South Korean View of P-1 Fire Control Radar Incident

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 12.24) Threatening aircraft South Korea- Japan radar tension: Even though no threatening action- nitpicky Japan...what's their scheme? Taehwoatoi fishing grounds - Dokto (island) disputed territory confrontation plan? Construct a pretext for war making powers?

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 12.24) Red oval, upper right, shows the position of the Taehwoatoi fishing grounds, in the Sea of Japan/East Sea between Korea and Japan. The X marks the relative position of a disabled small wooden North Korean fishing vessel in this area on December 20, about three pm. The South Korean Navy destroyer DDH 971 responded to distress calls in heavy seas, said to be 5 meters. Japanese Maritime Defense Force P-1 maritime patrol aircraft was in the area flying at low altitude. The position of Dokto (island) is represented near the tail of the P-1 graphic. The irregular polygon represents open waters between the two countries outside of their respective exclusive economic zones. Dokto is located in the open waters. Further west, Ulong island is within the South Korean exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The Oki islands of Japan are southeast of Dokto in the Japanese EEZ. The open waters between the two countries in the East Sea/Sea of Japan and current EEZ boundaries represent the agreements reached between Japan and South Korea with respect to shared fisheries and economic development. These agreements do not affect the claims of the parties to the territory of Dokto, which is in the possession of South Korea.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 12.24) Gwanggaeto the Great destroyer DDH 971 equipped with STIR-180 artillery and missile fire control radar.

The Korean destroyer was answering a distress call from a small North Korean fishing vessel in heavy seas. They turned their fire control radar on to locate the small wooden fishing vessel, and as the Japanese aircraft entered the area, at some point the latter detected a threat warning indication from the STIR 180 fire control radar. The Korean Defense Ministry statement indicated that the fire control radar was being used to discern the exact position of the distressed vessel in very heavy seas. Japanese official statements claim the incident involved an irresponsible presentation of a threat to their P-1 aircraft. The ROK Defense Ministry denied that there was any threat to the aircraft. Channel A News analysts suggested that if relations with Japan were better, the incident would not have resulted in such a critical and elevated response from Japan.

Shin In Kyun's presentation of this incident suggests that the South Korean ship should have advised the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force of their presence and purpose in the area, and advised the P-1 of the use of the fire control radar for search purposes in the emergency situation. Shin also suggests that the P-1's continued approach to the destroyer after receiving radar threat warning indications from the STIR 180 fire control radar, is evidence that they were aware there was no threat. A picture taken from the P-1, shows the aft STIR fire control system bearing toward the P-1. The Korean position is that it was operating in the optical mode at that point to record the P-1 passing close by. Shin's analysis emphasizes that international law calls for exercising all possible measures to rescue sailors in distress. By contrast, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea prohibits the use of fire control radars "locking up" other vessels or aircraft or simulating such fire control lock ups. One South Korean Defense Ministry statement denied that the STIR 180 had "locked up" the P-1. The Koreans feel the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue justifies their actions.

The analysts felt that the Japanese response was so unusual it reflected underlying ulterior motives on the part of the Abe administration. Among those, Abe is looking for an issue to impugn South Korea's international standing and at the same time distract Japan's domestic public with a manufactured national defense issue. The bottom line purpose is to override the domestic opposition to turning the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force and it's other self defense forces into offensive military forces. Specifically, the Channel A News analysts mentioned the pending conversion of their helicopter carrier escort class, Izumo, to make it suitable for F-35b fighter aircraft operations as the specific issue currently in question. Opponents to Abe in Japan's legislature are against it.

An editorial in The Chosun Ilbo presented the view that the situation reflected the deterioration in relations with the "nationalist" policies of Abe, and Japanese growing anger with the Moon administration's treatment of the comfort women agreement, and the Korean court's ordering Japanese companies to compensate individual complainants for forced labor during WWII. The Chosun Ilbo editorial reported the Korean destroyer successfully rescued the North Korean fishing vessel.

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/12/24/2018122401185.html

Are Military Movements in the Far East Really Linked to Diplomacy?

(Source- Channel A Top Ten News 12.20)

Channel A News Top Ten is reporting today that an unexpected joint naval exercise among allies Japan, Britain and the US will begin on December 22. Ostensibly, this is a response to political circumstances in the region and intended to place a "military check" on China. Specifically, the integrated allied force will practice joint operations against submarine threats in the East China Sea. One purpose is to demonstrate the level of unity and cooperation of the allies in their surveillance collection, information sharing and military operations. The Japanese ship Izumo, which can carry 14 helicopters is the center of the exercise. The HMS Argyle, a guided missile destroyer, is Britain's contribution. The US is providing Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to the operations.

(Source- Channel A Top Ten News 12.20)


In addition the program noted that it could be expected that a US nuclear powered attack submarine might play the role of enemy threat to be tracked and targeted by the forces in the joint exercise. The program reported recent prior submarine operations of the USS Michigan in the East China Sea during the period from December 9 to December 15. There apparently was a belated Chinese maritime patrol aircraft mission on December 14, which attempted to respond to those operations.

(Source- Channel A Top Ten News 12.20) Did Xi Jinping change direction because of US strong pressure? Xi- next year North Korea solve the nuclear problem demand. Unable to face the US on two fronts, cannot leave the North Korean problem unattended. Source, Kyongnam University, Far East Issues Research Center.


Purportedly, what might be characterized as "gunboat diplomacy" is alleged to have resulted in Chinese responsiveness in terms of the North Korean nuclear impasse with the United States. Allegedly, Xi has demanded that North Korea reenter negotiations with the US and "solve" the denuclearization problem in 2019. Relations with North Korea were characterized as having changed from unqualified support and to have grown distant lately.

