel A News (Donga media a conservative South Korean media company). In the first couple of minutes of the broadcast a few satellite photos from NK Pro are depicted, the latest of which shows the yacht offshore Wonsan, North Korea, on April 21. NK Pro has a paywall.

The Channel A News, Political Desk, broadcast program's guest expert, Chu Seong-eo, said the movements of the yacht suggest Kim has been present at the summer compound in spite of reports of his heart surgery, coma, death, etc.

The title of the program reflects the analysis that Kim is in need of rest at his summer facility near Wonsan since early April after a difficult time with sanctions, the public health efforts, etc. Kim had seen the building projects focused on tourism as a way to endure the sanctions regime, but the world wide corona virus epidemic forced him to close the country off from foreign visitors creating additional economic stress on the regime. Specifically, the report indicated that Kim was having a case of nerves, berating subordinates, and depression, and needed rest for that reason.

Number 3 in the party power structure Park Bong-ju was pictured in a factory setting in Pyongyang with a mask on on the 28th. He hadn't been seen since the 15th. Workers in the factory were shown wearing masks as well.

More on the Kim walking around in Wonsan story

This is just more confirmation on the Kim in Wonsan story broken by DongA media on April 23, which the blog commented on at that time. This report is basically being ignored in US, Japanese, and other so called mainstream media. The avalanche of English language reports started with the Daily NK report that Kim had had cardiovascular surgery and was in serious condition. A media and internet frenzy if not propaganda campaign followed in which Kim was variously described as in critical condition, in a coma, or dead. One report originating in Japan showed Kim in a badly photoshopped image taken of his father's glass display coffin. The Daily NK story had only one unidentified source alleged to be inside North Korea, but started an avalanche of speculative news reports around the world based on nothing but rumors and hearsay from unreliable sources. Donga.com has been updating their English language translation of their original report:


[exclusive] Kim Jong Un seen to be walking around in Wonsan, says U.S. official
Posted April. 25, 2020 10:23, Updated April. 27, 2020 09:00
jkim

It has been reported that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un who has recently become subject to rumors about his health moved to Wonsan to avoid COVID-19. The U.S. authorities captured Kim walking on his own.

“It has been identified that Kim Jong Un had been staying in Wonsan during the entire last week,” said a U.S. government official. “He was seen to be walking on his own between April 15 and 20.” It has been reported that the movements of Kim’s cars and close associates were also witnessed and Kim was walking on his own without help from others or being in a wheelchair. The U.S. authorities seem to have identified such information based on the analysis of radars and images captured by reconnaissance planes.

http://www.donga.com/en/home/article/all/20200425/2047198/1/Kim-Jong-Un-seen-to-be-walking-around-in-Wonsan-says-U-S-official

(Source- TBS, Kim Aw-joon News. 4.26) "김정은 건강이상설, 외신발 가짜뉴스 넘쳐... 정부 발표 신뢰해"(정세현 수석부의장)│김어준의 뉴스 Kim Jong-un's health critical story, foreign produced fake news...believe our government." Kim Aw-joon (left); Jeong Se-hyun (right)

In an interview April 26, Jeong Se-hyun, a former South Korean Unification Minister, with close ties to the current administration of South Korea, said the imagery that identified Kim Jong-un in Wonsan, North Korea, walking around with aides and associates, was from a reconnaissance aircraft rather than a satellite, and was clear with high resolution making Kim's identification possible. Jeong commented that stories in CNN and other US and foreign mainstream media were "fake news," and there was really no significant difference in opinion between the US and South Korea intelligence agencies in interpretation and significance of the shared intelligence information concerning their assessment of Kim's presence at Wonsan.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeong_Se-hyun

Jeong has considerably more expertise on North Korea, than anyone appearing or writing in the US media on this subject.

Kim Jong-un was observed at his Wonsan pad walking without assistance during the period from Apr 15 from Apr 20. I think imagery with a 7 to 10 centimeter resolution could easily identify Kim and his entourage at the facility. If there were any doubts they could potentially be dispelled by elint confirmation of related security movements and communications data. This is exactly what the earlier Donga exclusive report implied. I heard a South Korean expert on North Korea two days ago on a mainstream South Korean news broadcast confirm this view when he said it was a crucial judgement for the Blue House to determine that the need to assure the public was greater than the need to preserve secrecy concerning technical capabilities. The US government doesn't want to reveal the source of the information because of Trump's twitter blunder concerning a failed Iranian missile launch Aug 31, 2019, in which he publicized confidential satellite imagery to the public.

