UN Resolutions

1874 ( 12 June 2009 )

2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any
launch using ballistic missile technology;
3. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;


2387 ( 22 December 2017 )

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under Article 41, 1. Condemns in the strongest terms the ballistic missile launch conducted by the DPRK on 28 November 2017 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council’s resolutions; 2. Reaffirms its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;


...Further decides that this prohibition shall not apply with respect to crude oil that, for a period of twelve months after the date of adoption of this resolution, and for twelve months periods thereafter, does not exceed 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons in the aggregate per twelve month period,...
...this provision shall not apply with respect to procurement by the DPRK or the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of refined petroleum products, including diesel and kerosene, in the aggregate amount of up to 500,000 barrels during a period of twelve months beginning on January 1, 2018, and for twelve month periods thereafter, provided that (a) the Member State notifies the Committee every thirty days of the amount of such...

...this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, stresses the DPRK’s primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK, and decides that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;

26. Reaffirms its support for the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, and reiterates its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and the return of the DPRK to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at an early date, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT and underlining the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty and exist peacefully...

28. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch, and decides that, if the DPRK conducts a further nuclear test or a launch of a ballistic missile system capable of reaching intercontinental ranges or contributing to the development of a ballistic missile system capable of such ranges, then the Security Council will take action to restrict further the export to the DPRK of petroleum; 29. Decides to remain seized of the matter.


http://www.atomicarchive.com/Reports/Northkorea/JointStatement.shtml

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks
- September 19, 2005

5) The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=82&v=1oaAppeUCNw

International intelligence conference assessment concludes short range missile launches not a UN resolution violation.

It appears that one or more of the permanent Security Council member states have employed standard rules of construction, and the final paragraphs of Resolution 2397 to leave plenty of wiggle room for diplomatic maneuver in the ongoing nuclear dispute with North Korea. Therefore, the conclusion of the Global Intelligence Summit in South Korea this week seems arguable if not entirely correct. Andrew Kim former US CIA North Korea Mission Chief participated in the conference. South Korea’s Arirang News did not specify the legal or forensic bases for the assessment’s major finding so it is outlined here. Andrew Kim was quoted only for the practical ramifications of the assessment. Other plain language, in UN resolutions 1874 and 2397 hedged elsewhere with contextual statements and references, provides fodder for the extreme position taken by John Bolton against his own president. Bolton’s position that the short range missile launches by North Korea in May of this year violate “UN resolutions,” oddly finds support not only in the Congress but among the opposition Democratic Party as well. Naturally, his position while referencing UN resolutions generally, necessarily categorically rejects the Six Party principle cited above in paragraph 5 of the September 19, 2005 statement, incorporated by reference into UN Resolution 2397. There is quite intentionally in the latter UN resolution a difference between flat demands for suspension, moratorium, and abandonment of ballistic missile systems, in its introductory paragraphs, and the last provision in paragraph 28 of Resolution 2397 related specifically to enforceability in the form of further punitive sanctions only in connection with intercontinental ballistic missile threats from North Korea, in the form of further test launching.

Thousand Year Rock

천년바위
Thousand year rock (2013)

lyrics: Jang Kyeong-soo 장경수 Music: Jang Ook-cho 장욱조 Original singer: 박정식


동녘 저 편에 먼동이 트면 철새처럼 떠나리라
Beyond the East that way, if the sun rises, like a migrating bird, I will leave

세상어딘가 마음 줄 곳을 집시되어 찾으리라
Anyplace in the world that I'm inclined, I will become a gypsy and seek,

생은 무엇인가요 삶은 무엇인가요
Life what is it, what is existence?

부질없는 욕심으로 살아야만하나
Overcome living by way of futile desire.


서산 저 너머 해가 기울면 접으리라 날개를
If the sun sets over the western mountain, I will fold my wings

내가 숨쉬고 내가있는 곳 기쁨으로 밝히리라
I will draw a breath, My place will be joyfully revealed.

생은 무엇인가요 삶은 무엇인가요
Life what is it, what is existence?

부질없는 욕심으로 살아야만하나
Overcome living by vain desire.