(Source- Shin In Kyun, National Defense TV 12.19)

Shin In Kyun in a recent Defense Daily podcast suggested that the deployment of an US Air Force Osprey unit to Japan, contemporaneous with the with US special envoy, Stephen Beigun's current visit to Seoul was the "whip" behind his apparent eagerness to have North Korean diplomats meet with the US working group. Arirang News reports that Beigun went so far as to visit Panmunjeom, and also had some proposals (the carrot) for humanitarian relief efforts that had previously been handicapped by sanctions and US travel restrictions. The presence of so-called decapitation special forces in the region is unlikely to make North Korea more likely to negotiate.

(Source- RT America 12.13)

The arrest of Canadian hostage, Michael Spavor, in Dandong China, suggests that China had already taken a dim view of North Korea's suspension of diplomatic talks with the US before it became aware of any of these military operations discussed in the Top Ten program. This particular hostage, has been close to Kim Jong Un in the past, and as noted on a prior Top Ten broadcast, the arrest is intended to express China's displeasure with North Korea's current approach to negotiations with the US. It's more likely that trade issues between China and the US, are China's primary concern and motive for its message to North Korea. The existence of multiple potential military fronts as vexing problems for China is part of a wider more complex competition with the US. No doubt China would like the problem on the Korean peninsula to be timely resolved in an amicable manner, facilitating simpler direct negotiations between the US and China, concerning trade and other related issues.

Japan to Acquire US Long Range Air to Surface Missile

(Source Channel A News Top Ten 12.18) Japan proceeds with introduction of offensive weapon system. Jiji.com reports Japan defense summary- plan to introduce Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile, (JASSM) proceeding. Assessed as an offensive capability to strike enemy installations.


On Dec. 6, the Nikkei Asian Review reported that Japan was considering the Konigberg JSM as its new longer ranged ASM:

On the other hand, the U.S. would likely welcome Japan introducing either of the air-to-surface missiles it is considering, according to a source familiar with the matter. President Donald Trump spoke of Japan purchasing "massive amounts of military equipment" in a November news conference with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Both missile models involve U.S. companies. The JASSM is made by Lockheed, and Kongsberg's JSM was developed in cooperation with Raytheon.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/North-Korea-crisis-2/Japan-eyes-air-to-surface-missiles-that-would-put-North-Korea-in-range2

Today's Channel A News Top Ten program reported that Japan will be purchasing the JASSM extended range missile for it's air to ground AGM weapon of choice. The precision targeting weapon system is said to have a 1000 km range. Although it is contended to be a defensive weapon, it clearly has offensive capabilities. The Korean analysts at Top Ten were concerned that Japan, along with its growing fleet of aircraft carriers, is abandoning the "self defense force" characterization by becoming engaged in an offensive arms buildup.

(Source Channel A News Top Ten 12.18) Why did South Korea introduce Taurus AGM instead of JASSM? Taurus AGM on right only has a range of 500 km. JASSM with 1000 km range has a superior stealth capability.

Traditionally, the US Armed Forces provided offensive strike capabilities to supplement Japan's Self Defense Force. It appears that the North Korean ballistic missile threat to Japan was a primary consideration for acquisition of the JASSM long range standoff capability. For Japan to assume a new offensive attack capability with the AGM system is viewed as a deterrent to further North Korean missile launches in Japan's direction. Nevertheless, it also presents a new path to armed conflict in escalation scenarios prompted by any potential North Korea missile tests flying near or over Japan. The acquisition is viewed as new escalation of the arms race in northeast Asia. US made weapons acquisitions are also viewed as a way to offset trade imbalances with the US while enhancing Japanese military strength.

(Source Channel A News Top Ten 12.18) With its 1000 km extended range JASSM can reach the Korean peninsula and target most of North Korea even if launched from Japanese territory. If launched over the East Sea/Sea of Japan it can reach targets in China and Russia.

(Source Channel A News Top Ten 12.18) Taurus AGM was selected because its tactical range enabled it to reach most targets in North Korea from South Korean airspace along with its compatibility with South Korean tactical combat aircraft.

North Korea- Trump Has All the Time in the World- Does He?

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 12.17) "You move first." North Korea-US tense power struggle. Chosun Central News Agency (report)- North Korea Foreign Office, US Research Facility, policy research office director, individual statement- Denuclearization can be blocked permanently. (yesterday)

The commentary on Channel A news Top Ten was that the statement of the policy research office director, was not a direct one by the North Korean government and demonstrates a concern that negotiations are deadlocked as well as the overt resistance to American pressure to negotiate on their terms, with no prospect of movement on either sanctions relief or economic cooperation with South Korea in the absence of sanctions relief, or waivers or whatever progressive relief from the economic sanctions on North Korea might take. While tweets from President Trump and other statements that he's not in a hurry to resume negotiations, suggest a strategy of allowing the sanctions to take their toll on North Korea, and that he is in a superior position and able to wait out the North.

The South Korean political and diplomatic analysts on the program were not inclined to take this viewpoint at face value. In the first instance, both Trump and Moon Jae In, are in critical positions currently. Trump is faced with the imminent prospect of formally losing control of the House of Representatives, which can put additional obstacles in the face of any negotiations which might take place. His domestic political position ultimately grows weaker by the day with respect to legal developments concerning campaign law violations, allegations of self dealing, conflict of interest, and accusations of illegal transactions with Russia. Loss of effective control of the sanctions mechanisms is another potential landmine for negotiations, acknowledged on another VOA broadcast, such as with human rights sanctions adopted by Congress.