The source as reported in the original Donga reports was the US, as related by two South Korean government sources. The information was related to Donga media in an exclusive by 2 unnamed officials from the Ministry of Defense and the South Korean administration. This has been reported in South Korea for over three days now.

According to JTBC News April 26 an unnamed source from the Chinese International Liaison Office told them directly today that their team had gone to North Korea to advise Kim concerning coronavirus concerns by the North Korean government.

Kingmaker in North Korea?

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 4.24) Kim Il Sung (left); Kim Pyong-il (center); Thae Ku-min aka Thae Yong-ho (right)

According to an interview yesterday of Thae Yong-ho on Channel A News Top 10, Choe Ryong-hae is in a pivotal position as President and Vice Chairman of the State Affairs Committee to determine how any succession of leadership in North Korea proceeds in the event of the demise of Chairman Kim Jong-un.

As SPA president, Mr Choe is technically head of state, although real power in North Korea is wielded by Mr Kim and his immediate family.

Analysts say his appointment suggests a generational shift in the North's leadership, especially after the collapse of the Hanoi summit with Mr Trump in February.

Born in 1950, Mr Choe is considered Mr Kim's right-hand man – frequently referred to as the regime's "virtual number two official".

North Korea appoints Choe Ryong Hae as president, AFP April 12, 2019
https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/north-korea-appoints-choe-ryong-hae-as-president-1.848051

(Source-Arirang News, 4.25.20) Choe Ryong-hae

Kim Yo-jong derives most of her power from her brother Kim Jong-un. The other potential successor to Kim Jong-un is his uncle, Kim Pyong-il who is Kim Jong-il's brother. He returned from overseas after a lengthy diplomatic career as ambassador in Europe, where he was essentially in exile for decades. Kim Pyong-il is Kim Il-sung's son. Thae Yong Ho, did an analysis of Kim Pyong-il yesterday in which it was reported that he is under house arrest, since his return in November 2019, because he is a preferable contender for power among the current ruling elites, led by Vice Chairman Choe, who now in their sixties, went to the same schools he did and now serve in the top party positions. Kim Pyong-il always has been regarded as a potential threat to succession, but he has remained a modest public servant with a low political profile to survive. Thae Yong Ho met him overseas in a professional capacity three times according to his interview on Channel A News Top Ten, yesterday. Kim Pyong-il served as ambassador to Poland and Czech Republic in his later assignments. Thae, a North Korean defector from the DPRK embassy in London, was elected to the South Korean National Assembly April 25 from the upper crust Gangnam district in Seoul, as a United Future Party Candidate. (Thae Yong-ho changed his name just before the election for some reason, now it's Thae Ku-min)

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 4.24) Kim Pyong-il (left)

Thae's assessment is that there could be a power struggle or purge in the event of Kim's demise, while the old guard clings to the past and regards Kim Yo-jong as too young and inexperienced to rule. Thae prefers that Kim Yo-jong succeed Kim Jong-un. The program depicted Kim Yo-jong as isolated in the top echelons of power in North Korea. Even a nominal succession by her to power would be subject to resistance under the surface by the older and more experienced cadre of party elites who allegedly identify with Kim Pyong-il. The scenario presented is the classic maneuvering that takes place around the royal family before succession during the Chosun dynasty.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Pyong-il

Kim Jong Un observed walking around Wonsan

Channel A News reported in an exclusive that Kim Jong Un has been observed walking around in the Wonsan area without assistance. They believe he's been there for at least four days between the 15 and 20 April.

Relying on two unidentified South Korean government and military related sources, The Channel A report indicated they got this information from an unidentified US administration source:

(Source- Channel A News 4.23, youtube upload)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jK-fxwaWuI0

Analysts speculated that he was there to avoid risk of covid 19 infection in Pyongyang. The image shown above appears to be from a file video. The related DongA.com news exclusive report says that US analysts made this assessment based on electronic and imagery analysis.* DongA media owns Channel A news. According the Donga.com report, the US source said Kim Jong-un's health status was subject to further consideration by analysts.

