Reflecting on the deadlocked negotiation process, he expressed regrets over North Korean counterparts missing opportunities just in "search for obstacles."
"Regrettably, much opportunity has been squandered by our North Korean counterparts over the past two years, who too often have devoted themselves to the search for obstacles to negotiations instead of seizing opportunities for engagement," he said.*
*Biegun says diplomacy 'best' and 'only' course to resolving N.K. challenges, Yonhap News, Dec. 10; https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201210007900325
Let's look at how Reuters characterized the state of negotiations between the US and North Korea on Dec. 4, 2020:
Talks over reducing international sanctions on North Korea in return for concessions from Pyongyang broke down in the wake of a summit between Trump and Kim in Vietnam in February 2019, which ended with no deal.
Biegun’s visit comes as incoming U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has promised to reset relations with Seoul, which have been strained by Trump’s demand that South Korea pay billions of dollars more for maintaining the U.S. troop presence on the peninsula.
Relations between the allies were also complicated by South Korean frustrations with U.S. objections to some of its efforts to engage with North Korea.*
*U.S. envoy to visit South Korea next week: sources, Reuters staff, Dec. 4, 2020: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-northkorea-biegun/u-s-envoy-to-visit-south-korea-next-week-sources-idUSKBN28E1Y7
Note the use of the passive voice, talks "which ended with no deal," rather than the US walked out of the Hanoi Summit in a stunt designed for world wide media play. The US showed up at Hanoi to present a list of expanded demands not previously discussed, basically throwing Beigun's hints at a flexible negotiating posture out the window. The US posture presented a transparent bait and switch manuever designed to bring Kim Jong Un to the table for another momentous photo op for Trump with no substance. The US walk out embarrassed and humiliated the North Korean leader and gave the leadership group in North Korea a lesson in US duplicity it will likely never forget. The following June 2019 summit at Panmunjom was similar media stunt less embarrassing for Kim, but similarly conducted on the US side as a media event for Trump with no substance. Clearly Beigun bears some responsibility for this.
Beigun's role as the head of the US negotiating working group which ostensibly was to lay the groundwork for negotiations with North Korea, essentially devolved to blocking or otherwise frustrating South Korean initiatives with North Korea. The South Koreans were warned "not to get too far out in front," and "to get on the same page," as the US. US envoys said there can be "no daylight" between US and South Korean approaches. South Korean initiatives to open the liaison office with North Korea, and their military agreements to lower tensions along the DMZ, Joint Security Area, and Northern Limit Lines were criticized. North-South plans to survey, restore, and use the east coast and west coast railways were effectively blocked by US sanctions threats. Obviously, South Korea wanted to reopen the joint production facility at Kaesong, and the Geumgansan resort in North Korea. At one point a South Korean envoy was told by Washington, "don't bother coming to Washington" if you are going to bring up these plans.
The current wave of US "human rights" manufactured propaganda aimed against North Korea, and indirectly at South Korean diplomatic initiatives that present the prospect of success in relations with North Korea, involves US dismay that the North Korean defectors it sponsors in South Korea can no longer send balloons, drones, or other materials over the DMZ to North Korea. According to US propaganda, the prohibition on these dangerous activities impairs the "free speech" of South Koreans in general. This is absurd. No one has the right to go to the JSA and yell or otherwise transmit their personal political messages to North Korea. One could imagine the response of guards at the JSA to such activities. Is that restriction a "free speech" violation? Obviously not. Military and civilian activities along the DMZ and NLL are subject to severe restrictions. All flights within 20 km of the DMZ are restricted, and in the Eastern region of the DMZ the restrictions are extended to 40 km.
The notion that private individuals have a right to send airborne objects over the DMZ is absurd and militarily provocative. One cannot use their own loudspeakers along the DMZ either. Neither can the South Korean government according to the agreements it has made with the North. These are reasonable time, place and manner restrictions rather than an encroachment on free speech. These restrictions were negotiated by the freely elected government of South Korea and the criminal offenses related to these acts were legislated by the National Assembly. These laws serve the end of reducing the tensions along the DMZ and reducing the chance of incidents that may result in deadly escalations. US criticism in the Congress, executive branch, VOA and other venues represents blatant US interference in South Korean sovereignty.
The notion that the US knows better how to reach to North Korean people, or even that it cares about the North Korean people is simply not credible. In any case, no one is stopping the US from broadcasting its incessant propaganda to North Korea via VOA Korea or RFA. Worse, the US position on this issue, presumes that it and its paid North Korean defector NGOs know better how to negotiate with North Korea than the freely elected government of South Korea. Direct contact with South Korea and South Koreans, through diplomatic channels, limited economic projects, tourism, cultural exchanges, sports events, humanitarian aid, and public health cooperation, represent the best way to open North Korea to initiatives to encourage peace, prosperity, human rights and a path to denuclearization in the North. This is obviously the preferable course rather than the coercive US maximum pressure approach which punishes the North Korean people, encourages hostility, and has as its ultimate object, regime change. One thing the Hanoi summit clearly demonstrated is that the US has no genuine interest in negotiation but essentially is stalling for time while praying the North Korean communist regime will collapse from the "maximum pressure" being applied.
The blog has reviewed in several instances the "step by step approach" to negotiations favored by four of the original six parties, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and China. Reciprocity in step by step negotiations builds mutual trust in contrast to the all or nothing, "one bundle" or so called "Libyan approach" favored by the US and Japan. The outcome of the Libyan approach is demonstrably predictable. Mr. Biegun's feigned US flexibility portrayed in his public statements proved to be little more than window dressing for a hypocritical US regime change policy of maximum pressure. Blaming North Korea is the go to position for failed US negotiators.
Addendum 12.22
Ironically 38North.org published an article by Olli Heinonen Dec. 18, disputing the contention that there is a Uranium enrichment facility at Kangson. The article suggests the facility could be for manufacturing centrifuge components but is not an enrichment facility. Oddly, the article states in an aside that there must be such a "third facility" somewhere, but doesn't provide a basis for this assumption.*
New Evidence Suggests Kangson Is Not a Uranium Enrichment Plant, OLLI HEINONEN, Dec. 18; https://www.38north.org/2020/12/kangson201217/
I'm taking note of the article because according to Thae Yong-ho a well known North Korean defector in South Korea, and now a conservative National Assembly representative, the existence vel non of the so called Kangson secret enrichment facility was a dealbreaker at Hanoi. (See our discussion: Thae Yong Ho Says Secret Uranium Enrichment Facility Dealbreaker in Hanoi, March 14, 2019). In Beigun's January 31, 2019, presentation at Stanford, during the question and answer period, Beigun noted the pitfalls of confusing intelligence assessments and priorities with diplomatic policy goals. Noting the potential problem beforehand seemingly had no impact on the outcome of the summit. Allegedly, the US side's eagerness to test a dubious intelligence theory nevertheless resulted in the Hanoi Summit's theatrical denouement.
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