Deja vu- Decapitation Strategy

The "preemptive attack/decapitation scenario" will be played out during the summer US-ROK CFC summer military exercises according to an article in the Daily Beast, US to Enrage Kim Jong-un with Assassination Dry Run.*

For the first time in years, joint exercises between the U.S. and South Korea this month will culminate in a trial run of decapitating the North Korean leadership.

According to David Maxwell, retired Special Forces Colonel, "If you get the head of the military forces (which is Kim Jong-un) theoretically you gut (sic) the head of the snake."

Several questions arise in connection with the preemptive attack scenario. Namely, how do US forces ascertain the location of Kim Jong Un? Second how do they move into position without being detected crossing the maritime northern limit lines and the extended buffer zones around them? Third how do they succeed in obtaining permission from South Korean political and military leadership to carry out such a risky attack? Fourth, how do they avoid the risk of a nuclear retaliation against US targets in South Korea and the region? How do they avoid the risk of a conventional retaliation against urban areas such as Seoul? Fifth, what preparations have they made for a Chinese military intervention when their security interests inside North Korea are jeopardized? It should be noted that even right wing experts on the situation in North Korea, such a Victor Cha, and Thae Yong-ho, have warned against preemptive military attack on North Korea as a means to resolve the denuclearization stalemate in the past.

It's quite likely that a target of the new "tactical" nuclear warhead on the submarine launched ballistic missile is North Korea. The weapon appears to be specifically designed to destroy a deeply hardened target in a tactical environment. The US conventional military tactic of “decapitation” of North Korean leadership has been discussed openly in South Korean media in recent years. It never seemed practical, a special operations tactic to resolve a strategic problem.

In any case, if one were to consider the response from North Korea due to a “decapitation” attack with a small yield weapon like the W-76-2, let’s assume it succeeds with the precision and accuracy the new weapons are believed to have. Then in the aftermath of such an attack there remains a nuclear armed North Korea with unknown military commanders in unknown bunkers deciding what the response, if any, should be. Perhaps following US game theory they would decline to escalate the nuclear conflict. Or perhaps they wouldn’t. On the other hand, if the location of the bunker, or Kim Jong-un, was not precisely ascertained, and consequently the chairman or his successor survived, even for only for a brief time, a question arises about what would happen at that point. If one considers the desperation of the moment, the uncertainty, the confusion, and the likelihood of total destruction at the hands of the US military's vastly superior nuclear forces, what is the likely reaction of the North Korean leader? This thought arises, “Even though futilely suicidal, would he not respond in kind with nuclear armed ballistic missiles capable of reaching US bases in the region, where US and allied forces and command and control elements were plainly vulnerable?” Is this not in fact, exactly what would occur, given the ideological basis of North Korean communist doctrine and its self conscious role as the sacrificial victim of great power imperialism? Does the current deployment of US anti-ballistic missile forces in the region really give 100 percent assurance that this wouldn't be an effective response?

This is why Thae Yong-ho refers to the North Korean strategy as a "doomsday machine."

*US to Enrage Kim Jong-un with Assassination Dry Run, by Donald Kirk, The Daily Beast, Aug 3, 2022.
https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-to-enrage-kim-jong-un-with-assassination-dry-run

One China Policy legal review claims the Allies have title to Taiwan

Currently there are disputes about the "One China" policy and what it means. One, admittedly older, penumbral style legal analysis of the One China policy and what it purportedly means runs through a historical examination of the events leading to the current ambiguity or dissimulation, if you prefer, giving rise to the dispute over what the One China policy means. Frank Chiang's law review article merits review.* Some no doubt will find the legal discussion supportive of their view that the One China policy means something other than one China. In other words those who agree that Taiwan is not in fact Chinese territory may like the article. The opinion expressed here, is that the logic applied in the legal thesis is specious and fanciful, satisfying foreign policy objectives of the US, UK, Japan, and Taiwan separatists.

*One-China Policy and Taiwan, Y. Frank Chiang (2004)
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1950&context=ilj

(Source- USNI Oct. 4) US aircraft carriers Vinson and Reagan with HMS Queen Elizabeth, and the Japanese small carrier Ise. Taiwan News reported these ships operating north of Taiwan, October 3 and 4, with 13 other allied warships. .:
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4306367


After reading the detailed history, in Chiang's lengthy law review article, it appears that the west engaged in the kind of prevarication and equivocation with China that characterized prior agreements with Cuban and Philippine independence fighters and indigenous American peoples and Hawaiian natives before that. One Asian statesmen not too long ago, referred to a US diplomat as a long haired general on horseback, a sharp characterization of how current US Asian policy does resemble earlier treatment of indigenous Americans in the not too distant past. Present US equivocation (or doubletalk) on the One China policy by the Biden administration, clearly takes the form of 19th Century gunboat diplomacy. The administration attempts to treat China as some third rate power that it can it fool and intimidate, while making transparently false representations that it isn't seeking confrontation.

Japan's war against China began in 1894 in the Sino-Japanese War. It was this Japanese war that resulted in the Treaty of Shimonoseki and Japan's annexation of Taiwan. This US/UK/Japanese/Taiwan legal theory postulates that this treaty conveyed legitimate "title of Taiwan" to Japan. Further, when the KMT occupied Taiwan after Japan's defeat in WW II they did not get "title" to Taiwan but were only authorized by MacArthur to administer Taiwan as the "agent of the Allied Powers." (Not suprisingly the western diplomats, according to the account, deprived the KMT of their own agency with a treaty device). While Japan was divested of its "title" to Taiwan, after its defeat in WW II, title did not then vest in the KMT because the provisions of the Treaty of San Francisco did not give "title" to Taiwan to them. Nor did any subsequent treaty. According to the author, the Allied Powers were the vested successors in interest to the Taiwan "title" and this really hasn't changed since. At one point in this discusion, Chiang admits his view that as a practical matter, "title" to Taiwan, actually rests in the United States. This imperial theory posits that the promises made to China concerning the return of Taiwan to China at Cairo and Potsdam were not implemented because leaders of the US and UK didn't want to give it to them and expressions of the Allies intent at those wartime conferences were allegedly without legal significance or import. Note that no equitable theory is raised. This contrived legal argument is then used to undermine the One China policy statements in the three communiques issued by more recent US presidents. The claim purports to distinguish the "acknowledgement" by the US of the PRC's position on Taiwan, contending that an "acknowledgement" is not an "acceptance of" or "acquiescence to" the PRC position that Taiwan is part of one China.

The attempted repudiation of promises made at Cairo and Potsdam to China, which the US and UK left out of the San Francisco Treaty while upholding nonsense legalisms about Shimonoseki, demonstrate the 19th Century imperial mindset that potentially could result in a major war. Americans in general can't live with indefiniteness. Consequently, the current public sentiment, exploited by the administration and the Pentagon for that matter can simply be expressed as, "US right and China wrong." This western attitude of superiority is historically racially based and ethnocentric in nature. Nevertheless, the days of the great white fleet are long over, Americans just don't realize it yet. The typical American response in support of Taiwan independence now, and rejection of the One China policy is that too much time has passed, that was then, this is now. No one can really make a persuasive adverse possession argument, because the mainland government never gave up its national claim to Taiwan.

Frank Chiang's law review article isn't very persuasive. Not surprisingly, parts of it previously appeared in some Japanese journal. If you follow the logic of the Shimonoseki argument, the Chinese should take Taiwan by force because according to the author of this law review article that's a legitimate way to get "title," by force. Take possession at gunpoint, then force the former political leadership, under duress, to sign a "treaty." In conclusion, the author goes on to talk about the principle of self determination and how the US and others should call for a UN sponsored referendum on independence. Similar shenanigans preceded the US-Vietnam War and the Korean War which were manipulated by the US as exigencies arose. The US divided those countries and laid the groundwork for devastating wars in which millions died. Such a plan would be vetoed by the Security Council today, and wouldn't even pass in the General Assembly.

On the "Changing Nuclear Balance."

A response to Peter Heussey's, September 29. article in The National Interest, "The Nuclear Balance is Changing- and Not for the Better" *

* https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-balance-changing%E2%80%94and-not-better-194526

The US proclivity to entertain the use of nuclear weapons when its conventional military campaign is in jeopardy in an actual confllct is ignored in the Heussey article. Ostensibly, the US motives are pure, and it is the other who would resort first to nuclear weapons. It was the US that considered the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. During WW II of course, the US did use nuclear weapons. During the second Iraq War, the US adopted a nuclear strike response doctrine that would apply if it were to suffer unexpected battlefield reversals or if its forces experienced any sort of special weapons attack.

