The commentary on Channel A news Top Ten was that the statement of the policy research office director, was not a direct one by the North Korean government and demonstrates a concern that negotiations are deadlocked as well as the overt resistance to American pressure to negotiate on their terms, with no prospect of movement on either sanctions relief or economic cooperation with South Korea in the absence of sanctions relief, or waivers or whatever progressive relief from the economic sanctions on North Korea might take. While tweets from President Trump and other statements that he's not in a hurry to resume negotiations, suggest a strategy of allowing the sanctions to take their toll on North Korea, and that he is in a superior position and able to wait out the North.
The South Korean political and diplomatic analysts on the program were not inclined to take this viewpoint at face value. In the first instance, both Trump and Moon Jae In, are in critical positions currently. Trump is faced with the imminent prospect of formally losing control of the House of Representatives, which can put additional obstacles in the face of any negotiations which might take place. His domestic political position ultimately grows weaker by the day with respect to legal developments concerning campaign law violations, allegations of self dealing, conflict of interest, and accusations of illegal transactions with Russia. Loss of effective control of the sanctions mechanisms is another potential landmine for negotiations, acknowledged on another VOA broadcast, such as with human rights sanctions adopted by Congress.
Moon Jae In's administration was described as obsessed with achieving a breakthrough on the negotiations with the North, yet finding itself restrained by the US sanctions, and the unresponsiveness of the North to denuclearization overtures especially by the so called working group led by Stephen Beigun. The working group and the US State Department have insisted that Moon get in step with the US. His administration is also locked in disagreement with the US Defense Departments effort's to get South Korea not only to pay sharply increased costs of logistics and support for US Forces Korea, but also to absorb costs of offshore exercises and movements of US strategic assets it probably has no real desire to see in joint exercises. As the deadlock goes on between North Korea and the US the differences appear to widen in the US-Korea alliance. The failure to achieve more substantial results for Moon's administration combined with economic difficulties domestically, is resulting in a decline of domestic political support for Moon, once as high as 80 percent range, now after a steady decline down to about 50 percent. It's doubtful this is regarded as a problem in the US defense establishment which would most likely prefer to see the conservatives back in power. Yet, the North would probably become even less responsive to negotiations with a hostile administration in office in the south.
One of the analysts expressed as a core concern that he believed that the North might now have as many as thirty nuclear weapons and indefinite delays could result in this level being exceeded, leading to increased political tension and military threat to the region.
Near the end of its December 11, Korean language podcast on youtube, VOA reported that official UN submissions yielded a total of refined fuel imports to North Korea approaching half of the 500,000 barrel annual limit. 15,000 tons were said to have been from Russia, and 3,700 tons from China. This level actually seems quite low. With consideration given to at sea transfers, the total amount of refined fuels supplied to North Korea was reported by VOA to be in the 800,000 barrel range for the year so far. One has to wonder why the official reports are so far from the annual limit, while the estimated offshore transfers, by themselves, are said to be, by themselves, far in excess of the limit. The method of estimating at sea transfers is not provided. Public dissemination of the photographic evidence of transfers is sparse, with the same photographs tending to be used in reports over the course of months. Details such as ship displacements, time, dates and locations, are not often reported. This broadcast used photos of two transfers June 2, and June 7, which have been seen repeatedly. Just this past week, VOA did report one other at sea transfer observed by Canadian armed forces. Given the nature of the collection effort, primarily as an intelligence or military function, more details perhaps cannot be expected.
This level of refined fuel imports would not seem to put as much pressure on North Korea, as intended. On the other hand, VOA printed news reports on the impact of sanctions anticipate a deleterious impact on the governing system in North Korea. The tone of the VOA articles and broadcasts suggests that the negative impact on Kim's regime is anticipated to either bring the system down economically, as the economic behavior of the North Koreans can no longer be regulated by the central government, or bring North Korea to the bargaining table in a mood to make major concessions on denuclearization without signs of any US concessions in the form of reciprocal measures. South Korean analysis on Top Ten referred to this phenomena as a return to the previous administration's "strategic patience" policy.
A recent broadcast from North Korea appeared to show no lack of imported goods, or food, at a "department store" in Pyongyang. This although, estimated figures in South Korean reporting show that there has been a radical decline in North Korean exports and foreign currency to purchase such goods abroad. Early in the year, difficulty purchasing foreign luxury products was reported because of foreign exchange shortages which was having some adverse impact on the patronage system among elites. Just last week, Channel A News Top Ten reported the possibility that corruption had reached even Kim's elite body guard unit and that a "purge" of some kind might be underway. It was speculated that this may have been one reason why Kim had been out of sight for a couple of weeks until his appearance at his father, Kim Jong Il's memorial service today in the Palace of the Sun. Formulating a major policy speech for Kim's new years address to the party in this uncertain situation is another likely explanation of his absence from public view.
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