이제는 아무 것도 그리워말자 생각을 하지말자
Now let's want for nothing, let's think of nothing

세월이 오가는 길목에 서서 천년바위 되리라
Standing at the crossroads where time comes and goes, I will become a thousand year rock

천년바위 되리라 천년바위 되리라
I will become the millennial rock, become the millennial rock.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DJ8_zVmAa4&t=58s

China Staking Out its Policy

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzhZGUfaZhI



Liu Xin, CGTN news anchor rips Fox News coverage of the US-China trade war, and places US policy in a historical context viewed from the Chinese perspective. The thing that is remarkable about this editorial presentation by a Chinese government media group is the uncompromising and critical approach Liu Xin takes which is really uncharacteristic for her. This program is intended for English speaking audiences and that is typically consciously reflected in its temperate and diplomatic approach to issues. This places the trade dispute in an unfavorable historical light in which US-Chinese relations are prospectively to be viewed. The departure from the friendlier relationship between China and the US that began in 1972, is now being officially acknowledged on the Chinese side, and they are accepting the challenge to their sovereignty in historical terms which make accepting overbearing US terms unlikely.

Ri Son Gwon out at DPRK Reunification Office?

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 5.22) Ri Son Gwon to top South Korean business leaders visiting North Korea in September 2018, on a trip with President Moon Jae In: Did the nengmyun (North Korean cold noodle dish) go down your throat?

Ri Son Gwon, Minister of the Motherland Peaceful Unification Committee of the DPRK, appears to have been ousted according to official sources in the ROK Unification Ministry. He was observed in a commemorative photograph taken on April 10, 2019, of members of the Plenary Meeting of the DPRK Party Central Committee. Beyond this the South Korean Unification Ministry spokesperson could not provide additional confirmation. South Korean Unification Minister, Kim Yeon Chol, recently visited the Kaesong Liaison Office, May 8, to discuss arrangements for an upcoming meeting with South Korean business leaders who wish to visit their inactive factory facilities in Kaesong, North Korea. His counterpart Ri Son Gwon was not present, so he asked the North Korean side to convey his greetings. According to undisclosed intelligence sources, it is believed the replacement for Ri may be Im Yong Chol (림용철).

https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/view/2019/05/337308/

(Source- News TVChosun- 6.1.2018) Ri Son Gwon to South Korean reporters at Panmunjeom: In the future don't ask questions out of tenor with the times, I will consider them rude.

According to Channel A Top Ten news analysts, the continued non-appearance of Ri Son Gwon in public events is related to the debacle at the Hanoi summit and the fall from grace of Kim Yong Chol, who was reported on April 24, to have been replaced as the Unification Front chief. Kim Yong Chol was regarded as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's counterpart in denuclearization negotiations until the break at the second US- North Korean summit in Hanoi. According to reports, there was little love lost between Kim Yong Chol and Mike Pompeo. Kim Yong Chol did not attend the summit in Vladivostock with the Russian president Vladimir Putin. Ri Son Gwon was regarded as Kim Yong Chol's right hand, and was responsible for conducting negotiations with South Korea. The disappearance from public view of Ri is regarded as further evidence of turmoil, if not an all out purge, in North Korea's management of foreign affairs and in particular reflects a shift of authority from the Unification Front to the Foreign Office of North Korea where Choe Son Hui has apparently taken the leading role in dealings with US since the break at Hanoi.

The number that tells a different story of US-China trade

(Source- CNBC, youtube 5.21)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VG-aEwY0R50

How hundreds of billions of dollars in US multinational corporate sales in China and overseas generally are excluded from discussion in the anti-Chinese trade war/trade deficit hysteria.

Naval Support Buildup in the Far East?

(Source-Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense 5.14) Title- US in the process of concentrating a historically high level of war materials transport ships in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula. Has the US decided on war?

Sin In Kyun's May 14 podcast on youtube reports on US naval supply ship positions throughout the Pacific region with a focus on northeast Asia. He suggests that the level of prepositioned equipment, supplies and ammunition is at a historically high level and is a signal to North Korea that the US is ready to carry out military operations should the North be unwise enough to engage in more provocative missile launches. He claims there are enough supply vessels to arm and support three armored brigades and one division for fifteen days. He also identifies ammunition supply for air forces.

Shin's report is the result of his collection effort from his network of contacts according to what he said. He said the deployment of naval support ships attained the level of the crisis in 2017. He made some comment to the effect that if he could collect this much information about the naval posture, then certainly a more resourceful North Korean network would certainly be better informed and understand the current high level of readiness of US forces.