Part of the current problem is the decreasing relative dominance of US forces in the Chinese theater usually characterized as the rise of China. While think tanks readily entertain the vision of US conventional superiority in armed force projection, it is at least, in part, an illusion based on assumptions such as the ability to shut off Chinese lines of communication, choking its industrial infrastructure with naval and air blockades and so forth. This conventional military view, as conceived in the US think tank studies, is convincingly disputed by a few US experts on Chinese military capabilities. The US tends to take a static or very mechanical view, which fails to entertain the disadvantages the US has, such as its distance from the battlespace, numerical force limits, the possibility of even partially effective Chinese blockades of strategic straits to its own near seas, the possibility of successful Chinese interdictions in aerospace and open Pacific waters, and the prospect of potential destruction of US forward bases in Japan and elsewhere. It also rules out Chinese strategic depth, and the eventuality of a long war which will attrite US forces and national resources. While Chinese losses would be great also, if not catastrophic, as the defender of its home territory, their level of commitment would be much higher than that of the US. Far from harming CCP legitimacy and cohesion, a long conflict will enhance the bond of party and people. Many historical studies confirm this phenomenon in major wars where civilian populations are subject to attack by a foreign enemy.

Pursuing the natural US inclination to regain a decisive initiative in war with China, the US leadership will entertain using nuclear weapons to extract themselves from a prolonged conventional conflict from which they otherwise would be unable to withdraw, except at great political cost. It is unlikely that Russia would be a deterrent to US use of nuclear weapons on Chinese targets. In US game theory, the Chinese would presumably back down because of the overwhelming US advantage in nuclear weapon delivery systems. Therefore, unless the current Chinese buildup and improvements in their nuclear weapon delivery capability are stopped in the near future, the US will be faced with the inability to exert nuclear blackmail, and be effectively deterred from initiating tactical nuclear first strikes. Then the US would have to live with a growing inability to successfully end a conventional conflict which, as time goes by, will also become more unfavorable to the forces fighting far from home. It is doubtful that the US will find a technological fix in the form of new weapons systems or countermeasures to resolve this situation, so the diplomatic route of seeking nuclear arms control with China is sought.

What's in it for the Chinese? Nothing, so far. What can the US offer? The last two administrations worked the US into a corner, surrounding the Chinese with the modern version of gunboat imperialism, ostensibly giving the US insurmountable conventional warfare advantages, that it enjoyed in the 19th and 20th centuries. It's another tragic case of US illusions about China leading us on a path to another disastrous war, one on a scale probably not seen since WW II. A much weaker China fought a conventional conflict with a nuclear armed US during the Korean War. If its own territory or armed forces are attacked by the US (and any misguided allies), it will do so again.

In terms of the Peter Huessey article, US determination to maintain a "nuclear firebreak" rings hollow, as it the US that has developed smaller and smaller yield "precision" nuclear weapons. The US has an extensive arsenal of sophisticated "tactical" and arguably first use nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. It is the US that has created a pneumbral zone where the boundary between conventional and nuclear strikes is blurred. Moreover, US reluctance to tolerate substantial losses of high value conventional forces makes it more reliant on the nuclear option. The notion that the US can indefinitely maintain a conventional force advantage against a major power like China in its own backyard is just fundamentally mistaken. At some point US diplomacy is going to have to conform to the strategic reality that China is reaching peer power status, and that proposed military solutions are just futile. The US will only succeed in weakening itself further by its pathologically disproportionate allocation of resources to the business of war which may give rise to a horrible conflict. The goals and attitudes of the gunboat imperialist and the nuclear arms contol advocate are innately contradictory and cannot be "compartmentalized."

Biegun's last tour in Seoul characterized by self serving posture; US media's flaky leaflets campaign

In a December 10 article Yonhap News Agency described a talk given, in Seoul, by Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun who played a significant role as the US envoy for negotiations with North Korea. In the talk Biegun made self serving remarks blaming North Korea for the failure of nuclear talks with the US to go forward:

Reflecting on the deadlocked negotiation process, he expressed regrets over North Korean counterparts missing opportunities just in "search for obstacles."

"Regrettably, much opportunity has been squandered by our North Korean counterparts over the past two years, who too often have devoted themselves to the search for obstacles to negotiations instead of seizing opportunities for engagement," he said.*

*Biegun says diplomacy 'best' and 'only' course to resolving N.K. challenges, Yonhap News, Dec. 10; https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201210007900325

Let's look at how Reuters characterized the state of negotiations between the US and North Korea on Dec. 4, 2020:

Talks over reducing international sanctions on North Korea in return for concessions from Pyongyang broke down in the wake of a summit between Trump and Kim in Vietnam in February 2019, which ended with no deal.

Biegun’s visit comes as incoming U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has promised to reset relations with Seoul, which have been strained by Trump’s demand that South Korea pay billions of dollars more for maintaining the U.S. troop presence on the peninsula.

Relations between the allies were also complicated by South Korean frustrations with U.S. objections to some of its efforts to engage with North Korea.*

*U.S. envoy to visit South Korea next week: sources, Reuters staff, Dec. 4, 2020: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-northkorea-biegun/u-s-envoy-to-visit-south-korea-next-week-sources-idUSKBN28E1Y7


Note the use of the passive voice, talks "which ended with no deal," rather than the US walked out of the Hanoi Summit in a stunt designed for world wide media play. The US showed up at Hanoi to present a list of expanded demands not previously discussed, basically throwing Beigun's hints at a flexible negotiating posture out the window. The US posture presented a transparent bait and switch manuever designed to bring Kim Jong Un to the table for another momentous photo op for Trump with no substance. The US walk out embarrassed and humiliated the North Korean leader and gave the leadership group in North Korea a lesson in US duplicity it will likely never forget. The following June 2019 summit at Panmunjom was similar media stunt less embarrassing for Kim, but similarly conducted on the US side as a media event for Trump with no substance. Clearly Beigun bears some responsibility for this.

Beigun's role as the head of the US negotiating working group which ostensibly was to lay the groundwork for negotiations with North Korea, essentially devolved to blocking or otherwise frustrating South Korean initiatives with North Korea. The South Koreans were warned "not to get too far out in front," and "to get on the same page," as the US. US envoys said there can be "no daylight" between US and South Korean approaches. South Korean initiatives to open the liaison office with North Korea, and their military agreements to lower tensions along the DMZ, Joint Security Area, and Northern Limit Lines were criticized. North-South plans to survey, restore, and use the east coast and west coast railways were effectively blocked by US sanctions threats. Obviously, South Korea wanted to reopen the joint production facility at Kaesong, and the Geumgansan resort in North Korea. At one point a South Korean envoy was told by Washington, "don't bother coming to Washington" if you are going to bring up these plans.

The current wave of US "human rights" manufactured propaganda aimed against North Korea, and indirectly at South Korean diplomatic initiatives that present the prospect of success in relations with North Korea, involves US dismay that the North Korean defectors it sponsors in South Korea can no longer send balloons, drones, or other materials over the DMZ to North Korea. According to US propaganda, the prohibition on these dangerous activities impairs the "free speech" of South Koreans in general. This is absurd. No one has the right to go to the JSA and yell or otherwise transmit their personal political messages to North Korea. One could imagine the response of guards at the JSA to such activities. Is that restriction a "free speech" violation? Obviously not. Military and civilian activities along the DMZ and NLL are subject to severe restrictions. All flights within 20 km of the DMZ are restricted, and in the Eastern region of the DMZ the restrictions are extended to 40 km.

The notion that private individuals have a right to send airborne objects over the DMZ is absurd and militarily provocative. One cannot use their own loudspeakers along the DMZ either. Neither can the South Korean government according to the agreements it has made with the North. These are reasonable time, place and manner restrictions rather than an encroachment on free speech. These restrictions were negotiated by the freely elected government of South Korea and the criminal offenses related to these acts were legislated by the National Assembly. These laws serve the end of reducing the tensions along the DMZ and reducing the chance of incidents that may result in deadly escalations. US criticism in the Congress, executive branch, VOA and other venues represents blatant US interference in South Korean sovereignty.

The notion that the US knows better how to reach to North Korean people, or even that it cares about the North Korean people is simply not credible. In any case, no one is stopping the US from broadcasting its incessant propaganda to North Korea via VOA Korea or RFA. Worse, the US position on this issue, presumes that it and its paid North Korean defector NGOs know better how to negotiate with North Korea than the freely elected government of South Korea. Direct contact with South Korea and South Koreans, through diplomatic channels, limited economic projects, tourism, cultural exchanges, sports events, humanitarian aid, and public health cooperation, represent the best way to open North Korea to initiatives to encourage peace, prosperity, human rights and a path to denuclearization in the North. This is obviously the preferable course rather than the coercive US maximum pressure approach which punishes the North Korean people, encourages hostility, and has as its ultimate object, regime change. One thing the Hanoi summit clearly demonstrated is that the US has no genuine interest in negotiation but essentially is stalling for time while praying the North Korean communist regime will collapse from the "maximum pressure" being applied.

The blog has reviewed in several instances the "step by step approach" to negotiations favored by four of the original six parties, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and China. Reciprocity in step by step negotiations builds mutual trust in contrast to the all or nothing, "one bundle" or so called "Libyan approach" favored by the US and Japan. The outcome of the Libyan approach is demonstrably predictable. Mr. Biegun's feigned US flexibility portrayed in his public statements proved to be little more than window dressing for a hypocritical US regime change policy of maximum pressure. Blaming North Korea is the go to position for failed US negotiators.

