A New International Security Structure Needed for Korea

An international security structure to replace the outdated cold war/civil war arrangements in Korea is needed. Until that structure is built step by step over time by difficult negotiations among the affected parties, some manifestation of the seventy year old US/UNC commitment that brought the Korean conflict to the stalemate currently in place needs to be maintained. The phrase "you broke it, you bought it" comes to mind.

There is a conceptual model of truth and reconciliation, in the current South Korean approach to North Korea, according to historian Bruce Cummings. Understanding the pathways of the civil war, and consideration of the perspectives of each party relative to the capacity for good or evil of each player in it, could allow a process of reconciliation. The US and Japan seem incapable of this approach, and are unable to depart from their mythology about who did what to whom in Korea or their anti-communist ideological obsession. Without breaking the cold war ideological framework in the US/Japanese/western perspective there will be no resolution. This is especially difficult now with the added nuclear dimension of the North Korean "threat," which is essentially a deterrent to guarantee DPRK survival.

It is not unrealistic to expect, that ultimately both Koreas would be inclined to have a security relationship with the US that permitted them to offset not only Chinese dominance, but that of Japan as well. A balanced US approach, that left commerce and other peaceful pursuits as the priority rather than incessant planning for the next war is desirable.

Instead of moving in this direction, the US moves toward another cold war.

Bruce Cummings, author of The Korean War, A History, is regarded as a "revisionist" by critics. To the contrary, the book portrays the historical currents in their ugly reality, outside the good guy, bad guy myth of the Korean conflict that satisfy US propaganda requirements. The US is overly reliant on wartime economics and the purported international legitimacy to which they are allegedly directed. Cummings points out, especially in the latter chapters, how the Korean Conflict generated the wartime state economy that we in the US, subsequently, were never really able to escape.

Without the expectation of some miraculous breakthrough, it would nevertheless be best if the US would allow South Korea to pursue the initiatives that they feel provide promise for a new future relationship with the North. Instead, what we see from the new administration is reflected on their updated web site yesterday:

Innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. We will continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime domain, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas. We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, and also confirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees.*

* Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad," MARCH 12, 2021: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/

The statement of the "Quad" represents a very one sided adoption of the Pompeo doctrine on China, and the Far East, by the Biden administration. The White House has tried to dress it up as some humanitarian endeavor, to try to make it more palatable to South Korea and others. The statement reflects the US/Japanese interpretation of UNCLOS and UN resolutions and explicitly adopts the Japanese approach to China and North Korea. Naturally, these documents and their application are interpreted differently in the Far East by the other parties.

There are recent quotes elsewhere from Ned Price at the State Department fixated on a "lockstep" approach from allies and that they all get on "the same page."* This in fact, is the formulaic attack on the South Korean view, previously directed by Pompeo. Mr. Price's allusions to the former administration's other expectation of "no daylight" among views of the "allies," means South Korea specifically. The dilemna, is more accurately described as more akin to an "I can't breathe" problem for Korean sovereignty.

* Blinken's trip to Asia will provide 'key ingredient' for U.S. policy toward N. Korea: Price, Yonhap Mar. 13. Byun Duk-kun: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210313000400325?input=tw