Moon Jae In's administration was described as obsessed with achieving a breakthrough on the negotiations with the North, yet finding itself restrained by the US sanctions, and the unresponsiveness of the North to denuclearization overtures especially by the so called working group led by Stephen Beigun. The working group and the US State Department have insisted that Moon get in step with the US. His administration is also locked in disagreement with the US Defense Departments effort's to get South Korea not only to pay sharply increased costs of logistics and support for US Forces Korea, but also to absorb costs of offshore exercises and movements of US strategic assets it probably has no real desire to see in joint exercises. As the deadlock goes on between North Korea and the US the differences appear to widen in the US-Korea alliance. The failure to achieve more substantial results for Moon's administration combined with economic difficulties domestically, is resulting in a decline of domestic political support for Moon, once as high as 80 percent range, now after a steady decline down to about 50 percent. It's doubtful this is regarded as a problem in the US defense establishment which would most likely prefer to see the conservatives back in power. Yet, the North would probably become even less responsive to negotiations with a hostile administration in office in the south.

One of the analysts expressed as a core concern that he believed that the North might now have as many as thirty nuclear weapons and indefinite delays could result in this level being exceeded, leading to increased political tension and military threat to the region.

(Source- VOA 12.11) UN, North Korean refined petroleum imports approach 50 percent of sanctions limit. View of tank truck crossing the bridge between Dandong, China, and Sinuiju, North Korea.

Near the end of its December 11, Korean language podcast on youtube, VOA reported that official UN submissions yielded a total of refined fuel imports to North Korea approaching half of the 500,000 barrel annual limit. 15,000 tons were said to have been from Russia, and 3,700 tons from China. This level actually seems quite low. With consideration given to at sea transfers, the total amount of refined fuels supplied to North Korea was reported by VOA to be in the 800,000 barrel range for the year so far. One has to wonder why the official reports are so far from the annual limit, while the estimated offshore transfers, by themselves, are said to be, by themselves, far in excess of the limit. The method of estimating at sea transfers is not provided. Public dissemination of the photographic evidence of transfers is sparse, with the same photographs tending to be used in reports over the course of months. Details such as ship displacements, time, dates and locations, are not often reported. This broadcast used photos of two transfers June 2, and June 7, which have been seen repeatedly. Just this past week, VOA did report one other at sea transfer observed by Canadian armed forces. Given the nature of the collection effort, primarily as an intelligence or military function, more details perhaps cannot be expected.

This level of refined fuel imports would not seem to put as much pressure on North Korea, as intended. On the other hand, VOA printed news reports on the impact of sanctions anticipate a deleterious impact on the governing system in North Korea. The tone of the VOA articles and broadcasts suggests that the negative impact on Kim's regime is anticipated to either bring the system down economically, as the economic behavior of the North Koreans can no longer be regulated by the central government, or bring North Korea to the bargaining table in a mood to make major concessions on denuclearization without signs of any US concessions in the form of reciprocal measures. South Korean analysis on Top Ten referred to this phenomena as a return to the previous administration's "strategic patience" policy.


A recent broadcast from North Korea appeared to show no lack of imported goods, or food, at a "department store" in Pyongyang. This although, estimated figures in South Korean reporting show that there has been a radical decline in North Korean exports and foreign currency to purchase such goods abroad. Early in the year, difficulty purchasing foreign luxury products was reported because of foreign exchange shortages which was having some adverse impact on the patronage system among elites. Just last week, Channel A News Top Ten reported the possibility that corruption had reached even Kim's elite body guard unit and that a "purge" of some kind might be underway. It was speculated that this may have been one reason why Kim had been out of sight for a couple of weeks until his appearance at his father, Kim Jong Il's memorial service today in the Palace of the Sun. Formulating a major policy speech for Kim's new years address to the party in this uncertain situation is another likely explanation of his absence from public view.

Ito Hirobumi and Colonization of Korea

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, ep. 199)

Ito Hirobumi is in the center of the picture above. He believed that eventually Korea would fall under complete control of Japan in all affairs and therefore, after the Eulsa Treaty in 1905, a forcible formal annexation wasn't necessary. By controlling all access to the palace and who could gain an audience with the King, Resident General Ito, separated King Gojong from the independence movement. Under the pretext of protecting the royal family he placed them under his surveillance at all times. On the far left is Katsura Taro, prime minister of Japan who made an agreement with the US in 1905 acknowledging Japan's hegemony over Korea. Second from the far right is Kisi Nobusukae, Abe's maternal grandfather, war criminal during WW II. Kisi was released from confinement and rehabilitated by the US. He became Prime Minister of post WW II Japan. Abe appears on the far right.

Katsura Taro, Japanese prime minister ultimately removed Hirobumi as Resident General of the protectorate of Korea June 14, 1909. He installed as the successor Resident General and later after the 1910 annexation of Korea, the first Japanese governor of the Korean colony, second from left, Tarauchi Masatakae. In July 1907, after Ito had forced King Gojong to abdicate, Japan disbanded the Korean army, and took over internal control of Korea, abandoning all pretense of Korean autonomy. The primary thesis of the program is that there is a continuous historical tradition shared by all the characters shown in the picture above which emphasizes the power of a greater Japan based upon industrialized militarism and a view of neighboring Asian countries as inferiors. The tradition was in essence a learned behavior adopted from the western imperial powers such as the Great Britain, Germany, and the US.

Ito had visited London and studied there for several months. He learned about English control over Egypt and later used that British colonial rule as a model for his imperialism in Korea. He even used the pretext of modernizing and civilizing Korea as a justification for the protectorate. (England controlled Egypt from 1884 to 1954, the so called Cromer model, named after the Evelyn Baring, Earl of Cromer, consul general of Egypt). Ito was removed as Resident General because his policy of gradual assimilation of Korea rather than forced assimilation, failed to effectively prevent or deal with the emergence of an armed resistance by the Korean independence movement. According to the History Journal historians, there is historical evidence that Ito was preparing Korea for forced annexation, and is therefore regarded as having a two faced policy toward Korea. Eventually he agreed with the proposals by Katsura for forced annexation.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, ep. 199) Ito kept the Korean crown prince as a hostage and raised him in the Japanese military tradition. Japan's educational reform in Korea involved forcing the Japanese language on grade school students.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, ep. 199) Ito was assassinated by Korean patriot Ahn Jung-geun, October 26, 1909 in Harbin, China.