Addendum 12.22

Ironically 38North.org published an article by Olli Heinonen Dec. 18, disputing the contention that there is a Uranium enrichment facility at Kangson. The article suggests the facility could be for manufacturing centrifuge components but is not an enrichment facility. Oddly, the article states in an aside that there must be such a "third facility" somewhere, but doesn't provide a basis for this assumption.*

New Evidence Suggests Kangson Is Not a Uranium Enrichment Plant, OLLI HEINONEN, Dec. 18; https://www.38north.org/2020/12/kangson201217/

I'm taking note of the article because according to Thae Yong-ho a well known North Korean defector in South Korea, and now a conservative National Assembly representative, the existence vel non of the so called Kangson secret enrichment facility was a dealbreaker at Hanoi. (See our discussion: Thae Yong Ho Says Secret Uranium Enrichment Facility Dealbreaker in Hanoi, March 14, 2019). In Beigun's January 31, 2019, presentation at Stanford, during the question and answer period, Beigun noted the pitfalls of confusing intelligence assessments and priorities with diplomatic policy goals. Noting the potential problem beforehand seemingly had no impact on the outcome of the summit. Allegedly, the US side's eagerness to test a dubious intelligence theory nevertheless resulted in the Hanoi Summit's theatrical denouement.

The new W76-2 low-yield Trident submarine warhead and North Korea?

William Arkin, one of the authors of the FAS article on the new “tactical” warhead on a strategic nuclear missile (which doesn’t make any sense) appeared on the Democracy Now program. He made it clear the new nuclear weapon is more likely to be targeted at North Korea or Iran.* Firing such a weapon at Russia makes no sense at all. Arkin explores the convoluted logic of theories related to such a limited nuclear attack on Russian targets in the article.

*US Deploys New Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead
Posted on Jan.29, 2020 in Nuclear Weapons, Russia, United States by Hans M. Kristensen
By William M. Arkin* and Hans M. Kristensen
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/01/w76-2deployed/

It's quite likely that a target of the new "tactical" nuclear warhead on the submarine launched ballistic missile is North Korea. The weapon appears to be specifically designed to destroy a deeply hardened target in a tactical environment. The US conventional military tactic of “decapitation” of North Korean leadership has been discussed openly in South Korean media in recent years. It never seemed practical, a special operations tactic to resolve a strategic problem.*

*Shin In-Kyun describes North Korean attack scenarios, May 1, 2019
https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2019/05/shin-in-kyun-describes-north-korean.html

Some expert observers of North Korea regardless of their political persuasion regarded the "bloody nose," or any conventional military attack on North Korea as completely "off the table." Potentially, the new Trident low yield nuclear weapon is being deployed for the same decapitation mission. Yet, it looks as if the new Trident warhead would elicit the very response from North Korea that it's use is allegedly designed to preclude, a barrage of ballistic missiles on friendly targets. The unreasonable response one could anticipate from the North Korea leadership, in reaction to a limited "tactical" nuclear attack by the US wouldn’t conform, to the logic or illogic if you prefer, of US nuclear game theory. Coincidentally, authoritative sources emphasized that the US carrier strike force recently deployed to the Indo-Pacific had an ABM mission as there are multiple aegis equipped surface warships associated with the carrier.*

*Korean focus on Carrier Strike Group deployment? Jan. 23, 2020
https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2020/01/korean-focus-on-carrier-strike-group.html

Additionally, General John E. Hyten, Vice Chairman, JCS, made a widely circulated public statement about that time that he had 100 percent confidence in the strike force’s ability to deal with North Korean missile threats. The presentation of a potential first strike by a low yield nuclear weapon combined with a highly effective ABM capability suggests in the case of North Korea, a scenario, where a first strike, such as a decapitation strike, could be undertaken with confidence, if not impunity. This is not the case, because the irregular trajectories and terminal guidance of several of the North Korean short range ballistic missiles fired last year presented detection and tracking problems for the US, South Korea and Japan. This was the observation of media military and intelligence analysts in South Korea, which exacerbated concerns about the temporary South Korean withdrawal from GSOMIA, an intelligence sharing agreement among the three countries directed exactly at just such a threat. For those who may consider discussion of this scenario off base, keep in mind recent events involving the assassination of General Soleimani, which was a type of decapitation mission, and then the apparent absence of any effective defense against the subsequent Iranian ballistic missile barrage. These nominally unrelated events reflect national security thinking in Washington, D.C. and are intended to convey a message to North Korea.

In any case, if one were to consider the response from North Korea due to a “decapitation” attack with a small yield weapon like the W-76-2, let’s assume it succeeds with the precision and accuracy the new weapons are believed to have. Then in the aftermath of such an attack there remains a nuclear armed North Korea with unknown military commanders in unknown bunkers deciding what the response, if any, should be. Perhaps following US game theory they would decline to escalate the nuclear conflict. Or perhaps they wouldn’t. On the other hand, if the location of the bunker, or Kim Jong-un, was not precisely ascertained, and consequently the chairman or his successor survived, even for only for a brief time, a question arises about what would happen at that point. If one considers the desperation of the moment, the uncertainty, the confusion, and the likelihood of total destruction at the hands of the US military's vastly superior nuclear forces, what is the likely reaction of the North Korean leader? This thought arises, “Even though futilely suicidal, would he not respond in kind with nuclear armed ballistic missiles capable of reaching US bases in the region, where US and allied forces and command and control elements were plainly vulnerable?” Is this not in fact, exactly what would occur, given the ideological basis of North Korean communist doctrine and its self conscious role as the sacrificial victim of great power imperialism? Does the current deployment of US anti-ballistic missile forces in the region really give 100 percent assurance that this wouldn't be an effective response?

Conclusion, a “decapitation” attack with a “smaller” tactical nuclear warhead by the US would likely eventuate in a series of nuclear weapons detonating in the region.

Korean focus on Carrier Strike Group deployment?

Some of the South Korean media broadcasts have reported on the deployment of the Theodore Roosevelt Strike Group. The deployment is reported as an Indo-Pacific cruise, but the South Korean focus is naturally on the possible relationship to the stalemated denuclearization talks with North Korea.

SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (TRCSG) departed San Diego for a scheduled Indo-Pacific deployment, Jan. 17...

...TRCSG consists of Carrier Strike Group 9, USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11, the Ticonderoga class guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), Destroyer Squadron 23, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Russell (DDG 59), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), USS Pinckney (DDG 91), USS Kidd (DDG 100) and USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115).*

*Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group Departs for Deployment
Story Number: NNS200118-02Release Date: 1/18/2020 12:11:00 PM
From Carrier Strike Group 9 Public Affairs
https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=111880

The US Navy also reports that in Japan, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) is in port in Yokosuka. and USS America (LHA-6) is underway.*

* https://news.usni.org/2020/01/20/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-jan-20-2020

Military analysts in South Korea have noted that should the Strike Group operate in the seas around Japan, the force levels will look similar to that during the "the fire and fury" tensions with North Korea of 2017. Recently according to South Korean media reports, military officials indicated that they expected spring training exercises in South Korea to be of a similar subdued nature as those of last year. I think the regular armored brigade rotation is probably completed by now. Some South Korean analysts opined that the regular rotation of ground forces was reported by the US Defense Department sources with publicly available video of the movement, to assure allies in the region.

An election campaign season with voting on April 15 for the new National Assembly in South Korea, free of any provocations or incidents related to the current deadlock in North Korean nuclear talks would be ideal. Unfortunately, the recent public statements from North Korea are not reassuring. If they do conduct more missile tests, especially long range tests, or any nuclear testing, it will probably have a further adverse affect on regional security, inter-Korean relations and the character of the campaign season in South Korea.

Joe Biden wouldn't meet Kim Jong Un without preconditions.

This is the story on the VOA website reported from Seoul:

Biden: No Meeting With Kim Jong Un Absent Preconditions
By William Gallo
January 15, 2020 04:16 AM

SEOUL - Democratic presidential frontrunner Joe Biden says he would not meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un without preconditions. It is the latest evidence Biden would overturn parts of U.S. President Donald Trump’s outreach to Pyongyang.

"Not now, I wouldn’t meet without any preconditions," Biden said Tuesday during a Democratic debate in the midwestern state of Iowa. "Look, we gave him everything he’s looking for. The president showed up, met with him, gave him legitimacy, weakened the sanctions we have against him."

https://www.voanews.com/usa/biden-no-meeting-kim-jong-un-absent-preconditions

Gallo is the VOA editor in Seoul. He continues to surprise me, or I wouldn't bother posting a VOA article. I pretty much watch VOA Korea podcasts every day which are standard anti North Korean propaganda one would expect. The daily podcasts are in Korean, of course, because that's the target audience. VOA's Washington Talk program, which is posted on youtube on Saturdays, tends to be more in depth, and the speakers are US "experts," on Korean affairs, or at least experienced Korea hands. Their discussion in English is translated into Korean subtitles. I've been watching these programs and others regularly for three years. Occasionally, they get a dissenting view on there, but usually there is a consensus that everything is either the fault of Chairman Kim, or a mistake by President Moon Jae-in. The idea that Moon Jae-in, the president of South Korea would know more about Korean affairs than an American is never considered. Apologia for Trump's approach are sometimes offered when he is so far off base something has to be said, but the usual practice concerning US missteps, miscalculations and blunders is to omit them or deny their existence.