Shin contends that currently there are 13 ships potentially available to support military operations in the Korean theater. One could make a lower estimate. Shin argues that there was no exercise activity to warrant the positioning of these ships in the areas he has plotted, but there actually has been an exercise in Philippines recently. (12-day-long Balikatan, an annual military exercise between American and Filipino troops ended April 11). Also some of these 13 ships are rather remote from the Korean peninsula such as one reported in the Singapore area, and two more in the vicinity of Guam, with another charter merchant vessel still in port in California as of the time of his report. So that takes his reports of thirteen vessels as being an unusual indicator down to nine, deployed in the direct vicinity of either South Korea or Japan. Shin also reports on some air operations at Yokota airbase in Japan as being unusual VIP transport. He never misses an opportunity to mention continuing Osprey operations there.

(Source-Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense 5.14) US prepositioned deployed ships, as many as 13 ship movements listed.

Because Shin tends to be overzealous and exaggerates in his approach to defense analysis, perhaps his report should be disregarded. Nevertheless, the detail of a report in itself may warrant a look, although perhaps lending it a credibility it might not deserve. Obviously, it's a difficult subject matter due to classification and operational security concerns. This particular youtube podcast of his Daily Defense program has gained almost 800,000 views at this point.

(Source-Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense 5.14)

(Source-Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense 5.14) US prepositioned ships, as many as 13 ship movements!

China's "Pearl Necklace"

(Source- Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense 5.13) Shin put together a nice map of Chinese port interests extending from Hainan to Khartoum on the Red Sea, and to Bagamoyo, on the East Coast of Tanzania. The chart reminds one of the 15th Century trading patterns of China described in When China Discovered America by Gavin Menzies and When China Rules the World by Martin Jacques.

Starting from Hong Kong, and proceeding south to Hainan Island in the South China Sea, the Chinese maritime "pearl necklace"( 진주 목걸이 ), described by Shin, marks the military bases of the Spratley and Paracel islands, and then proceeds westward toward unspecified locations in Cambodia and Thailand; the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone in Myanmar on the Bay of Bengal; Chittagong, Bangladesh; Hambantota port project in Sri Lanka; the Maldives; Gwadar, Pakistan; Bagamoyo, Tanzania; Djibouti; and Khartoum. The Chinese prefer the term maritime silk road; the US coined term, "string of pearls," implies a military rather than economic objective.

One unidentified location is the Kuantan Port in Malaysia, a known Belt and Road Initiative. This is the only container port on the east coast of Malaysia.

https://en.businesstimes.cn/articles/104621/20181103/a-look-behind-the-development-of-malaysia-kuantan-port-funded-by-china.htm

One of BRI initiatives in Thailand is the Kra Canal project:

Another initiative that might have implications for the BRI is the controversial Kra Canal project. This would see a waterway excavated across the narrow 135-km isthmus linking the Gulf of Thailand directly to the Indian Ocean, enabling ships from China and other north Asian countries to save around three days sailing, via Singapore, on journeys westwards. The canal would cost around $28bn to complete, but has long been the subject of political controversy due to the impact it would have on fellow ASEAN members Singapore and Malaysia.*

*China's Belt and Road Initiative to reshape routes in Thailand and the broader South-east Asian region
https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/road-china%E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-initiative-reshaping-south-east-asia-2

Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the planned Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway are two BRI projects in Cambodia. Sihanoukville is the only Cambodian deep water port.
https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/the-belt-and-road-in-cambodia-successes-and-challenges/

Shin points out that the port of Gwadar is the centerpiece of the "string of pearls." Gwadar was the scene of a recent terrorist attack last weekend by separatists.

Gwadar port was constructed by China as part of the Belt and Road Initiative and is an important hub in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing aims to expand its influence in Pakistan and across Central and South Asia.

Baloch separatists — both militant and political groups — oppose China's increasing involvement in the province. In March 2018, Aslam Baloch, a BLA commander, told Indian media that Pakistan and China are exploiting Baluchistan's resources.*

* Pakistan: Gunmen target luxury hotel in China-funded port city https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-gunmen-target-luxury-hotel-in-china-funded-port-city/a-48701401

The thrust of Shin's presentation is that the BRI initiative by China is predatory, and that China is lending funds for capital infrastructure projects that cannot be paid back, that China is taking managerial control of the infrastructure, and in effect "taking over." He says the interest rates on the projects are 12 percent. He doesn't really present a source for this information and in general his presentation seems to oversimplify some of the contractual arrangements with host national entities who share an interest in these projects. How is what China does different from US overseas investment practices? One is reminded of John Perkins' book, Economic Hitman. One can't help but think about what is going in Venezuela, which is a paradigm for recreating the comprador model of imperialism in that part of the world. How much have African states benefited from western economic exploitation?

