Channel A News Top Ten broadcast for December 4, led off with US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis' presentation at the Reagan Foundation National Defense Forum as its top story line for today insofar as it related to North Korea. The report was styled as "Mattis- North Korea is the greatest threat." Allowing for a bit of editorial distortion in the brief topic label, the report concerning Mattis' remarks on North Korea in answer to questioning at the forum seems simplistic. The diagram above blocks out a theoretical picture of the respective threats to US security, Russia, North Korea, and China. Although Iran was discussed by Mattis, it was regarded as a regional threat while the DPRK is an "international threat."
It is somewhat inaccurate to say that North Korea is the greatest threat; what Secretary Mattis said was that it is the most urgent threat. He described the threat presented by Russia as characterized by its strength, the threat of China by its will, and that of North Korea by its urgency. The use of blocks in the diagram is as if to suggest that there was no integration of the characterized threats. Clearly, the Chinese-DPRK relationship is a complex mechanism, that is further complicated by a failure of the US to distinguish Chinese trade problems from DPRK sanctions problems, and from the inherent military implications of the situation in North Korea for China. A penumbral analysis would perhaps use overlapping circles or a wire diagram to reflect more complex relationships. But as the US strategy toward the DPRK has only two unifying characteristics, maximum pressure in the form of the economic embargo or sanctions, and inflexibility in an essentially coercive negotiating strategy, characterizing the tangled web of international political, military and economic relations and their respective interplay seems unnecessary. The visual device used here suggests some analysis is actually missing. Similarly so with Mattis' rhetorical device that the image reflects.
Secretary Mattis actually made the policy emphasis he wanted to make in the most direct way possible while ostensibly leaving diplomacy to others. Mattis suggested that three unanimous UN Securty Council votes for strict sanctions against North Korea was reflective of the sense of urgency the international community felt presented by the North Korean threat. But that was then and this is now. Effectively, what is in place now, is the freeze for a freeze approach suggested by China and Russia at the time. Mattis' remarks suggested that issues in play with China could be compartmentalized. But the "threats," China and North Korea, are inextricably linked. The attempt to distinguish them ignores reality. The Top Ten host commented that Mattis viewed resumption of joint military exercises early next year, as part of the concessions made to diplomacy inasmuch as they would be reduced in scope and scale. Elsewhere, Arirang News has reported that these exercises are still subject to negotiations with South Korea and the final outcome has not yet been reached. Earlier it was reported by Mattis himself that these decisions would have been reached by December 1.
Stephen Mnuchin claims that the Chinese again promised to support the sanctions regime against North Korea. They voted for the UN sanctions regime in the past during the height of the weapons testing in North Korea. However since, the North Koreans have taken some steps to suspend their nuclear weapons and missile testing programs, and made other gestures of good will. There haven't been any reports that Chinese suggestions for easing of sanctions have been abandoned. So the question is what is the nature of US inflexibility on step by step reciprocity in negotiations with North Korea? It appears according to the South Korean analysts in the Top Ten broadcast that the issue of sanctions against North Korea is being linked by Mnuchin to issues of trade and tariffs in other disputes with China and they are expected to "close the border" and "close the holes" which allow North Korea to evade sanctions restrictions to some limited degree. Even a right wing think tank analyst on a recent VOA broadcast suggested this expectation by the US administration was an unlikely one. China was also advised not to use the North Korean impasse against the US in trade negotiations. So this is the wedge the US seeks to use to separate DPRK from Chinese strategic interests in northeast Asia.
Another major topic reviewed in this Top Ten broadcast was the apparent dithering of Kim Jong Un in response to the invitation of President Moon Jae In, to visit South Korea. There are three major problems with the prospect of a visit prior to any meaningful progress in negotiations with the US. First, is that in view of US inflexibility on its maximum pressure sanctions approach, there doesn't appear to be much of a prospect of any significant results on that front. Several North South economic initiatives are on the table already which can't go anywhere without US sanctions exemptions, waivers or other easing. Moon came away with nothing from Trump at their G-20 meeting. Second is the problem of managing Kim's image for propaganda purposes. South Korea politics are fractious, and he would likely face, relatively small by Korean terms, but very unfriendly demonstrations in any public appearance. Third, is the matter of logistics and personal security. He appears to be weighing the risks against the potential benefits of such a visit. In a previous episode the program had suggested the possibility of Moon's invitation to Kim to visit Hallasan volcano on Cheju island, where security could be more carefully arranged, and where the potential for hostile demonstrations would probably be lessened.
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