To his credit, Mr. Gallo's written material here concerning Mr. Biden's view on North Korean negotiations exposes the former Vice President's incompetence. The view that Chairman Kim has been granted "legitimacy" by Trump's approach, summits, letters, etc., is amateur diplomatic claptrap, put out by persons who have nothing more substantial to say concerning the deadlocked negotiations. The notion that Trump has weakened sanctions is absurdly incorrect. Tim Shorrock, an expert commentator and journalist concerning Korean affairs, has written how sad it is, that Democrats have this proclivity to attack Trump's haphazard approach from the right. Trump's impulsive approach includes threats of war, inappropriate gushing about his great personal relationship with Kim Jong-un, and infinite faith in his top down approach. Increased calls for sanctions and demands for North Korean capitulation, alternate with facile and vague promises of a "bright future", and reassurances that the US is "not a threat." Trump evidently feels this inconsistent and hostile approach is concealed by his personal charm and deft negotiating skills. One need only observe the current Iran debacle he and his cabinet have engineered since the withdrawal from the JCPOA. All this however does not absolve Mr. Biden's ignorant and factually incorrect statement.

Gallo's subtlety is that he let's Mr. Biden's statement speak for itself. The statement reveals Mr. Biden has no insight into the Northeast Asian political dilemma, and at the same time has a factually mistaken comprehension of the sanctions regime in effect against North Korea. One can see for themselves if they are familiar with the facts and have followed the negotiations, that Mr. Biden is entirely lacking in the judgement and insight that he purportedly claims to have as a result of his "extensive" foreign policy experience. So the presumptive emperor in waiting as it were, has no clothes, and Mr. Gallo, is a credit to VOA for not attempting to conceal the embarrassing truth.

Korea Times fails to rehabilitate US Ambassador's poor image

The effort by the Korea Times content editor Oh Young-jin to rehabilitate US Ambassador Harris' image in South Korea is a failure. Harris' claim that he never stated that it looked like Moon Jae-in was surrounded by leftist supporters of communist North Korea is simply labored prevarication. The content of his statement last September came from not one but multiple sources at his embassy meeting with National Assembly members.

What is worse is that the admiral, er, I mean the ambassador, doesn't seem to realize that he has zero authority to insist on confidentiality during a meeting with elected members of the National Assembly. They represent the sovereign power of government inside South Korea, not him. The fact, that the long time military man doesn't understand this simply lends more credence to the analogy with the unfortunate legacy of foreign legations, especially that of Japan, routinely, interfering in internal Korean politics, with a view toward controlling it. In Harris' revealing but disingenuous response, the admiral referred to the article "Who framed Roger Rabbit- in Cheong Wa Tae?" by the same Oh Young-jin of Korea Times. Harris' comment, in context, reveals an untoward knowledge of internal workings of South Korean foreign policy, as viewed from the right, especially concerning the South Korean governmental policies and officials that he, like most US officials, would also prefer to see gone. Again, Oh's analysis of Harris' implausible denial highlights the US inclination to interfere in the South Korean policy making process. Oh's rendering of the interview portrays the Ambassador's attempt to mitigate the damages from his blundering meddling:

Harris denied my description of the Moon Jae-in government as being friendly toward North Korea. Some would go further than I did as anti-Moon factions called him pro-North Korean or leftist or worse. Harris said that in trying to improve the chance of dialogue with the North, Moon's policy was not a function of government but a function of opportunity. Simply put, Moon is using it when it has a chance while some of his predecessors had no opportunity so they did not have a chance to implement it. Maybe Harris is trying to be nice to the Moon government amid cat calls from Moon critics, but it may reflect a general U.S. view of Moon. If the latter were true (emphasis added), it would mark a departure from what is often believed to be the Washington consensus about Moon, his North Korean view and his China approach.

In other words Moon is trying to lead a South Korean foreign policy that puts Korea first, and this is what is resented in the US as it accustomed to more pliable leaders.

(Source- Yonhap News 11.21) Korean War Hero on Birthday. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20181121124600315
Admiral Harris pays homage to the former Japanese Imperial Army officer who served in Manchukuo on behalf of Japan during WWII. General Baik Seon-yup later led troops against the communist armed forces in the Korean conflict. Recently, the former ROK Army four star general has been rolled out at the forefront of encouraging active duty Armed Forces personnel to oppose the Moon Jae-in administration. How far ROK Army officers might go in their opposition is an open question in light of Saenuri Party (LKP) administration martial law plans in early 2017.

Harris really plays poorly with the public in South Korea, while the far right demonstrators who worship the former US supported dictators Syngmun Rhee and Park Chung Hee, are currently out on the streets. They voice their support for the efforts of the far right LKP party in the legislature to obstruct the government's lawful processes, commonly using illegal and disruptive tactics. While they are promoting what can only be viewed as a descent into authoritarianism aimed at bringing down democracy, they wave US flags. Further they call on president Moon Jae-in to step down without any justification. All this Sturm und Drang, necessary because the far right is now clearly in the minority in a democratic system. The authoritarians can't get over it and want Moon, his cabinet, and the ruling democratic coalition out. Coincidentally, this is exactly what the US would like as implied by Oh in his opinion. While Harris alleges that he is impartial, he supports elements in the South Korean community of military officers, former and present, as demonstrated by his public endorsement of 100 year old General Baik Seon-yup, who is the very symbol of the confluence of South Korean authoritarianism and the Japanese colonial legacy in South Korean domestic politics. In spite of the considerable effort of the Korea Times and the US Ambassador, it won't be forgotten that Harris attempted to enter into a discussion with South Korean legislators concerning South Korean domestic politics in which he described the incumbent cabinet as pro-North Korean leftists.

Admiral Harris's jawboning of National Assembly members to support the extortionate demand by the US for 5 billion dollars in the SMA is just one more self evident proof of his poor judgement, undiplomatic character, and desire to meddle in internal South Korean politics.

Admiral, that is Ambassador Harris should retire from his "diplomatic" career. He is a rude, arrogant meddler in the sovereign affairs of South Korea. While he may meddle no more than some prior US ambassadors during the days of the dictatorships, the analogy with the Japanese legations of yore fits as well. Growing a mustache didn't cure his authoritarian militarism.

Sources:

*해리스 “文대통령, 종북좌파에 둘러싸여있다” 발언 논란
조동주 기자 , 한기재 기자입력 2019-11-30 03:00수정 2019-11-30 03:00
http://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20191129/98601249/1

*US envoy under fire for disparaging remarks on ally, By Do Je-hae, Park Ji-won, Dec. 2.
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/12/113_279649.html

Harris: 'I am not Japanese US ambassador'
Oh Young-jin 12.29
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/12/120_281041.html

[FULL TEXT] Interview with US Amb. Harry Harris
By Yi Whan-woo
Transcript of Dec. 23 interview published 12.29
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/12/176_281050.html


Who framed Roger Rabbit - in Cheong Wa Dae? 10.10,
By Oh Young-jin
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2019/10/667_276894.html

The Art of Denuclearization

(Source- BK News Briefing 12.12.19 ) Clearly South Korea is one of the parties suffering greatest harm from the mutual distrust between the US and North Korea.

(Source- BK News Briefing 12.12.19 ) Strange, a clever way to protect the mutual promises of the US and North Korea from ever being broken never emerged.

The US special envoy to North Korea for the negotiations, Stephen Biegun, arrived in Beijing today after visiting Seoul and Tokyo, prompting a lot of hopeful speculation in the South Korean media as to whether Choe Son-hui, the North Korean vice Minister of Foreign Affairs or some other North Korean negotiator might show up. Biegun declined to give any statements when he arrived at the airport.

This is a related development:

State Department North Korea envoy confirmed as deputy secretary of state
By Jennifer Hansler, CNN

Updated 5:56 PM ET, Thu December 19, 2019

https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/19/politics/steve-biegun-deputy-secretary-of-state-confirmation/index.html

After the abortive attempt to resume working level negotiations between Biegun and Kim Myong Gil, at Stockholm, last October, Biegun complained that Kim the North Korean working level envoy, wasn't senior enough and didn't really have authority to negotiate. Envoy Kim said that the US side brought nothing new to the table and broke off those talks reciprocating the US side's earlier behavior at the Hanoi summit. Biegun had requested to meet with Choi Son Hui at one point but she had said that Biegun himself was a lower level official. So in Stockholm, Kim Myong Gil was what he got. Kim Hyuk Chol, the prior North Korean envoy, disappeared after the Hanoi debacle. Biegun's appointment to Deputy Secretary seems the latest move in the "you're not senior enough" game.

Maximum Pressure leading to Maximum Failure?

(Source- JTBC News, 11.9) Kim Yong Chol, "We are a people with nothing more to lose." Chyron: Warning- "We can go back to the relationship that existed before the US-North Korean dialogue."