(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, ep. 199) Yoshida Shoin, Political educator and thinker. Spiritual leader of the Meiji Restoration. Ito lived near Shoin's Shoka school and studied there for two years. Shoin was executed in 1859 for his rebellion against the Shogunate. In 1869 Ito Hirobumi tried to burn down the British legation in Japan.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, ep. 199) This vision of a greater imperial Japan as depicted in the graphic was attributed to Yoshida Shoin in the mid 19th Century.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, ep. 199) Yoshida Shoin's memorial tablet is stored at the Yasukuni shrine. The shrine commemorates other heroes and patriots of earlier wars and conflicts associated with the Meiji Restoration and the Meiji government. The shrine also commmemorates WW II war criminals, such as Tojo Hideki. Koreans and other victims regard the shrine unfavorably as veneration of the Japanese imperial tradition.

An interesting footnote to the program, was the role of a former US diplomat, Durham Stevens who was employed as an adviser to the Japanese government, and installed by them as an adviser to King Gojong in Korea. Stevens approved of Japanese dominance of Korea. Stevens was assassinated by two Koreans in San Francisco, on March 23, 1908.

For anyone who thinks these considerations of history are not material, the sequelae of the Shoin legacy and the Japanese imperial excesses are still alive and at work. The story on the opening of a small museum commemorating Ahn Jung-geun in Harbin was circulated worldwide and had adverse impact on Japanese relations with China and Korea.

The South Korean foreign ministry praised the museum, saying that it would “set the path for genuine peace and co-operation based on correct historical awareness.”

The memorial was criticized by the government of Japan, where Hirobumi Ito is regarded as one of the founding fathers of the country. Chief Cabinet Secretary and government spokesperson, Yoshihide Suga described the opening as “regrettable” during a regular press conference.

“The Japanese opinion of Ahn Jung-geun is that he is a terrorist who was sentenced to death for murdering Ito Hirobumi, our first prime minister,” he stated.

https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/china-opens-memorial-honoring-korean-independence-activist/

Also from the same The Diplomat article:

Japan’s relations with South Korea and China have soured since the Abe administration entered government in late 2012. The Japanese prime minister’s recent visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine was met with protests from its neighbors and even a statement from the U.S. embassy that said that it was “disappointed.”

Generic news reporting routinely dates the Japanese colonization of Korea to annexation in 1910, but Japanese subjugation of Korea more accurately might be said to have begun with the Sino-Japanese War which began in July 1894, and was basically a conflict over who would dominate Korea. The Japanese assassination of Queen Myeongseong in October 1895, and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, were just further steps in consolidation of undisputed control of Korea by Japan.

Shin In Kyun Advocates Preemptive Strikes on North Korea After Ultimatum

(Source- Shin In Kyun Defense Daily December 11) The conditions for attack on North Korea are being provided. "...or we can assassinate (Kim) like Osama bin Laden and get rid of the situation that way."


If it wasn't clear earlier why "defense analyst" Shin In Kyun no longer appears on Channel A News Program Top Ten which regularly makes presentations on defense and foreign policy issues related to Korea, this December 11, podcast of his National Defense TV program on youtube justifies his ostracism from mainstream media in South Korea. In a recent broadcast before this one, Shin claimed he was unjustifiably discontinued from Channel A News appearances because of his political views, and made the case that he is being blacklisted by mainstream broadcasting in South Korea in violation of his free speech rights.

After giving the litany of human rights abuses in North Korea and the recent justification for the US Treasury Department's sanctions just imposed on three leading figures in the North Korean regime, Shin goes on to advocate that the US present an ultimatum to Kim Jong Un, demanding a complete list of nuclear weapons and facilities and a schedule for eliminating them. After the US demand is refused, he suggests that B1 bombers be used, first to eliminate the air defense network of North Korea with so called "precision strikes," and then with another precision strike, carry out a decapitation mission to kill Kim Jong Un. If Kim is not killed, then US special forces should be sent into North Korea, to capture or kill Kim, in the style of Saddam Hussein, or Osama bin Laden missions in previous US wars. It's interesting that Shin doesn't refer to one of his prior broadcasts in which he states that GPS navigation can be denied by North Korean electronic counter measures, and that "precision guidance" may not available to US bombers and that they might have to rely on dead reckoning navigation and gravity bomb strikes, specifically B-61-12 nuclear weapons.

This extremist presentation, advocating war, fails to address the problem of the impact on South Korea, or how many Koreans generally, or Americans living or stationed in Seoul or the region, would be killed, during his recommended war. This represents Shin In Kyun in his true character as a provocateur hoping to get a particular reaction from North Korea, specifically, a reaction which discourages negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the national security issues and other issues dividing the Koreas, and threatens the region with a disastrous conflagration. One can't help noticing that the youtube podcast included an advertisement for Boeing.

US Sends Kim New Signals

(Source- Channel A Top Ten News 12.7) Hardline faction Bolton unprecedented sanctions removal statement. If there is performance economic sanctions removal can be examined. Now will Kim Jong Un return to the negotiating table? Channel A cites US National Public Radio interview on Dec. 6, as source.

With the US strategy failing to relieve the diplomatic deadlock with North Korea, John Bolton says US will consider sanctions relief for performance of denuclearization by North Korea. According to the NPR transcript of the broadcast he said of a potential second summit meeting:

Well, I don't think the president views it as rewarding him. The issue is not simply what North Korea says. We've heard them say for decades that they're willing to give up their nuclear program. What we need to see is performance. And when we get performance then we can look at removing the economic sanctions.