Musanggae by Bo Hyun Seunim 무상게 (無常偈) 보현스님

1.
곱디 고운 베옷 입고 Dressed in lovely hemp clothes
꽃신 신고 가는 님아 And flowered shoes, My love leaves
이승의 짐 훌훌 벗고 Slips off the baggage of this world
고이 가소 정든 님아 And leaves peacefully, My beloved

사바고해 고통일랑 Bitter world of suffering and torment
한강물에 띄우고 In the Han River float away
지난 날 맺힌 한 Sorrows tied to past days
바람결에 흩날리고 Flutter away with the wind.

지장보살 영접받아 Jijangbosal (Ksitigarbha Bodhisattva) receives you
서방정토 왕생하여 Pass away to paradise
아미타불 친히 뵙고 You will meet Amitabha,
부디 성불 하고지고 Pray, to attain Buddhahood.
아아아 아아아 아아아 ah, ah, ah, ah...
부디 성불 하고지고 Pray to enter Nirvanna

2.
태산 준령 망망대해 High and steep mountains, open seas
세월 속에 변하는데 In the passage of time change
백년 안팎 짧은 인생 A hundred years more or less, short life.
생로 병사 면할 손가 Birth, infirmity, sickness and death, will one escape more loss?

부처님이 이르시되 Buddha said this
사대육신 허망하여 Human flesh and bones are vain
인연따라 태어났다 According to Nidana, you were born
인연따라 간다했소 According to Nidana, you passed away.

지장보살 영접받아 Jijangbosal (Ksitigarbha Bodhisattva) receives you
서방정토 왕생하여 Pass away to paradise
아미타불 친히 뵙고 You will meet Amitabha,
부디 성불 하고지고 Pray, to attain Buddhahood
아아아 아아아 아아아 ah, ah, ah...
부디 성불 하고지고 Pray, to attain Buddhahood

<<<<>>>卍──┼♧撫 仙
무상게(無常偈)
보현스님 Bo Hyun Seunim

(Source- https://www.lyrics.co.kr/?p=524646 ; teoui's English translation)

US-DPRK: Mine's Bigger than Yours

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 5.9)

North Korea has fired two more guided missiles from a launch site inland near Sino Ri, North Pyongyan Province. The flight paths carried the missiles eastward toward the Sea of Japan/East Sea. The first launch at 4:30 pm Seoul time was estimated as a 420 to 430 km flight. The second launch at 4:50 pm was estimated at 270 km. The prior guided missile flight from the Hodo peninsula on April 4, was 240 km.

The US announced on April 9 that it had seized a North Korean coal freighter Wise Honest on or about April 2. The US also fired another Minuteman III ICBM in a second exercise on April 9, the missile was targeted at the Kwajalein range in the Marshal Islands. This was the second Minuteman III test launch in just over a week. It is believed that the US Minuteman ICBM launch on the 9th was almost contemporaneous with the two North Korean Sino Ri launches. Reportedly the Vandenburg launch took place ten minutes after the first North Korean launch. The claim that this second Minuteman launch was a routine exercise launch seems disingenuous. The USS Rhode Island test fired a Trident SLBM off the Florida east coast April 9, a few hours later. The headlines appear to be trying to relate this Navy launch to the North Korean situation to get the most mileage out of it.

(Source- KBS 24 youtube podcast April 26) Panmunjeom Declaration, one year special edition discussion. Pak Ji Won, Democratic Peace Party representive; Jeong Se Hyun, former Unification Minister; Moon Chung In, President's special adviser for unification policy, foreign relations, and national security.


Stephen Biegun is in Seoul purportedly to discuss negotiating approaches to North Korea. South Korea intends to carry out humanitarian food aid to North Korea. The White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said the US would not oppose it. I have the distinct impression from listening to an open discussion among the three "wise men" of South Korea concerning unification policies, April 26, calling for more courage from the Moon Administration in a difficult situation, that the humanitarian aid would go ahead whether the US consented or not. The wise men also called for South Korea to draw up a road map for denuclearization with each step delineated on a schedule with tangible actions for North Korea and tangible reciprocal measures by the US including easing of sanctions incrementally as progress is made along the way. Why the US hasn't done this yet reflects on the character of its "negotiating" effort.