The obstacle to progress in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea is still the fundamental confrontation over the step by step method versus the all or nothing, no concessions, no trust building approach favored by US officials, elected or otherwise. Most Korea "experts" inside the beltway echo chamber just refuse to acknowledge this fundamental shortcoming in the US diplomatic approach which is first a process issue, and then secondarily a matter of great substantial importance. Either that, or they just want regime change in North Korea and can't imagine bargaining with the communist dictatorship under any circumstances other than complete capitulation by the North, often referred to as the Libyan approach.

"Sanctions have reached a point of diminishing returns. It is unlikely, therefore, that more “maximum pressure,” without a diplomatic strategy that offers Pyongyang positive inducements to negotiate steps toward denuclearization, will deliver results." Richard Nephew

Furious Futility: Maximum Pressure in 2020
BY: RICHARD NEPHEW
NOVEMBER 15, 2019
https://www.38north.org/2019/11/rnephew111519/

Town said North Korea has previously indicated a willingness to give up parts of its nuclear program as a first-phase deal, but not to discuss complete denuclearization up front.

“The North Koreans have always preferred a step by step approach rather than negotiating everything all at once,” Town said. (Jenny Town, editor of 38North.org.)

North Korea's U.N. envoy says denuclearization off negotiating table with United States
Michelle Nichols, David Brunnstrom
Dec. 7, 2019
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa/north-koreas-u-n-envoy-says-denuclearization-off-negotiating-table-with-united-states-idUSKBN1YB0FG


This is also the preference of Russia, China, and South Korea.

SEOUL - A senior adviser to South Korea's president expressed a broad range of frustrations at U.S. policy toward North Korea, saying Washington has not adequately empowered Seoul to play a mediating role with Pyongyang.

In an interview with VOA, Jeong Se-Hyun, who advises South Korean President Moon Jae-in on unification issues, also said the U.S. should offer more incentives to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.

"Don't act as if you're offering a carrot while really you are using a stick," said Jeong. "North Korea must first be given carrots. Then if that doesn't work, you use a whip."

As North Korea's Deadline Approaches, South Pushes US for Progress
By William Gallo VOA News
December 01, 2019 10:04 AM
https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/north-koreas-deadline-approaches-south-pushes-us-progress

Achieving security and stability and reducing catastrophic risks on the peninsula will require intensive, expert-level negotiations and comprehensive, step-by-step implementation over many months and years. This broader effort cannot be viewed solely as a bilateral U.S.-North Korean discussion. It also must include China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia and address the security and political concerns of all the parties, including economic and humanitarian matters.

Economic, military, and diplomatic pressure helped bring the North Koreans to the table, but reaching a successful agreement will require carrots as well as sticks. Ernst J. Moniz and Sam Nunn

Lynn Rusten and Richard Johnson with Steve Andreasen and Hayley Anne Severance, Building Security Through Cooperation: Report of the NTI Working G roup on Cooperative Threat Reduction with North Korea (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019), 2, https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_DPRK2019_RPT_FNL.pdf. (from the forward by Ernst J. Moniz and Sam Nunn)

The necessary operating principle taken from the September 5, 2005 Six Party Talks:

And yet, a year and a half have passed. To move forward, the two countries should agree as a baseline on the fifth clause of the fourth round of the September 2005 Six-Party Talks: “The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the… consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action.” Wada Haruki

Overcoming the San Francisco System: One Japanese Person’s View
Wada Haruki, with an introduction by Alexis Dudden, December 1, 2019
Asia-Pacific Journal, Volume 17,| Issue 23, Number 3, Article ID 5331
https://apjjf.org/2019/23/Wada.html

Selfies of the old order: US officials in South Korea

(Source- VOA Korea, Washington Talk, Nov. 30) General Robert Abrams, US Forces Korea Commander (left), taking a selfie with retired ROK Army Gen. Baik Sun-yup. On the right is Eighth Army Commander, Lt.Gen. Michael Bills.

US generals and "diplomats" should keep posing with Gen. Baik Sun-yup.

That way South Koreans know where exactly US "values" really are, in support of conservative obstruction of South Korean democracy by the far right pro-Japan faction in South Korea. Gen. Baik Sun-yup is a hundred years old. The patron of the dictator Park Chung-hee represents the passing of the old order in South Korea. US leaders posing with him represent the failure of the US to come to terms with democracy in South Korea. Admiral, er, that is Ambassador Harris, posed with Gen. Baik recently as well. He isn't partial to Japan is he? The VOA's past messaging that US policy toward the current South Korea-Japan dispute is impartial is absurd. VOA Washington Talk's picture of the day belies the program's more deceptive talking points. Soo Kim, former CIA analyst now with the Rand Corporation, stumbled somewhat trying to articulate just what the US position was between South Korea and Japan, reflecting "US values." This appears to be new messaging coming from the US broadcast platform.

It's amazing that the VOA Korea Washington Talk program could go on for twenty five minutes without mentioning the US walkout at Hanoi, the failure of the US to implement the principles of Singapore, the deleterious effects of US and UN sanctions on humanitarian aid to North Korea, or the onerous and outrageously unreasonable 5 billion dollar demand on South Korea during the military cost sharing negotiations in South Korea. The latter in spite of the fact, that one of the "expert" guests, Colonel David Maxwell has authored a detailed and appropriate criticism of such demands in the recent past.*

*U.S.-ROK Relations, An Ironclad Alliance or a Transactional House of Cards?
by David Maxwell, November 15, 2019
https://www.nbr.org/publication/u-s-rok-relations-an-ironclad-alliance-or-a-transactional-house-of-cards/

In fact, the US negotiating team dramatically walked out from those negotiations in Seoul on Novemeber 19, mimicking Trump's act in Hanoi against Kim Jong Un and his North Korean delegation. To add insult to injury the undiplomatic US Ambassador openly lobbied members of the South Korean National Assembly in a rude and demeaning manner in an attempt to interfere with the internal workings of our ally's democracy. This US diplomatic activity is widely regarded in South Korea as extortion. The litany of provocative acts by North Korea including artillery exercises that violated the 9.19 military agreement with Seoul and the long range ballistic missile artillery launches over the holiday headed up the program. The two US B-52 missions into the Sea of Japan/ East Sea October 25 and November 22 went unmentioned. The latter mission was a joint mission with Japanese F-15s.*

*https://twitter.com/AircraftSpots/status/1197960029292249088

One of the US right wing objectives appears to be returning South Korea to the status of a tribute paying vassal state. The US diplomatic and military establishment is out of their depth trying to implement President Trump's arrogant financial objectives while at the same time, attempting to push an unwanted Indo-Pacific alliance on South Korea. South Korean critics openly compare US leadership in South Korea to the Japanese Protectorate. Hint, to Admiral Harris, this is not a good thing.

(Source- Yonhap News 11.21) Korean War Hero on Birthday. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20181121124600315

Admiral Harris pays homage to the former Japanese Imperial Army officer who served in Manchukuo on behalf of Japan during WWII. General Baik later led troops against the communist armed forces in the Korean conflict. Recently, the former ROK Army four star general has been rolled out at the forefront of encouraging active duty Armed Forces personnel to oppose the Moon Jae-in administration. How far ROK Army officers might go in their opposition is an open question in light of Saenuri Party (LKP) administration martial law plans in early 2017. One recently defecting LKP Assembly representative used the term "spitting in the well," to characterize South Korean conservative leadership flirting with reactionary generals.

There was a related controversy in South Korea on November 30th, when news media reported that Ambassador Harris in a conference earlier on September 24, at the US Ambassador's official residence, with members of various parties of the National Assembly, questioned whether President Moon Jae-in had surrounded himself with pro-North Korean leftists. This report was confirmed by more than one source present at the meeting according to the conservative Donga.com. A Democratic Party member asked Harris not to speak that way. This overtly ideological approach by Harris to internal South Korean politics is unprecedented and similar to the ideological slant of retired ROK generals and other elements of the far right calling for Moon Jae-in to be removed from office. The US Embassy when questioned about the report refused to comment saying it was agreed by the parties attending the conference that discussions were confidential.*

*해리스 “文대통령, 종북좌파에 둘러싸여있다” 발언 논란
조동주 기자 , 한기재 기자입력 2019-11-30 03:00수정 2019-11-30 03:00
http://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20191129/98601249/1

Update Dec. 2:

Harris' ideological framing of the issues appears to follow the language of a letter he transmitted to President Trump on behalf of LKP Assembly member Ahn Sang-soo in December 2018 disclosed by JTBC News on December 2, 2019. Ahn was present at the September meeting at Harris' official embassy residence. So Harris appears to be promoting the right wing opposition to the democratic administration of Moon Jae-in. The Korea Times has a report which includes criticism by the Democratic Party spokesperson that the former admiral was the most impolite ambassador she has ever met.*

*US envoy under fire for disparaging remarks on ally, By Do Je-hae, Park Ji-won, Dec. 3.
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/12/113_279649.html

Train of US diplomatic blunderers in South Korea compared to Alice Roosevelt

(JTBC News- 11.19) Alice Roosevelt riding a stone horse statue at the Memorial for Empress Myeongsong, acting as if she were "riding a carousel at an amusement park." The picture is from the Cornell University Library collection.