North Korea has been unresponsive for weeks to South Korean and US overtures. North Korea's conspicuous silence has put the US on notice of failed diplomacy despite statements by President Trump and President Moon Jae In aimed at getting the stalemated negotiations back in motion. Previous public statements from US officials have all emphasized that only final full verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (FFVID) would result in sanctions relief. The VOA Korean language video broadcast on Dec. 7, continued to refer to the FFVID formulation when reporting on the Pompeo meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung Hwa in the US on December 6.

According to Channel A analysts, this statement by Bolton offers the possibility of breaking the impasse with North Korea. This possibility was entirely missing from contemporaneous VOA Korean language news on US Korean relations. Top Ten analysts described the atypical statement from Bolton as sweet sounds coming from the sour tempered Bolton's lips to entice North Korea back to negotiating table. Channel A News analysts suggested that the potential for step by step implementation of sanctions relief in response to similar trust building measures on denuclearization undertaken by North Korea might break the current negotiating deadlock. One might think that this was just a loose use of words by the National Security Advisor. However, another development suggests that a softening of the US position is in process to break the deadlock.

At the same time the South Korean Chosun Ilbo is reporting today that the large scale joint US ROK spring Foal Eagle exercises will be canceled for this April 2019 in the hope of a second US-DPRK summit. The South Korean armed forces will carry out the exercise independently.

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/12/07/2018120701403.html

Military Restrictions on Land Use in South Korea Lifted

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 12.5) Military restricted protection zone land released 336,690,000 square meters (total)- (depicted in orange circles) Inchon: 11,370,000 sq meters; Gyeonggido 114,640,000 sq meters; Gangwando 212,020,000 sq meters; much smaller changes listed to locations further south.

Today the South Korean Minister of Defense, Jeong Kyeong Du, announced implementation of military reform 2.0 in the form of the greatest change in military restrictions on land use and development in South Korea since 1994. The overwhelming majority of substantial changes involve lifting of military restrictions of land use in the border provinces of Gyeonggido and Gangwando, and also affect Inchon to some extent as reflected on the map. Private owners, investors and developers will now be able to develop real estate in these areas without consultation or approval from military authorities. It is felt that the freeing of military restrictions on land use will encourage efficient private use and profitable development of these areas.

One criticism of the reform, which will be implemented gradually, is that over the long term development of land in the area near the DMZ will restrict military operations and maneuver in times of a potential military emergency.

Based upon the report that 9000 sq km, of land are designated as military restricted protection zones in South Korea, this easing of the restrictions affects less than four percent of the designated area released for unrestricted private use.

Mattis, Mnuchin, and Mediation on the Korean Peninsula

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 12.4) America's greatest threat? Russia strength; North Korea, urgency; China, will. Mattis- Iran's threat is regional in dimension, North Korea's threat is international.

Channel A News Top Ten broadcast for December 4, led off with US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis' presentation at the Reagan Foundation National Defense Forum as its top story line for today insofar as it related to North Korea. The report was styled as "Mattis- North Korea is the greatest threat." Allowing for a bit of editorial distortion in the brief topic label, the report concerning Mattis' remarks on North Korea in answer to questioning at the forum seems simplistic. The diagram above blocks out a theoretical picture of the respective threats to US security, Russia, North Korea, and China. Although Iran was discussed by Mattis, it was regarded as a regional threat while the DPRK is an "international threat."

It is somewhat inaccurate to say that North Korea is the greatest threat; what Secretary Mattis said was that it is the most urgent threat. He described the threat presented by Russia as characterized by its strength, the threat of China by its will, and that of North Korea by its urgency. The use of blocks in the diagram is as if to suggest that there was no integration of the characterized threats. Clearly, the Chinese-DPRK relationship is a complex mechanism, that is further complicated by a failure of the US to distinguish Chinese trade problems from DPRK sanctions problems, and from the inherent military implications of the situation in North Korea for China. A penumbral analysis would perhaps use overlapping circles or a wire diagram to reflect more complex relationships. But as the US strategy toward the DPRK has only two unifying characteristics, maximum pressure in the form of the economic embargo or sanctions, and inflexibility in an essentially coercive negotiating strategy, characterizing the tangled web of international political, military and economic relations and their respective interplay seems unnecessary. The visual device used here suggests some analysis is actually missing. Similarly so with Mattis' rhetorical device that the image reflects.

Secretary Mattis actually made the policy emphasis he wanted to make in the most direct way possible while ostensibly leaving diplomacy to others. Mattis suggested that three unanimous UN Securty Council votes for strict sanctions against North Korea was reflective of the sense of urgency the international community felt presented by the North Korean threat. But that was then and this is now. Effectively, what is in place now, is the freeze for a freeze approach suggested by China and Russia at the time. Mattis' remarks suggested that issues in play with China could be compartmentalized. But the "threats," China and North Korea, are inextricably linked. The attempt to distinguish them ignores reality. The Top Ten host commented that Mattis viewed resumption of joint military exercises early next year, as part of the concessions made to diplomacy inasmuch as they would be reduced in scope and scale. Elsewhere, Arirang News has reported that these exercises are still subject to negotiations with South Korea and the final outcome has not yet been reached. Earlier it was reported by Mattis himself that these decisions would have been reached by December 1.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 12.4) Mnuchin- China promised to help the US remove nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. Implications- (to China) if you maintain holes in the sanctions against the North, will it have an adverse influence on the trade war? (To DPRK) Don't hide behind China, a warning to change course?