*[단독] 美당국자 “김정은 원산서 걷는 모습 포착”
워싱턴=김정안 특파원 , 한상준 기자 , 황인찬 기자 , 도쿄=박형준 특파원입력 2020-04-24 03:00수정 2020-04-24 03:30
http://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20200424/100787903/1

The new W76-2 low-yield Trident submarine warhead and North Korea?

William Arkin, one of the authors of the FAS article on the new “tactical” warhead on a strategic nuclear missile (which doesn’t make any sense) appeared on the Democracy Now program. He made it clear the new nuclear weapon is more likely to be targeted at North Korea or Iran.* Firing such a weapon at Russia makes no sense at all. Arkin explores the convoluted logic of theories related to such a limited nuclear attack on Russian targets in the article.

*US Deploys New Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead
Posted on Jan.29, 2020 in Nuclear Weapons, Russia, United States by Hans M. Kristensen
By William M. Arkin* and Hans M. Kristensen
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/01/w76-2deployed/

It's quite likely that a target of the new "tactical" nuclear warhead on the submarine launched ballistic missile is North Korea. The weapon appears to be specifically designed to destroy a deeply hardened target in a tactical environment. The US conventional military tactic of “decapitation” of North Korean leadership has been discussed openly in South Korean media in recent years. It never seemed practical, a special operations tactic to resolve a strategic problem.*

*Shin In-Kyun describes North Korean attack scenarios, May 1, 2019
https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2019/05/shin-in-kyun-describes-north-korean.html

Some expert observers of North Korea regardless of their political persuasion regarded the "bloody nose," or any conventional military attack on North Korea as completely "off the table." Potentially, the new Trident low yield nuclear weapon is being deployed for the same decapitation mission. Yet, it looks as if the new Trident warhead would elicit the very response from North Korea that it's use is allegedly designed to preclude, a barrage of ballistic missiles on friendly targets. The unreasonable response one could anticipate from the North Korea leadership, in reaction to a limited "tactical" nuclear attack by the US wouldn’t conform, to the logic or illogic if you prefer, of US nuclear game theory. Coincidentally, authoritative sources emphasized that the US carrier strike force recently deployed to the Indo-Pacific had an ABM mission as there are multiple aegis equipped surface warships associated with the carrier.*

*Korean focus on Carrier Strike Group deployment? Jan. 23, 2020
https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2020/01/korean-focus-on-carrier-strike-group.html

Additionally, General John E. Hyten, Vice Chairman, JCS, made a widely circulated public statement about that time that he had 100 percent confidence in the strike force’s ability to deal with North Korean missile threats. The presentation of a potential first strike by a low yield nuclear weapon combined with a highly effective ABM capability suggests in the case of North Korea, a scenario, where a first strike, such as a decapitation strike, could be undertaken with confidence, if not impunity. This is not the case, because the irregular trajectories and terminal guidance of several of the North Korean short range ballistic missiles fired last year presented detection and tracking problems for the US, South Korea and Japan. This was the observation of media military and intelligence analysts in South Korea, which exacerbated concerns about the temporary South Korean withdrawal from GSOMIA, an intelligence sharing agreement among the three countries directed exactly at just such a threat. For those who may consider discussion of this scenario off base, keep in mind recent events involving the assassination of General Soleimani, which was a type of decapitation mission, and then the apparent absence of any effective defense against the subsequent Iranian ballistic missile barrage. These nominally unrelated events reflect national security thinking in Washington, D.C. and are intended to convey a message to North Korea.

In any case, if one were to consider the response from North Korea due to a “decapitation” attack with a small yield weapon like the W-76-2, let’s assume it succeeds with the precision and accuracy the new weapons are believed to have. Then in the aftermath of such an attack there remains a nuclear armed North Korea with unknown military commanders in unknown bunkers deciding what the response, if any, should be. Perhaps following US game theory they would decline to escalate the nuclear conflict. Or perhaps they wouldn’t. On the other hand, if the location of the bunker, or Kim Jong-un, was not precisely ascertained, and consequently the chairman or his successor survived, even for only for a brief time, a question arises about what would happen at that point. If one considers the desperation of the moment, the uncertainty, the confusion, and the likelihood of total destruction at the hands of the US military's vastly superior nuclear forces, what is the likely reaction of the North Korean leader? This thought arises, “Even though futilely suicidal, would he not respond in kind with nuclear armed ballistic missiles capable of reaching US bases in the region, where US and allied forces and command and control elements were plainly vulnerable?” Is this not in fact, exactly what would occur, given the ideological basis of North Korean communist doctrine and its self conscious role as the sacrificial victim of great power imperialism? Does the current deployment of US anti-ballistic missile forces in the region really give 100 percent assurance that this wouldn't be an effective response?