Alice cavorted around Seoul being treated like an American princess after Teddy Roosevelt had already sold out Korean sovereignty to the Japanese at the Treaty of Portsmouth September 5, 1905. The great powers bargained away Korea's sovereignty to Japan to serve their own imperial interests. Russia actually was the only power to resist the Japanese, but that was because they had wanted to make Korea a Russian domain. The Russians lost the Russo-Japanese War and had to sign the Portsmouth Treaty arranged by President Roosevelt, in which Japan's dominance in Korea was acknowledged. Later in September 1905, King Gojong still thought the US might be of help to avoid the Japanese takeover of Korea when President Roosevelt's daughter, Alice Roosevelt, visited Korea. Other high ranking US diplomats who had been traveling with Alice through other Asian capitals didn't bother to come. Korea's fate was already cast.

Alice attended a formal dinner presented in her honor by the "Emperor," and rode in his palanquin through the streets of Seoul. Her memorable faux pas was to jump on the back of a stone horse statue at the memorial mound of Empress Myeongseong who in 1895 had been assassinated by the Japanese. At least Alice had an excuse. She was immature, so the editorial goes. Alice wrote that Emperor Gojong of Korea, small in stature, cut a piteous insensitive figure. Here we are more than a hundred years later.

What is the excuse of the US Ambassador to Seoul Harry Harris, who is among those who have been jawboning Korean officials for weeks? Secretary Esper? Mr. DeHart? It isn't the 1950s or the end of the Russo-Japanese War during the heyday of imperialism. South Korea is no longer run by the conservative heirs of pro-Japanese dictators and their cronies. Allison Hooker and other "experts" are giving team Trump in Asia very bad advice. South Korea isn't going to "get over" it's dispute with Japan in the manner they have in mind. Nor will it cave to US extortion. And that is what it is being called in Korea, extortion. The behavior of US officials is described as "shameful."

(Source- JTBC News 11.18) South Koreans demonstrate against US military cost sharing demands outside US embassy. Signs say, is this an alliance or highway robbery? Chyron reads "Opposition to US extortion of taxpayer money. Opposition to US humiliating negotiations."

Esper, Harris, DeHart, General Milley, General Abrams, and others are making absurd demands with no basis in existing agreements. Ambassador Harris has been buttonholing members of the Korean National Assembly, particularly the opposition members making the absurd demand for five times the current South Korean cost sharing contribution to US defense costs in Korea. Also, they are pressuring South Korea to cave in to US demands to participate in, what is in effect, a new defense alliance with Japan and other US allies throughout the Indo-Pacific. The US is blatantly taking up for Japan in the continuing political and economic dispute between the two countries. It's pretty clear that without some concessions by the imperial minded Abe, the GSOMIA agreement for sharing military information will lapse on the 23rd as scheduled. The Chair of the Intelligence Committee in the National Assembly, Lee Hye-hoon, referred to Ambassador Harris' repeated demands as rude and unreasonable. The US cost sharing demand has been dead on arrival for weeks. US diplomats and generals must be stone deaf.

The South Korean government has no intention of allowing the US or Japan to dictate their foreign policy. The South Koreans have repeatedly confirmed their commitment to the alliance with the United States but they are not capitulating to absurd or unreasonable demands.

Trump's Diplomatic Approach to South Korean Alliance: Trash and Crash

Whether it's the ridiculous demand for five billion dollars in military cost sharing put forward by the US in the Special Measures Agreement negotiations currently pending between representatives of the US and South Korea, or whether it is the continuing US pressure to renew the General Sharing of Military Information Agreement before it expires November 23, the US appears to be following a policy undermining the legitimacy of South Korean rule as a sovereign democratic state.

As pointed out in the the Hankyoreh, there is no international agreement supporting the unreasonable and unprecedented US demand for an increase of South Korean military cost burden sharing from approximately one billion to five billion dollars a year. The US team attempting to ram this down South Korea's throat has absolutely no understanding of South Korean history nor its domestic political situation. Ostensibly, the negotiating team leader James Dehart was sent, without notice, to South Korea last week to gain some understanding of the situation and South Korean perspective on this matter. Conservatives in the National Assembly are no more receptive to financially overbearing demands than the democratic administration of President Moon Jae-in. It simply defies belief how tone deaf the US "diplomacy" really is. They have been told by the South Korean Foreign Minister that the US demand is outside the scope of the Status of Forces Agreement and will be rejected by the National Assembly. Even if it were even remotely plausible that any credible group of South Korean politicians would accept such demeaning demands, which there isn't, the Democratic Party leaders in the Assembly could simply table any proposed ratification at the committee level so that it never sees the light of day. So it appears the US team has zero comprehension of the democratic political processes in South Korea. They also miscalculate their influence in contemporary South Korea by attempting to browbeat the South Korean side.

A similar unsavory prospect is presented by the US demands that the South Korean government renew the GSOMIA agreement without a satisfactory quid pro quo from the Abe administration in Japan. While pretending to take an impartial role based upon regional security concerns, a failure by the US to play an intermediary role between Japan and South Korea in their current diplomatic dispute is little more than taking up the Japanese cause of trade war in defense of historical revisionism to the detriment of regional security.

(Source- JTBC News, 10.3) The Taegukki People's Revolution Movement, a reactionary far right organization, appeared to be present at the demonstration in force, carrying US flags as well as Korean flags. Their banner (above) featured the former ruthless dictators Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee. It's clear where they're coming from.

The upcoming defense cost sharing negotiations with Japan and Germany are an ultimate objective as the US team Trump tries to break down South Korean resistance to unreasonable demands from it's so called ally to bolster it's own military budget which is out of control as a result of poor budget planning in all dimensions. The target seems to be making an example of the relatively weaker South Korea as one of the most vulnerable allies. Ironically, South Korea spends more of its GDP on military expenditures for its own defense than any other US NATO ally. It recently expended 10 billion dollars accommodating the US base transition plan to Camp Humphreys in Pyongtaek, the largest US military base outside the US. It also purchases billions in US military equipment. Nevertheless, the unreasonable US demands threaten the integrity of the political process in South Korea both in the Assembly and in upcoming elections for Assembly seats in April. No assemblyman nor party in South Korea can put themselves in the position of capitulating to such unreasonable demands from an outside power, ally or not.

Massive far right demonstrations took place in the street in Gwanghwamun for the past few weeks by fascist supporters of prior dictators who historically acted as puppets of the US and pro-Japanese elements in the power structure. This weekend religious fundamentalists and former military officers dressed in Erwin Rommel chic addressed a crowd bearing hundreds, if not thousands of US flags. This won't change the political calculations in the National Assembly or the Blue House. Anyone seen capitulating to the US and Japanese manipulations to return to a semi-colonial quisling status will be branded as a traitor whose name will go down in infamy. On the other hand, a failure to obtain an SMA agreement on military cost sharing will be political catastrophe for the South Korean administration. These US and Japanese tactics are starting to smell like a regime change formula for the democratically elected government of South Korea.

See: [News analysis] The US’ intentions behind ramping up S. Korea’s share of defense costs
Posted on : Nov.8,2019 17:49 KST Modified on : Nov.8,2019 17:49 KST
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/916356.html

[Editorial] US contradicting itself by pressuring S. Korea to extend GSOMIA
Posted on : Nov.7,2019 16:52 KST Modified on : Nov.7,2019 16:52 KST
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/916184.html

Korean Students Trespass on US Ambassador's Residence: Reflections

One can read or watch the short accounts of a relatively small group of South Korean college students climbing the wall of Ambassador Harris' official residence in Seoul. Some well qualified pundits of South Korean affairs have taken the opportunity to righteously condemn what was an obviously illegal demonstration. Nineteen students involved have been arrested. The historical and political context is somewhat lost, as legality is the ultimate arbiter for others, as Americans sometimes tacitly and sometimes openly approve of illegal operations when it favors their own cause. One, can't help but think of the "Free Choseon" group that attacked the North Korean embassy in Madrid on the eve of the Hanoi Summit. For a brief time, this was a cause celebre in certain US circles. The former Marine intelligence specialist, Christopher Ahn, was arrested in the US for his alleged participation, jailed, and then released on conditions pending a Spanish government extradition request. Whatever intelligence was gleaned from the hand phones and hard drives taken from the DPRK embassy by the group, was delivered to the FBI, not surprisingly. A patina of official legality was maintained by returning the items, issuing a warrant for Adrian Hong, the group's Yale educated ring-leader, and arresting Ahn.

But all that aside, the substance of the unlawful "sit in" demonstration at the US Ambassador's residence is historically significant because it relates back to a time in the late 19th Century when foreign legations sought to control Korea's fate. Early on, the Japanese and Chinese contended for dominance in late Chosun. The Chinese were defeated by the fledgling modern Japanese armed forces in the Sino-Japanese War. After that the Russian and Japanese delegations vied for control of the Chosun emperor's court. Empress Myeongseong who attempted to resist Japanese coercion of the struggling Chosun dynasty, was assassinated by agents of the Japanese right in Gyeongbokgung palace, October 28, 1895. Periodically, Japanese troops entered the palace grounds. Gojong the "Emperor" was offered protection in the Russian legation official residence. That refuge didn't last. The Russians ultimately lost the Russo-Japanese War for dominance in Korea. For a brief period Gojong moved next to the US legation residence in Seoul to obtain the advantage of the protection of USMC guards next door. That didn't last as the US abandoned it's "open door" policy in Chosun for a cynical deal with the Japanese recognizing their dominance in Korea in exchange for US colonial dominance in the Philippines.