Stephen Mnuchin claims that the Chinese again promised to support the sanctions regime against North Korea. They voted for the UN sanctions regime in the past during the height of the weapons testing in North Korea. However since, the North Koreans have taken some steps to suspend their nuclear weapons and missile testing programs, and made other gestures of good will. There haven't been any reports that Chinese suggestions for easing of sanctions have been abandoned. So the question is what is the nature of US inflexibility on step by step reciprocity in negotiations with North Korea? It appears according to the South Korean analysts in the Top Ten broadcast that the issue of sanctions against North Korea is being linked by Mnuchin to issues of trade and tariffs in other disputes with China and they are expected to "close the border" and "close the holes" which allow North Korea to evade sanctions restrictions to some limited degree. Even a right wing think tank analyst on a recent VOA broadcast suggested this expectation by the US administration was an unlikely one. China was also advised not to use the North Korean impasse against the US in trade negotiations. So this is the wedge the US seeks to use to separate DPRK from Chinese strategic interests in northeast Asia.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 12.4) Promise of return visit to Seoul, Kim's considering? Highest dignity, Personal safety. The burden of having my image damaged. Results of a visit to South Korea? Nothing is certain about the future situation.

Another major topic reviewed in this Top Ten broadcast was the apparent dithering of Kim Jong Un in response to the invitation of President Moon Jae In, to visit South Korea. There are three major problems with the prospect of a visit prior to any meaningful progress in negotiations with the US. First, is that in view of US inflexibility on its maximum pressure sanctions approach, there doesn't appear to be much of a prospect of any significant results on that front. Several North South economic initiatives are on the table already which can't go anywhere without US sanctions exemptions, waivers or other easing. Moon came away with nothing from Trump at their G-20 meeting. Second is the problem of managing Kim's image for propaganda purposes. South Korea politics are fractious, and he would likely face, relatively small by Korean terms, but very unfriendly demonstrations in any public appearance. Third, is the matter of logistics and personal security. He appears to be weighing the risks against the potential benefits of such a visit. In a previous episode the program had suggested the possibility of Moon's invitation to Kim to visit Hallasan volcano on Cheju island, where security could be more carefully arranged, and where the potential for hostile demonstrations would probably be lessened.

History Journal lesson - Advice to South Korean Leadership?

There was an interesting discussion on the KBS History Journal recently about the so called Treaty of Eulsa signed by representatives of the Chosun dynasty on Nov. 17, 1905 which established the "protectorate" status of Korea under the Japanese Imperial government. It appears that one of arguments that led to the treasonous signing of the agreement was that Korea should leave foreign policy to the rich and powerful countries.

The discussion among the South Korean historians gave the impression, they were trying to make a point here about the dangers of giving up foreign policy to foreign powers. This as Secretary Mike Pompeo and his special representive to "North Korea," Stephen Biegun, and their working group with South Korean officials, attempt to restrict South Korean policy initiatives toward North Korea. This is the so called "no daylight" approach. The US is clearly trying to take control of South Korean policy after being caught flat footed by President Moon Jae In's numerous initiatives, political, cultural, economic, and military with North Korea. Whether it should be called foreign policy as it pertains to North Korea, could be said to be a matter of perspective. According to Pompeo and Biegun, the South Koreans shouldn't "get ahead of the US." The South Koreans and the US should "speak with one voice." Further according to the unofficial but connected spokespeople from the ultra conservative think tanks who typically appear on VOA broadcasts to Korea, our ally can be subjected to secondary sanctions and the US can even walk away from the alliance.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, Episode 197 11.25 ) Han Kyu Seol, bottom far right, wears traditional Korean attire. He was the only hold out, who didn't succumb to the Japanese arguments, financial inducements or physical threats to give up Korean sovereignty. It was said that there were five Eulsa traitors, a sixth Korea official was persuaded to abandon opposition at the meeting with Ito Hirobumi, the seventh came around to the pro-Japanese position at a later time. Han Kyu Seol, ultimately was the only steadfast opposition of the original group of Korean government officials. He was arrested immediately, and later stripped of his political position.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, Episode 197 11.25 )

This graphic represents the situation in 1905. England and Japan had a treaty in which Japan recognized UK rights in India and UK recognized Japan's dominance of Korea. This actually achieved Britain's goal of using Japan to check Russian power. US diplomats not only approved of the Portsmouth Treaty but negotiated secretly with Japan to recognize Japan's status in Korea, and in exchange Japan would respect the US colonization of the Philippines in the Katsura- Taft agreement. Similar great power gamesmanship in Northeast Asia affects the treatment of the Koreas today as they jockey for position around the North Korean denuclearization issue.

The great powers bargained away Korea's sovereignty to Japan to serve their own imperial interests. Russia actually was the only power to resist the Japanese, but that was because they wanted to make Korea their sphere of influence. They lost the Russo-Japanese War and had to sign the Portsmouth Treaty in which Japan's dominance in Korea was acknowledged. In September 1905, King Gojong still thought the US might be of help to avoid the Japanese takeover of Korea when Alice Roosevelt visited Korea.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, Episode 197 11.25 ) Teddy Roosevelt's daughter Alice is the woman on the left, center. She was treated like a queen by the Korean Royal family while she was in Korea. In the background is Empress Meongseong's grave. The Korean queen was assassinated by the Japanese in her quarters in the Kyongbok palace October 8, 1895. King Gojong's message to the Americans about Japan fell on deaf ears.

The History Journal participants in the program did not refer to current affairs in the broadcast, this is the author's opinion of what the implicit message was. The historians only suggested that given the decades long awful sequelae for Korea of the so called Eulsa "Treaty," one should keep in mind it's principal lesson.