North Korea short range missile launch in context

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 4.23) "US Forces Korea, last week conducted a THAAD deployment to Pyeongtaek...Photo made public on SNS."


In the last few weeks, the US has test fired a double ABM intercept on a single test target in the Pacific, conducted an exercise Minuteman III ICBM launch in the Pacific, deployed THAAD missiles to Camp Humphreys in a mobility exercise, and conducted a new version of the Max Thunder joint Air Force exercise with South Korea. In addition to this it is upgrading its entire nuclear armaments force and putting new precision nuclear warhead fuses on its SLBMs to turn them into a nuclear first strike force. Recently the US withdrew from the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran and gave notice it's leaving the INF treaty with Russia.

So the North Koreans launch long range artillery rockets, and a new short range guided missile according to new reports and the propaganda mills are in full throttle. KCNA reporting May 5 acknowledged the use of tactical guided weapons (전술유도무기). The launches avoided the military exercise buffer zone established in the recent military agreements with South Korea and apparently did not offend any other territorial limits. Yet, we’ll no doubt have to hear about this event over and over again for weeks if not months. It’s the usual hype by those adamantly opposed to any kind of denuclearization agreement with North Korea.

(Picture source Channel A Top Ten News 5.7) North Korea tactical guided missile left. South Korean Hyunmoo tactical guided missile right. Both solid fueled.

“This is just kind of what this class of short-range missiles looks like,” Jeffrey Lewis says.*

Jenny Town says, “It actually makes it more difficult for the U.S. and South Korea to postpone military exercises.”* The problem here is that they had already resumed joint exercises in late April before this short range guided missile launch in North Korea. Several experts have linked the two events. The new North Korean guided tactical weapon ( 전술유도무기 ) was first observed in a military parade in Pyongyang in February 2018 according to Channel A News national security experts.

(* See: https://www.npr.org/2019/05/08/721135496/north-koreas-newest-missile-appears-similar-to-advanced-russian-design)

In any case, what happened in Hanoi was a rejection of negotiations and a return to regime change politics by the US despite Trump and Pompeo’s statements to the contrary. This was signaled implicitly by the invasion of the Madrid embassy by the group “Free Joseon” (just days before the Hanoi summit); the US adoption of an all or nothing approach to negotiations with no reciprocity at Hanoi; the rejection by the US of the South Korean recommendations for joint Korean economic overtures; the defacto abandonment of the Singapore joint statement; the public complaints about human rights abuses in North Korea by US representatives to UN committees; and the human rights content of daily VOA broadcasts in Korean, including public statements from senior republicans in Congress and the Senate on a daily basis concerning human rights, weapons of mass destruction and other items not outlined at Singapore. The import of these events is unmistakable. Even the conservative expert in South Korea, Thae Yong Ho (the former DPRK diplomat who defected to South Korea) has commented that a return to human rights issues is the code for regime change in North Korea and signals an end to negotiation.


This is from a RAND study:
Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea's Expanding Nuclear Capabilities Drive a Complex Set of Problems*

CHINA’S POSSIBLE ROLE

If a DPRK regime collapse were to occur, the Chinese military might intervene as far as 200 km into North Korea to establish a buffer zone. Within this buffer, Beijing would have considerable interest in halting the northward flow of DPRK soldiers and refugees, securing any missiles and WMD sites, and preventing nuclear materials from possibly entering China. Chinese forces may be willing to cooperate or at least coordinate with other intervention forces to achieve common objectives. To avoid accidental conflict, it is highly advisable for the United States, South Korea, and China to begin a dialogue on their respective objectives and roles in the event of a DPRK regime collapse.

The study implies without making clear that China will not allow US military forces or bases near its border and will probably act preemptively to prevent that from occurring.

*Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea's Expanding Nuclear Capabilities Drive a Complex Set of Problems
by Gian Gentile, Yvonne K. Crane, Dan Madden, Timothy M. Bonds, Bruce W. Bennett, Michael J. Mazarr, Andrew Scobell
https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL271.html

May 8 Note: this blog opinion has been updated, rewritten and edited several times since May 5.

Shin In Kyun Describes North Korean Attack Scenarios

(Source- Shin In Kyun Daily Defense 4.1 youtube) (신인균의 국방TV) Analysis about US 7th Fleet amphibious power to remove Kim Jong Un. The displacement and landing force complement of each ship: USS America LHA, USS Ashland LSD, USS Greenville LPD, and USS New Orleans LPD, are enumerated, along with the respective aircraft and landing craft loads. The Ashland has no aircraft but an amphibious vehicle load.