Lee Won Yong, prime minister, and Ito Hirobumi, resident general of the Korean protectorate, circa 1907. Ito was assassinated in Harbin in 1909, and Lee was the victim of an attempted assassination by stabbing months later in Seoul. Lee was known at the leading traitor of Eulsa. As the erstwhile leader of the Korean Independence Federation, and prime minister of Chosun, Lee had lost foreign support for the independence of Korea.


In 1905, the "Emperor" Gojong refused to sign the "Treaty of Eulsa," which made Korea a "protectorate" of Japan. Those Korean officials who did sign it went down in infamy as the "traitors of Eulsa," which unfortunately included the acting prime minister, who also led the Korean Independence Federation, and betrayed its principles for the proverbial forty pieces of silver (actually he was paid about 2.5 million in gold upon signing the Treaty). Although it is said that Korea didn't become a colony until it was officially annexed in 1910, it had already lost all it's sovereignty as a protectorate in 1905. Japanese undue influence over Korea essentially began with it's military involvement in the suppression of the Tonghak movement in 1894 and ebbed and flowed until its victory over Russia in 1905. This was a period when the legations of the more powerful states in the region routinely interfered in the domestic and foreign affairs of Korea. The Korean crown prince was held as a hostage by the Resident General Ito Hirobumi after the Eulsa capitulation. Annexation in 1910, with its pretensions of legality in the heyday of imperialism was just a formality.

So this period so important to the genesis of the Korean Independence Movement, is the backdrop for modern Korean events. Politically aware Koreans know very well what role foreign diplomatic delegations have played in interference in their sovereign matters, whether by coercion or providing financial inducements to heads of state, like the dictator, Park Chung Hee. Ambassador Harris has a "chin il," pro-Japanese bias, as most Americans do, the legacy of the cold war. Perhaps he has a sensitivity to these issues as someone of Asian-American heritage, with a substantial resume in Japan, perhaps not. Clearly, Japan, is not the only power to have coerced South Korea, although it is also doing it again now. However, the admiral cum ambassador's public demand for increasing the South Korean contribution to defense sharing by a factor of five was a blunder of high order. One cannot help but wonder how he conceives his role as ambassador to repeat such a ridiculous demand. Is he just "following orders" as the saying goes? One would expect an ambassador rather than acting merely as an advocate for the president's unreasonable demand in these negotiations to attempt to mitigate the impact by advising the white house and the diplomatic team preparing to negotiate in Hawaii, that they are way out of line. Donald Trump needs more than a yes man in the ambassador's residence.

The presence of large right wing crowds, led by the Liberty Korea Party, near Gwanghwamun plaza, the Gyeongbokgung palace, and the US embassy building, many waving US flags doesn't help any. The net effect is to undermine the current democratic South Korean administration at home while it is negotiating the five year Special Measures Agreement. The coincidence doesn't really escape notice. The embassy's location can't be changed soon enough.

Liar's Poker in Stockholm

When I saw this story on KBS 24 live on youtube, they said that the North Koreans complained that the US hadn’t changed its position. The report said the US representative Stephen Biegun wouldn’t talk to reporters because it wasn’t appropriate to reveal their reaction publicly. Reporters believed that Biegun went to the US embassy rather than stay at the facilities where the talks were being held. The plans of the NK delegation were not clear at the time. The speculation was that it was the old “one bundle” approach of the US v. the step by step approach. The immediate harsh North Korean undiplomatic statements at the scene, after the Stockholm meeting, appear similar to what Trump, Bolton and company did to the North at the summit in Hanoi.

I’m kind of surprised because the Washington Talk on VOA Korea by the two well connected experts they had on Saturday, seemed cautious but upbeat. Most genuine experts seem to know the structure of a deal that could work, I wonder if any were formulated beforehand or if Biegun’s team is just playing liar's poker. The dialogue imagined looks like this, “you have to come off the dime first;” “no you have to make the first offer;” “what did you bring to the table?” “what did you bring to the table?” “You have to define denuclearization and the end stage first;” “no, it’s step by step, with reciprocal trust building measures;” “no that isn’t how it works;” “Okay, bye, we see you haven’t changed a bit, why did you bother?”

Biegun clearly knows better from his presentation at Stanford that was used to sucker the North Koreans at Hanoi. To his credit at his last major policy presentation on North Korea, his views were even less promising and really offered no daylight for the North Koreans in terms of changing the US policy position. To be realistic Kim Jong Un's negotiating team isn't negotiating with Trump, it's negotiating with the entire US government and private establishment with vested interests in the so called San Francisco system that supports US national security in the "Indo- Pacific." These people aren't negotiating, they're in the regime change business. Domestically, Trump is so weak at this point it's unlikely he's capable of offering a negotiating process the North Korean's can accept, let alone make substantive concessions. This is what he found out after Singapore.

Japan follows Trump's bad foreign policy example

T.K. Park is clearly one of the leading analysts of South Korean affairs in the US today. I particularly liked his insight near the end of today's installment, of his series of articles titled Korea-Japan and the End of the '65 System. * He observes that Abe crossed a line in Japan- Korean relations by confusing the economic and security relationship between South Korea and Japan with the untended historical disputes. This was a decisive step in the wrong direction following the poor example set by Trump's chaotic shake it up and see what happens approach to international relationships including security alliances. T.K.'s insight is this:

It is difficult to overstate the damage that Abe’s trade war caused to the ’65 System. The ’65 System was able to persist and grow because South Korea and Japan had separated the cost of System—namely, the historical issues—from the benefit of the System, namely the economic and security partnership. This was initially achieved by South Korean dictators suppressing the Korean victims of Japanese imperialism. But even after the victims began voicing their injury in the 1990s, South Korea and Japan were able to continue the ’65 System by drawing a clear line between the historical issues on one hand, and the economic and security issues on the other.

Abe’s trade war crossed this critical line. To exercise leverage on the historical issues, Abe used economic cooperation with South Korea as a chain around Seoul’s neck. When the blowback began for engaging in a trade war, Abe made up a national security excuse that no one believed in. From there, the decline of the ’65 System passed the point of no return.*

*Korea-Japan and the End of the '65 System - Part V: the End of the '65 System
http://askakorean.blogspot.com/2019/09/korea-japan-and-end-of-65-system-part-v.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter


During the transitional period of more liberal governance since the period of authoritarian rule in South Korea, T.K's article provides some explanation of how the separation of historical grievances from the need for cooperation somehow survived to preserve a pragmatic relationship between South Korea and Japan which he now feels is gone.

There is also a congruent but slightly different perspective. Kim Dae Jung's liberal administration only came to power by compromising with Kim Jong Pil, the former head of the KCIA during the Park Chung Hee, pro-Japanese ( 친일파 ) right wing dictatorship. Roh Tae Woo's conservative administration continued to represent the interests and parties that had flourished under dictators Park and Chun Doo Hwan until Chun was forced out of power by pro-democracy demonstrations in the late eighties. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung did not and could not come to power until they accommodated those pro-Japanese right wing interests in a political alliance with Kim Jong Pil, a minority regional politician and conservative stalwart. During DJ's rule as president, he pursued progressive initiatives such as the Sunshine Policy with North Korea, but was presented with the same obstacles Syngman Rhee had faced decades before. Namely, the notion that the popular grievances against domestic colonial era criminal colloborators with Japan (and their conservative progeny) would arrive at some just denouement was stifled by political compromise, this time by the need to form a governing coalition in a representative government. Forming a governing coalition could not yet be achieved without once again reigning back the historical issues domestically. This is what the NY Times had to say in its eulogy to Kim Jong Pil, the former KCIA director, and advocate for the 1965 Agreement with Japan:

...Any politician with presidential ambitions had to pay respects to Mr. Kim and win his favor.

He helped Kim Young-sam win the presidency in 1992, forming a political alliance with him and Mr. Roh, in which their three parties merged. Later, after a falling-out with Kim Young-sam, he merged his new party with that of Kim Dae-jung, who went on to be elected president in 1997. He became prime minister under President Kim Dae-jung, who would win a Nobel Peace Prize for his policy of outreach to North Korea, including a historic summit meeting with Kim Jong-il, then the North’s leader.*

*Kim Jong-pil, Political Kingmaker in South Korea, Dies at 92, NT Times obituary, By Choe Sang-Hun, June 23, 2018; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/obituaries/kim-jong-pil-south-korea.html

The experiment of returning to a nostalgic revisionist view of South Korean dictatorships by electing Park Geun Hye, the daughter of the former Japanese Imperial Army officer, and dictator of South Korea, failed. This has allowed Moon Jae In, to finally repudiate the costs of the pro-Japanese element in conservative Korean politics to the chagrin of the right wing governments in Japan and the US.