Conclusion, a “decapitation” attack with a “smaller” tactical nuclear warhead by the US would likely eventuate in a series of nuclear weapons detonating in the region.

Thae Yong Ho on the corona virus and public health in North Korea

(Source- 태영호TV -ThaeYongHoTV, 2.2.2020) "South Korean - North Korean collaborative handling is the best and easiest method."

Sanctions, privatization, and "self sufficient" agriculture in North Korea will promote the spread of the new coronavirus according to Thae Yong Ho. With virtually no fertilizer or fuel due to sanctions, farmers and others use excrement for fertilizer, and have animals living with them in their living quarters.

Uncharacteristically for the outspoken opponent of the North Korean dictatorship, Thae recommended cooperation by South Korea and the international community to provide equipment, facilities and organization to contain the Wuhan virus. He said the North Korean public health resources are wholly inadequate to cope with the health care challenge and noted the spread of the Asian swine flu virus across the DMZ into South Korea last year as proof of Northern incapacity.

Thae said that it was necessary for the North's communist leader to swallow his pride and request assistance.

In today's analysis, Thae points out the Chinese are the airway for North Korea in a time when sanctions restrict access to resources and capital. This is the peak season for smuggling across the Tumen and Amur rivers for the Jangmajang private enterpreneurs in North Korea, when the rivers are frozen. According to Thae the border guards and army will not be able to stop the smuggling across the northern frontier to bring Chinese goods to the private marketplaces. So the official quarantine at the border from China will not be effective. In addition North Korea's lack of public health facilities, equipment, supplies and skills will make definitive identification, diagnosis and treatment of any of those infected difficult.

(Source - [태영호TV]-ThaeYongHoTV [북핵외교 심층분석]-Nuclear Diplomacy-Ep-8 김정은의 신종 코로나작전, 한국의 대응은? 2.3.10) The unfavorable Wuhan virus, "but a good opportunity for peace on the Korean peninsula is also possible."

Due to the state of chronic malnutrition among workers and children, immune systems are weakened, and recovery from infection will be problematic. According to Thae if the epidemic penetrates to the heart of North Korea, Kim is concerned that the military could collapse. Construction projects which heavily depend on concentrations of manual labor both from the Army and civilians will need to be stopped. The party policy of reviving the economy by self reliant methods and the "frontal breakthrough" policy are in jeopardy of complete failure per Thae. (8:27) In fact, he says it is all but certain.

The official closing of the North Korean border with China cuts off both the tourist trade and the export of labor both of which supply North Korea with dearly needed foreign cash. Kim is actually in a position of supplication to China at this point. Awkwardly, he has officially stopped international commerce because of the Wuhan virus but at the same time he is hat in hand, asking China for continued financial support. A preferable alternative according to Thae is to turn to the South for the assistance. Kim needs to cope with the Wuhan virus which North Korea is otherwise incapable of responding to as a practical matter because of sanctions and diplomatic isolation. In this episode, Thae recommended that the South Korean government take the initiative and offer to assist North Korea with the public health challenges presented. While China and North Korea may be as "close as lips and teeth," as the Chinese saying goes, it is the Korean people who are family in fact, and should work together to resolve the situation. Thae acknowledges that the offers of assistance cannot take place in the absence of an admission that the assistance of the South is necessary to meet the needs of North Korean citizens, and this will be instrumental in moving North Korea off the dime in terms of a peaceful future for Korea.

One added benefit from the South Korean right wing perspective, beside the prospect of undermining North Korean domestic legitimacy in this situation, is that regardless of the North Korean response, unilateral offers of assistance from the South will no doubt be subject to widespread criticism by the right wing media of South Korea, and US media, in a key period before the April 15 general elections. So, such recommendation, if followed, for the sake of improved dialogue on the peninsula and the chance to actually improve the public health situation, peninsula wide, could present multiple ongoing opportunities for heavy criticism by right wing opposition in South Korea. Taking advantage of pandemic panic could turn the public discussion away from the other significant achievements by the current democratic administration in South Korea.

