In the last few weeks, the US has test fired a double ABM intercept on a single test target in the Pacific, conducted an exercise Minuteman III ICBM launch in the Pacific, deployed THAAD missiles to Camp Humphreys in a mobility exercise, and conducted a new version of the Max Thunder joint Air Force exercise with South Korea. In addition to this it is upgrading its entire nuclear armaments force and putting new precision nuclear warhead fuses on its SLBMs to turn them into a nuclear first strike force. Recently the US withdrew from the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran and gave notice it's leaving the INF treaty with Russia.
So the North Koreans launch long range artillery rockets, and a new short range guided missile according to new reports and the propaganda mills are in full throttle. KCNA reporting May 5 acknowledged the use of tactical guided weapons (전술유도무기). The launches avoided the military exercise buffer zone established in the recent military agreements with South Korea and apparently did not offend any other territorial limits. Yet, we’ll no doubt have to hear about this event over and over again for weeks if not months. It’s the usual hype by those adamantly opposed to any kind of denuclearization agreement with North Korea.
“This is just kind of what this class of short-range missiles looks like,” Jeffrey Lewis says.*
Jenny Town says, “It actually makes it more difficult for the U.S. and South Korea to postpone military exercises.”* The problem here is that they had already resumed joint exercises in late April before this short range guided missile launch in North Korea. Several experts have linked the two events. The new North Korean guided tactical weapon ( 전술유도무기 ) was first observed in a military parade in Pyongyang in February 2018 according to Channel A News national security experts.
(* See: https://www.npr.org/2019/05/08/721135496/north-koreas-newest-missile-appears-similar-to-advanced-russian-design)
In any case, what happened in Hanoi was a rejection of negotiations and a return to regime change politics by the US despite Trump and Pompeo’s statements to the contrary. This was signaled implicitly by the invasion of the Madrid embassy by the group “Free Joseon” (just days before the Hanoi summit); the US adoption of an all or nothing approach to negotiations with no reciprocity at Hanoi; the rejection by the US of the South Korean recommendations for joint Korean economic overtures; the defacto abandonment of the Singapore joint statement; the public complaints about human rights abuses in North Korea by US representatives to UN committees; and the human rights content of daily VOA broadcasts in Korean, including public statements from senior republicans in Congress and the Senate on a daily basis concerning human rights, weapons of mass destruction and other items not outlined at Singapore. The import of these events is unmistakable. Even the conservative expert in South Korea, Thae Yong Ho (the former DPRK diplomat who defected to South Korea) has commented that a return to human rights issues is the code for regime change in North Korea and signals an end to negotiation.
This is from a RAND study:
Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea's Expanding Nuclear Capabilities Drive a Complex Set of Problems*
CHINA’S POSSIBLE ROLE
If a DPRK regime collapse were to occur, the Chinese military might intervene as far as 200 km into North Korea to establish a buffer zone. Within this buffer, Beijing would have considerable interest in halting the northward flow of DPRK soldiers and refugees, securing any missiles and WMD sites, and preventing nuclear materials from possibly entering China. Chinese forces may be willing to cooperate or at least coordinate with other intervention forces to achieve common objectives. To avoid accidental conflict, it is highly advisable for the United States, South Korea, and China to begin a dialogue on their respective objectives and roles in the event of a DPRK regime collapse.
The study implies without making clear that China will not allow US military forces or bases near its border and will probably act preemptively to prevent that from occurring.
*Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea's Expanding Nuclear Capabilities Drive a Complex Set of Problems
by Gian Gentile, Yvonne K. Crane, Dan Madden, Timothy M. Bonds, Bruce W. Bennett, Michael J. Mazarr, Andrew Scobell
https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL271.html
May 8 Note: this blog opinion has been updated, rewritten and edited several times since May 5.
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