Correction: this article was edited Sep. 18, to delete a misstatement about the relationship of Kim Jong Pil to the Chun dictatorship and to add Kim Jong Pil's relationship to the Kim Yong Sam administration.

Upcoming US - Korea summit and military alliance cost sharing

(Source- JTBC News 9.14)

So the current 2019 cost sharing contribution for US Forces Korea is US $881,178,161.00 at current exhange rates. This figure doesn't include the 9 billion dollars the Republic of Korea recently spent on expansion, modernization, and construction of new facilities at Camp Humphreys, in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, to facilitate the transfer of US Forces Korea and many of its military commands and units to what is now the largest US military base outside the United States. Additionally, not considered are the cost to South Korea of the transfer of some 26 former US military bases back to the host nation including untold billions in cleanup expenses for environmental damages, and personal injury claims based upon pollution and damage to surrounding communities and individuals. The US has been stonewalling cleanup costs in an attempt to foist them on South Korea with zero accountability. On a per capita basis the Republic of Korea spends more on its defense than other US allies. Yet, President Trump, in his coercive, transactional, and undiplomatic style, repeatedly publicly raises this issue, in a hyperbolic and unfair manner, and has in fact, demanded a five hundred percent increase in the South Korea contribution to the alliance's military costs. This is not helpful to the alliance and represents poor public relations with the people of South Korea.

JTBC reports that pending issues for the summit will naturally include military cost sharing, South Korean withdrawal from GSOMIA (military intelligence sharing) and other contentious issues with Japan, and, of course, denuclearization issues with North Korea. These present the prospect of a difficult summit ( 고난도 담화 ) between President Moon Jae In and President Trump, when the former arrives for a three day visit in the US September 22, for the upcoming UN General Assembly.

Unfortunately, the concurrent poor treatment of South Korea by the far right leaders, Abe and Trump, has the appearance of great power manipulation of the democratic government on the basis of pure power politics reminiscent of late 19th and early 20th Century imperialism which destroyed Korean sovereignty. South Korea is still struggling against unjust political legacies imposed by the US and Japan that the latter allies disingenuously evade. It is extremely unlikely that President Moon will acquiesce to their pressures to give up South Korea's recently asserted sovereignty or submit to "make Japan great again," initiatives or other Japanese revisionist moves, tacitly supported by the US. He will however, while weathering the current storm, do his best to keep the US-Korea alliance as strong as possible, and encourage measures to facilitate new diplomatic talks between the US and North Korea.

Always with a view to fighting the next war vs. the signpost.

Listened to two US "experts" advise the South Korean people on VOA that all political decisions must be considered from the point of view of fighting the next war with North Korea. According to this analysis the South Korean dispute with Japan is little more than irrational, "populist" rabble rousing manipulation. The elephant in the room is the fact that there is absolutely no establishment US interest in the divisive, harmful, and deceitful measures taken by the far right wing Abe regime against South Korea.

The US barely awakened from its semi-comatose state after the Moon administration gave notice of withdrawal from GSOMIA, to blame South Korea without examination of the historical issues or current Japanese policies. This slumbering state has been referred to elsewhere as the "silence of August." * Now disturbed from sleep, the US just repeats Japanese contentions about the 1965 Agreement with Park Chung Hee in a knee jerk fashion. Criticism of Japan by the US is virtually nonexistent, due to Japan's status as a major customer of US military sales, in addition to funishing the US forward military base structure in the Japan, indispensable for anti-China strategies. Abe essentially has Trump, the deal maker, over a barrel, with a lot of room for unilateral maneuver to achieve its own nationalist agenda to "make Japan great again." With the GSOMIA decision, the US only has one remedy, to criticize the democratic government of South Korea, as if badgering them will accomplish something.

*The Silence of August, ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, AUGUST 21, 2019; https://www.38north.org/2019/08/rgallucci082119/

Beyond gross over simplification about the issues between Japan and South Korea, the US is unwilling to examine its own role in creating the problem or its current policies which are destabilizing East Asia. The US, like Abe, is wishing the Moon government would go away rather than taking a more reflective view of how and why the plan to make South Korea and Japan allies moved to the fail column. Erasing the US historical role is a necessary corollary. At the same time, Pompeo and Beigun futilely insist that North Korea must come to the negotiating table while offering nothing but the abortive Bolton "all or nothing" formula. Stephen Beigun's speech on September 6, at the University of Michigan, offered little but vague platitudes unlikely to result in renewed dialogue with North Korea. In fact, his speech was less promising than public statements he has made in the past and represents the retrenchment to the hardline position by the US, revealed at Hanoi, alongside his apparent lack of authority to negotiate.* The world looks on with wonder. Do these experts, know what their doing? Are they the "best and the brightest?"

*Remarks by Special Representative for North Korea Stephen E. Biegun at the University of Michigan’s Weiser Diplomacy Center, Sep 6, 2019; https://www.state.gov/remarks-by-special-representative-for-north-korea-stephen-e-biegun-at-the-university-of-michigans-weiser-diplomacy-center/

( Source- SBS News Videomug Insight 1.17.2017 ) "When walking on a snow covered path don't walk in a disorderly way, because the path I walk forward on today, will later serve as a signpost for others." Bek Beom, Kim Ku

The US trivializes the South Korea - Japan dispute as a negotiating technique.

White House indifference to the South Korea - Japan dispute is part of the transactional/coercive technique of this administration. The White House loathes the progressive Moon Jae In democratic party government of South Korea. The US defense interests want to increase South Korean payments to the US for defense costs by a factor of five, increase ROK commitments to out of area Indo-Pacific operations; deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles and more THAAD launchers in South Korea; and have South Korea buy into an integrated Aegis air defense system in the region with US and Japanese forces. Unlikely to get much cooperation on these issues from the progressive Moon government, weakening and destabilizing the Moon administration in tacit alliance with the right wing "make Japan great again" Abe government is the chosen path.

It is interesting that US "experts" refer to the situation as "spat" and "tit for tat," trivializing the dispute. The South Korean perspective is that they will no longer tolerate Japanese interference in internal South Korean affairs facilitated by prior South Korean right wing dictatorships and their progeny no matter what the US demands.

Some thoughts on Panmunjom summit meeting

I'll believe there is a shift in the US position when I see it. The problem isn't just a couple of personalities like Bolton and Pompeo. Biegun is not that reliable and issues vague and contradictory statements. He showed limited flexibility before the Hanoi summit and then after went hard line when his bosses failed to negotiate. (See the prior blog entry "Who is Stephen Biegun's Counterpart?"). Now he allegedly is flexible again. An informed observer can only agree with Tim Shorrock's assessment of Biegun's so called flexibility after reading the recent article about his June 30 statements published in the Hankyoreh.

If Biegun favors a step by step approach to the DPRK talks, there's still no sign of it in his public statements. "Biegun says US will maintain sanctions until N. Korea completely denuclearizes."

See http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/900545.html

One can't help but note that Biegun's recent "off the record" statements seem to parallel Mr. Bolton's expansive demands at Hanoi, calling for the removal of all missiles, and all weapons of mass destruction, the favored lexicon of US middle eastern war making. Such an expansion of categorical demands make resolution of nuclear issues all the more unlikely.

The resistance to negotiation with North Korea is institutional and permeates the very structure of the US. It includes Congress, the UN apparatus, the state department, and the cottage industry of pundits, experts, and "scholars" in academia and non-profits, representing their defense industry sponsors who flood the media with the never ending propaganda against negotiations with North Korea 24-7.

It was just the media choreography of the Moon-Kim meeting that Trump sought to copy. He has yet to demonstrate the political will to engage in reciprocal confidence building measures at the negotiating table. The fiasco at Hanoi proved this.

President Moon's meeting with Kim at Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, captured the media world wide and stimulated speculation about what could be.

The very steps and gestures that Moon took that day with Kim Jong Un were carefully mimicked by Trump at Panmunjom with Kim. While this media buildup about "love letters" and the impending visit to the DMZ was unfolding (similar in nature to the prelude of the unveiling of Al Capone's vault), US diplomats were still twisting the knife in North Korea's back at the UN. While Trump feigned friendship for the North Korean leader, the US delegation at the UN were seeking reduction of refined fuel exports to the DPRK to zero, and encouraging the members to comply with repatriation of North Korean workers abroad as scheduled by a previous UN resolution. This is the two sided face of US diplomacy referred to by South Korea's former Unification Minister Chong Se Hyun as the policies of an "Indian killing long haired white general," after Hanoi.

Thae Yong Ho, the right wing pundit and North Korean defector, says that Trump was trying to emulate Nixon's historic visit to China. This is nonsense. No credit could ever be given by the South Korean right to President Moon Jae In's leadership in his approach to North Korea and Kim Jong Un. Trump never could get the imagery from the Moon Kim Panmunjom summit out of his mind. The significance of Trump stepping on the North Korea side of the military demarcation line really doesn't mean much if anything. President Moon's gesture was far more meaningful. It meant "We are one people." For Trump it meant nothing but a campaign media stunt, to show he could compete with Xi Jinping, among others.