Korean focus on Carrier Strike Group deployment?

Some of the South Korean media broadcasts have reported on the deployment of the Theodore Roosevelt Strike Group. The deployment is reported as an Indo-Pacific cruise, but the South Korean focus is naturally on the possible relationship to the stalemated denuclearization talks with North Korea.

SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (TRCSG) departed San Diego for a scheduled Indo-Pacific deployment, Jan. 17...

...TRCSG consists of Carrier Strike Group 9, USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11, the Ticonderoga class guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), Destroyer Squadron 23, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Russell (DDG 59), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), USS Pinckney (DDG 91), USS Kidd (DDG 100) and USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115).*

*Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group Departs for Deployment
Story Number: NNS200118-02Release Date: 1/18/2020 12:11:00 PM
From Carrier Strike Group 9 Public Affairs
https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=111880

The US Navy also reports that in Japan, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) is in port in Yokosuka. and USS America (LHA-6) is underway.*

* https://news.usni.org/2020/01/20/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-jan-20-2020

Military analysts in South Korea have noted that should the Strike Group operate in the seas around Japan, the force levels will look similar to that during the "the fire and fury" tensions with North Korea of 2017. Recently according to South Korean media reports, military officials indicated that they expected spring training exercises in South Korea to be of a similar subdued nature as those of last year. I think the regular armored brigade rotation is probably completed by now. Some South Korean analysts opined that the regular rotation of ground forces was reported by the US Defense Department sources with publicly available video of the movement, to assure allies in the region.

An election campaign season with voting on April 15 for the new National Assembly in South Korea, free of any provocations or incidents related to the current deadlock in North Korean nuclear talks would be ideal. Unfortunately, the recent public statements from North Korea are not reassuring. If they do conduct more missile tests, especially long range tests, or any nuclear testing, it will probably have a further adverse affect on regional security, inter-Korean relations and the character of the campaign season in South Korea.

Joe Biden wouldn't meet Kim Jong Un without preconditions.

This is the story on the VOA website reported from Seoul:

Biden: No Meeting With Kim Jong Un Absent Preconditions
By William Gallo
January 15, 2020 04:16 AM

SEOUL - Democratic presidential frontrunner Joe Biden says he would not meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un without preconditions. It is the latest evidence Biden would overturn parts of U.S. President Donald Trump’s outreach to Pyongyang.

"Not now, I wouldn’t meet without any preconditions," Biden said Tuesday during a Democratic debate in the midwestern state of Iowa. "Look, we gave him everything he’s looking for. The president showed up, met with him, gave him legitimacy, weakened the sanctions we have against him."

https://www.voanews.com/usa/biden-no-meeting-kim-jong-un-absent-preconditions

Gallo is the VOA editor in Seoul. He continues to surprise me, or I wouldn't bother posting a VOA article. I pretty much watch VOA Korea podcasts every day which are standard anti North Korean propaganda one would expect. The daily podcasts are in Korean, of course, because that's the target audience. VOA's Washington Talk program, which is posted on youtube on Saturdays, tends to be more in depth, and the speakers are US "experts," on Korean affairs, or at least experienced Korea hands. Their discussion in English is translated into Korean subtitles. I've been watching these programs and others regularly for three years. Occasionally, they get a dissenting view on there, but usually there is a consensus that everything is either the fault of Chairman Kim, or a mistake by President Moon Jae-in. The idea that Moon Jae-in, the president of South Korea would know more about Korean affairs than an American is never considered. Apologia for Trump's approach are sometimes offered when he is so far off base something has to be said, but the usual practice concerning US missteps, miscalculations and blunders is to omit them or deny their existence.