ROK Soldier's Death at DMZ Guard Post

The tragic death last week of a South Korean soldier assigned to a guard post in the demilitarized zone in Yanggu, Kangwando, South Korea has sparked controversy and internet rumors in South Korea. A Liberty Party Korea (conservative opposition party) national assembly member, Bek Sung Ju, claimed that the military agreement signed by the two Korean states in September and put into effect November 1, contributed to the service member's death from a gun shot wound. Purportedly, a delay was caused by restrictions on the flight of military aircraft in the forty km zone around the DMZ in this part of Korea. It is claimed by conservatives that prior approval from North Korea was required before the medical evacuation helicopter could enter the zone to evacuate the severely wounded service member.

The Korean Defense Ministry flatly rejected the claim, and reported that the procedures for emergency medical evacuations from the DMZ have not changed from those in effect previously and were unaffected by the terms of the military agreement.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 11.21) Defense Ministry- South North, Evac helo entry first, notice later. (critics) 9.19 Military Agreement suspected cause of Army evac helo failed dispatch. Defense Ministry- we regret to say entirely untrue. Ex post facto phone report notifications to North Korea agreed. Emergency evac support requests and consent procedures are minimized. In this incident, preexisting evac helo mobilization procedures were used.

The consensus on the Top Ten program, was that the military agreement had no role in delay of the flight and that given standard procedures for medical evacuations, and the absence of landing facilities in the DMZ, timeliness was going to be an issue in evacuation in any case. Reference was made to the "golden rule" of one hour in traumatic gun shot cases. The shooting occurred at 5:03 pm. Request for evac was received at 5:19. The aircraft was ready for takeoff at 5:39. The soldier expired at 5:38.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 11.21) GP firearm accident, Emergency helo late lift off reason. Gunshot wound 5:03pm, Request for evac helo: 5:19; moved to transport vehicle for evac 5:24; death during transport 5:38; helo ready for take off 5:39; 20 minutes at least for helo ready for take off, Army manual provides for take off readiness within 20 minutes in daytime, 30 minutes at night.

Rumors that the soldier had been killed by a sniper were not indicated by the circumstantial evidence at the scene. The walls of the guard post were three meters high to block sniper fire. The CCTV showed the soldier in the bathroom area moments before the fatal wound from the gun shot. Video of the scene after the gunshot showed the expended empty shell case from the soldier's own weapon. The soldiers hand phone showed he had been viewing internet sites about suicide before he died.

CSIS corporate backers

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-nMMvY9zNrk

Tim Shorrock published an excellent analysis in The Nation magazine of the NY Times scare story on North Korean missile bases:

How ‘The New York Times’ Deceived the Public on North Korea
Stretching the findings of a think-tank report on Pyongyang’s missile bases is a reminder of the paper’s role in the lead-up to the Iraq War.
By Tim Shorrock NOVEMBER 16, 2018

https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-new-york-times-deceived-the-public-on-north-korea/

Simulated South Korean "Octagon" Military HQ reported in North Korea

(Source* Channel A News Top Ten youtube 11.16) North Korea- Gyeryong HQ replica set up for military exercise? Picture on left the North Korean model of the Gyeryong HQ (satellite image by Planet Labs); Right- image of actual ROK military HQ in Gyeryong. (google satellite image).

Channel A News Top Ten News reported today that the North Korean military has built a simulation of the ROK military services headquarters in Gyeryong, South Korea, at North Korean military training grounds in Yongbyun, North Korea, for military exercise purposes. Gyeryong is located just southwest of Daejun, in Chungcheongnam Provice. VOA broadcast the report on November 14 as reported in Chosun News. The location of the North Korean military training grounds where the structure was located was in Pyonganbuk provice, Yongbyon county, Goseong Ri (평안북도 영변군 고성리 ).

Cited by some analysts as further proof of North Korean hostile intent and duplicity, it is alleged that the target simulation was constructed during the period of improving relations and summits between North and South Korea. The viewers were reminded of the preparation of a similar target in North Korea during 2016 which simulated the Blue House during a time when discussions of "decapitation missions," by US and ROK special forces units against North Korea were common. The Channel A analysts varied in their commentary from views that the Moon administration was in denial of the North's true intentions, to references to periodic indications that major US-ROK joint military exercises could resume, the failure of the North to obtain sanctions relief and the recent US-ROK joint exercises near Pohang.

(Source VOA 11.16) Stephen Beigun, US special envoy to North Korea. US- South Korean working group to meet next week.

Today's VOA program reported that Stephen Beigun's US-ROK working group rould have it's first meeting next week. The meeting of President Moon Jae In with Vice President Mike Pence at the Singapore ASEAN conference was also reported. CNN confirms that Pence said the US was "backing down" on a requirement for North Korea to provide a full list of nuclear and missile sites before a second meeting between Trump and Kim. This seems to present a misleading view of the Vice President's otherwise hard line position on negotiating with North Korea, especially on sanctions issues which are a sensitive point in connection with the Moon administration's plans for economic cooperation with North Korea. See my October 31 commentary - US "working group" to restrain ROK inter-Korean policy.

Undisclosed Missile Bases Report (continued)

(Source Channel A News Top Ten 11.14) Tactical missile belt 50-90km (from the DMZ/MDL) Scud class short range and mid range ballistic missile deployment; the operational belt 90-150 km north for Nodong class ballistic missile deployments; the strategic belt 150 km plus north- Hwasang, Taepodung class ICBMs expected. The primary source for the graphic is the CSIS study at beyondparallel.csis.org.