Reports were released by the US Navy on April 26 that the USS Wasp LHD and USS Stethem DDG, were to be replaced by USS America LHA, and USS New Orleans LPD as forward deployed ships in the far east. They will be based in Sasebo, Japan. In his May 1 Daily Defense podcast, Sin In Kyun has incorporated this information into his ongoing dialogue about how these (increased) amphibious force capabilities could be used to carry out a decapitation mission against Kim Jong Un in the not too distant future. According to Shin's analysis the amphibious group of the 7th Fleet could independently carry out an air assault of 700 troops, and a sea landing of 2300 more combat troops. Missions possible according to Shin are attacks on the Communist Party Headquarters building in Pyongyang ostensibly to capture or kill Kim Jong Un, attacks on Yongbyun nuclear facility and the like. Specific locations mentioned during the broadcast included Chonju, south of Sinuiju, where a famous battle took place in October 1950 during the Korean conflict. Other locations mentioned were Nampo and Pyongyang. Not too long after the battle of Chonju, the UN forces suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Chinese at Chosin Reservoir. Shin didn't mention the latter.

(Source- Shin In Kyun Daily Defense 4.1 youtube) (신인균의 국방TV) Graphic depicts 7th Fleet decapitation mission scenario.

Interestingly, the theoretical scenario sketch by Shin, shows the amphibious attack staged from the West Sea. The USS Ronald Reagan CVN, would participate in the attack, initially in an air defense suppression role. The airborne ground forces would attack the target in Pyongyang. F-35s from the two carriers would establish air superiority and air support. Amphibious landing forces would secure beach landing zones and then secure a path for withdrawal of captured personnel or weapons. Shin indicated he ran out of room on the graphic so the Reagan is shown in the East Sea.

Several questions arise in connection with Shin's scenario. Namely, how do US forces ascertain the location of Kim Jong Un? Second how do they move into position without being detected crossing the maritime northern limit line and the extended buffer zones around them? Third how do they succeed in obtaining permission from South Korean political and military leadership to carry out such a risky attack? Fourth, how do they avoid the risk of a nuclear retaliation against US targets in South Korea and the region? How do they avoid the risk of a conventional retaliation against urban areas such as Seoul? Fifth, what preparations have they made for a Chinese military intervention when their security interests inside North Korea are jeopardized? It should be noted that even right wing experts on the situation in North Korea, such as Victor Cha, and Thae Yong Ho, have warned against preemptive military attack on North Korea as a means to resolve the denuclearization stalemate in the past.

(Source- Shin In Kyun Daily Defense 4.1 youtube) (신인균의 국방TV) This is the forcible intrusion concept carried out by airlift of special forces troops to the center target (red) zone. The red and orange zones are attacked and occupied by Tier 1 and Tier 2, special forces, respectively, from the air. In the orange zone those forces establish and widen the perimeter. US Marine forces constitute tier 3 in the standard decapitation scenario, Shin has described before. The tier 3 forces in the outer green zone block the enemy from coming to aid the center under attack, and secure the withdrawal route. The airlift capability whether by Ospreys CV-22, or C-130s is regularly practiced at night in Yokota according to Shin.

(Source- Shin In Kyun Daily Defense 4.1 youtube) (신인균의 국방TV) Graphic depicts special forces landed from Ospreys at the party headquarters building in Pyongyang. Shin said, "Can Kim rest easy and sleep at night? It seems like the annoucement of Kim's death is not far off."

Shin describes the relative isolation of Kim without much expectation of help from Russia, and China apparently turning away from North Korea recently. He claimed that most North Koreans are so preoccupied with their own survival at this point they would be focused on their own affairs. He emphasized at the programs outset that John Bolton seemed to think the military option was the only option and felt this way for years. Shin relied on the April 26 article in New Yorker about Bolton. He felt Pompeo's view wasn't much different. In a separate broadcast, Shin noted differences between South Korea and the US concerning negotiations which were depicted in a statement attributed to US Ambassador Harris to the effect that he didn't have any information on what a step by step negotiating process was. A flippant remark to say the least. Stephen Biegun will be in Seoul soon, to meet the "working group," allegedly to discuss possible approaches to reopen negotiations with Kim.

King Yeongjo's Principle of Governance

(Source: Haechi, viki.com/ Kocowa )

(Source: Haechi, viki.com/ Kocowa )