To his credit, Mr. Gallo's written material here concerning Mr. Biden's view on North Korean negotiations exposes the former Vice President's incompetence. The view that Chairman Kim has been granted "legitimacy" by Trump's approach, summits, letters, etc., is amateur diplomatic claptrap, put out by persons who have nothing more substantial to say concerning the deadlocked negotiations. The notion that Trump has weakened sanctions is absurdly incorrect. Tim Shorrock, an expert commentator and journalist concerning Korean affairs, has written how sad it is, that Democrats have this proclivity to attack Trump's haphazard approach from the right. Trump's impulsive approach includes threats of war, inappropriate gushing about his great personal relationship with Kim Jong-un, and infinite faith in his top down approach. Increased calls for sanctions and demands for North Korean capitulation, alternate with facile and vague promises of a "bright future", and reassurances that the US is "not a threat." Trump evidently feels this inconsistent and hostile approach is concealed by his personal charm and deft negotiating skills. One need only observe the current Iran debacle he and his cabinet have engineered since the withdrawal from the JCPOA. All this however does not absolve Mr. Biden's ignorant and factually incorrect statement.

Gallo's subtlety is that he let's Mr. Biden's statement speak for itself. The statement reveals Mr. Biden has no insight into the Northeast Asian political dilemma, and at the same time has a factually mistaken comprehension of the sanctions regime in effect against North Korea. One can see for themselves if they are familiar with the facts and have followed the negotiations, that Mr. Biden is entirely lacking in the judgement and insight that he purportedly claims to have as a result of his "extensive" foreign policy experience. So the presumptive emperor in waiting as it were, has no clothes, and Mr. Gallo, is a credit to VOA for not attempting to conceal the embarrassing truth.

The Art of Denuclearization

(Source- BK News Briefing 12.12.19 ) Clearly South Korea is one of the parties suffering greatest harm from the mutual distrust between the US and North Korea.

(Source- BK News Briefing 12.12.19 ) Strange, a clever way to protect the mutual promises of the US and North Korea from ever being broken never emerged.

The US special envoy to North Korea for the negotiations, Stephen Biegun, arrived in Beijing today after visiting Seoul and Tokyo, prompting a lot of hopeful speculation in the South Korean media as to whether Choe Son-hui, the North Korean vice Minister of Foreign Affairs or some other North Korean negotiator might show up. Biegun declined to give any statements when he arrived at the airport.

This is a related development:

State Department North Korea envoy confirmed as deputy secretary of state
By Jennifer Hansler, CNN

Updated 5:56 PM ET, Thu December 19, 2019

https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/19/politics/steve-biegun-deputy-secretary-of-state-confirmation/index.html

After the abortive attempt to resume working level negotiations between Biegun and Kim Myong Gil, at Stockholm, last October, Biegun complained that Kim the North Korean working level envoy, wasn't senior enough and didn't really have authority to negotiate. Envoy Kim said that the US side brought nothing new to the table and broke off those talks reciprocating the US side's earlier behavior at the Hanoi summit. Biegun had requested to meet with Choi Son Hui at one point but she had said that Biegun himself was a lower level official. So in Stockholm, Kim Myong Gil was what he got. Kim Hyuk Chol, the prior North Korean envoy, disappeared after the Hanoi debacle. Biegun's appointment to Deputy Secretary seems the latest move in the "you're not senior enough" game.

Maximum Pressure leading to Maximum Failure?

(Source- JTBC News, 11.9) Kim Yong Chol, "We are a people with nothing more to lose." Chyron: Warning- "We can go back to the relationship that existed before the US-North Korean dialogue."

The obstacle to progress in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea is still the fundamental confrontation over the step by step method versus the all or nothing, no concessions, no trust building approach favored by US officials, elected or otherwise. Most Korea "experts" inside the beltway echo chamber just refuse to acknowledge this fundamental shortcoming in the US diplomatic approach which is first a process issue, and then secondarily a matter of great substantial importance. Either that, or they just want regime change in North Korea and can't imagine bargaining with the communist dictatorship under any circumstances other than complete capitulation by the North, often referred to as the Libyan approach.

"Sanctions have reached a point of diminishing returns. It is unlikely, therefore, that more “maximum pressure,” without a diplomatic strategy that offers Pyongyang positive inducements to negotiate steps toward denuclearization, will deliver results." Richard Nephew

Furious Futility: Maximum Pressure in 2020
BY: RICHARD NEPHEW
NOVEMBER 15, 2019
https://www.38north.org/2019/11/rnephew111519/

Town said North Korea has previously indicated a willingness to give up parts of its nuclear program as a first-phase deal, but not to discuss complete denuclearization up front.

“The North Koreans have always preferred a step by step approach rather than negotiating everything all at once,” Town said. (Jenny Town, editor of 38North.org.)

North Korea's U.N. envoy says denuclearization off negotiating table with United States
Michelle Nichols, David Brunnstrom
Dec. 7, 2019
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa/north-koreas-u-n-envoy-says-denuclearization-off-negotiating-table-with-united-states-idUSKBN1YB0FG


This is also the preference of Russia, China, and South Korea.

SEOUL - A senior adviser to South Korea's president expressed a broad range of frustrations at U.S. policy toward North Korea, saying Washington has not adequately empowered Seoul to play a mediating role with Pyongyang.

In an interview with VOA, Jeong Se-Hyun, who advises South Korean President Moon Jae-in on unification issues, also said the U.S. should offer more incentives to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.

"Don't act as if you're offering a carrot while really you are using a stick," said Jeong. "North Korea must first be given carrots. Then if that doesn't work, you use a whip."

As North Korea's Deadline Approaches, South Pushes US for Progress
By William Gallo VOA News
December 01, 2019 10:04 AM
https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/north-koreas-deadline-approaches-south-pushes-us-progress

Achieving security and stability and reducing catastrophic risks on the peninsula will require intensive, expert-level negotiations and comprehensive, step-by-step implementation over many months and years. This broader effort cannot be viewed solely as a bilateral U.S.-North Korean discussion. It also must include China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia and address the security and political concerns of all the parties, including economic and humanitarian matters.

Economic, military, and diplomatic pressure helped bring the North Koreans to the table, but reaching a successful agreement will require carrots as well as sticks. Ernst J. Moniz and Sam Nunn

Lynn Rusten and Richard Johnson with Steve Andreasen and Hayley Anne Severance, Building Security Through Cooperation: Report of the NTI Working G roup on Cooperative Threat Reduction with North Korea (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019), 2, https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_DPRK2019_RPT_FNL.pdf. (from the forward by Ernst J. Moniz and Sam Nunn)

The necessary operating principle taken from the September 5, 2005 Six Party Talks:

And yet, a year and a half have passed. To move forward, the two countries should agree as a baseline on the fifth clause of the fourth round of the September 2005 Six-Party Talks: “The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the… consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action.” Wada Haruki

Overcoming the San Francisco System: One Japanese Person’s View
Wada Haruki, with an introduction by Alexis Dudden, December 1, 2019
Asia-Pacific Journal, Volume 17,| Issue 23, Number 3, Article ID 5331
https://apjjf.org/2019/23/Wada.html

Liar's Poker in Stockholm

When I saw this story on KBS 24 live on youtube, they said that the North Koreans complained that the US hadn’t changed its position. The report said the US representative Stephen Biegun wouldn’t talk to reporters because it wasn’t appropriate to reveal their reaction publicly. Reporters believed that Biegun went to the US embassy rather than stay at the facilities where the talks were being held. The plans of the NK delegation were not clear at the time. The speculation was that it was the old “one bundle” approach of the US v. the step by step approach. The immediate harsh North Korean undiplomatic statements at the scene, after the Stockholm meeting, appear similar to what Trump, Bolton and company did to the North at the summit in Hanoi.

I’m kind of surprised because the Washington Talk on VOA Korea by the two well connected experts they had on Saturday, seemed cautious but upbeat. Most genuine experts seem to know the structure of a deal that could work, I wonder if any were formulated beforehand or if Biegun’s team is just playing liar's poker. The dialogue imagined looks like this, “you have to come off the dime first;” “no you have to make the first offer;” “what did you bring to the table?” “what did you bring to the table?” “You have to define denuclearization and the end stage first;” “no, it’s step by step, with reciprocal trust building measures;” “no that isn’t how it works;” “Okay, bye, we see you haven’t changed a bit, why did you bother?”

Biegun clearly knows better from his presentation at Stanford that was used to sucker the North Koreans at Hanoi. To his credit at his last major policy presentation on North Korea, his views were even less promising and really offered no daylight for the North Koreans in terms of changing the US policy position. To be realistic Kim Jong Un's negotiating team isn't negotiating with Trump, it's negotiating with the entire US government and private establishment with vested interests in the so called San Francisco system that supports US national security in the "Indo- Pacific." These people aren't negotiating, they're in the regime change business. Domestically, Trump is so weak at this point it's unlikely he's capable of offering a negotiating process the North Korean's can accept, let alone make substantive concessions. This is what he found out after Singapore.