I'm not going to review all the tedious details of the Sakkanmol Missile Base report headline story. I read the CSIS reports, the NY Times Sanger/Broad framing of the Sakkanmol report and then looked for other press reactions from more responsible sources than the NY Times. The website 38North, likes to be described as "Informed analysis on North Korea," and it generally is. Leon Sigal published a commentary there today, November 13, titled the New York Times' Misleading Story on North Korean Missiles. It's definitely worth a read. The knowledgeable commentator on North Korean affairs characterized the NY Times article by David Sanger and William Broad as "tendentious hyperbole." Here's the link:

https://www.38north.org/2018/11/lsigal111318/

In South Korea, Channel A News Top Ten promoted the story again today, November 14, as it's number one discussion for its analysts. The consensus by the South Korean analysts seemed to be that the NY Times' article was a politically motivated hit piece as discussed yesterday in my interpretation of Shin In Kyun's presentation on Defense Daily and Channel A Top Ten. The most conservative Top Ten analyst somehow regarded the "deception" take as accurate citing Kim Jong Un's statements reflecting his intent to denuclearize. Do nations not attempt to keep their military resources secret and keep them in facilities that they regard as secure as they can obtain? Is this some sort of surprise? Were these bases previously unknown to US observers? At what point did the North Koreans promise to unilaterally give up these weapons without tangible acts of consideration or reciprocity from the US? Secretary of State Pompeo said himself not so long ago, without complete verifiable irreversible security (for the North Korean system) you won't get complete verifiable irreversible denuclearization.

So the focus of Top Ten today was away from the Sakkanmol Scud base facilities to the broader picture of ballistic missile threats in North Korea presented by the CSIS Nov 12 report. The information for the Top Ten graphic and their report came from the CSIS November 12, Beyond Parallel assessment, Undeclared North Korea: Missile Operating Bases Revealed.

https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-koreas-undeclared-missile-operating-bases/


Although there has been a lot of discussion about how medium range missiles could possibly be deployed to the Sakkanmol facilities, one has to wonder at the wisdom of moving more valuable assets to a more vulnerable position. In fact the Top Ten graphic presentation shows what has been the view on ballistic missile positioning for quite some time. The greater the missile's range, the further away its deployment from the DMZ to more remote locations. There will be disputes about facilities that allegedly don't fit the rule, like the purported Kangson missile production facility alleged to be operating just south of Pyongyang. There is also the contention about detection times being reduced by placing medium range ballistic missiles closer to the DMZ and so on. However the graphic above shows this: scuds deploy in the southern belt closest to the DMZ; medium range missile bases in the middle belt, further away; and, icbm's based in the most remote northern zone. The Top Ten graphic based on the CSIS report allows for the possibly deployment of medium range missiles to the "tactical" belt. In the November 12, Sakkanmol report, the CSIS author Joseph Bermudez acknowledges that, "...some of the information used in the preparation of this study may eventually prove to be incomplete or incorrect..."

Who knew? The North Koreans have ballistic missiles.

The "Undisclosed Missile Bases" Report

The New York Times version of the undisclosed missile base story is being promoted by VOA in Asia, and a phalanx of actors from the press and think tanks in the English speaking world promoted as "analysts" and "experts."

The CNN article, When it Comes to North Korea Who's Really Being Deceptive? is surprisingly good. The author Will Ripley's bio says he's been to NK 19 times. His article explains the differences in negotiating styles and positions of the two sides, and how the NK position actually makes sense in light of US politics. Further he describes the Blue House reaction to the misleading characterizations in the New York Times' Sakkanmol missile base story.

The Blue House said Tuesday the existence of the missiles sites was "nothing new" and rejected the use of the word "deception" by the Times and similar framing of the story by other news outlets, including CNN, citing a risk of undermining sensitive talks.

"Talk of 'secrets' or 'undeclared' or 'deception' can possibly bring misunderstanding at this moment when there is a need for US North Korea dialogue, because it can block the talks and undermine the opening of negotiation," the Blue House official said.

https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/13/asia/north-korea-missile-bases-analysis-intl/index.html

In fact, the existence of the Sakkanmol missile base has been known since its construction was observed two decades ago. The whole intent of the report and its framing is obviously to discourage the resumption of negotiations with the North. Another key aspect is the base chosen, one out of thirteen locations known to the US. The Sakkanmol missile base is 85km north of the DMZ and only 135km from Seoul. So the story is intended to impact South Korean political opinion, particularly that in Seoul.

Source Channel A News Top Ten 11.13

Shin In Kyun 신인균, the military analyst who does so much work for Channel A Top Ten, is saying the US electoral politics are driving US policy toward North Korea to the hardline position. (트럼프의 큰그림에 낚인 민주당, 북폭으로 가나?) Democratic Party, hooked by the Trump big picture, heading to an explosion in North Korea? That's the title of his presentation. (Buk Pok appears to a contraction for bukhan pokkiak, north korea bombing attack.)

In other words, Democrats, "hooked by the Trump big picture," are hardliners. He begins his report with the Sakkanmol missile base story by the New York Times and the reported 13 "undisclosed missile bases," the US knows about but there are others alleged up to a total of 20. He then goes on to describe how this coverage and other coverage by the NY Times and other media are designed to support the Democratic Party officials by repeated reports criticizing Trump.

Shin calls it hooked by the Trump big picture, we call it Trump derangement syndrome. It plays right into the hands of the hardliners inside the beltway, State Department, and "national security" community who simply don't know what they are doing other than promoting as many military threats as they can to protect their budget and acquisition plans.

In any case, the election results forced the postponement of the Kim Yong Chol trip to NYC more than anything else. Shin cites Senator Markey as an example of the Trump syndrome driving the Democratic hardliners.

(Source 신인균의 국방TV Nov 13, 2018 youtube) Sen Edward Markey East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee- Trump is being played by Kim Jong Un. Nuclear and Missile program suspension doesn't include any concrete measures, talks are inappropriate.

Shin asserted that Markey stated not only that Trump should not have a second summit with North Korea but that the State Department shouldn't negotiate with North Korea either. According to Shin, people in the US establishment think that this strategy intended to get the North Koreans to think that they may be attacked preemptively at any time, is going to get them to make the concessions along the lines desired by the US hardliners. The atmosphere it creates in the north, especially under current unstable conditions there, makes such a reaction unlikely. He does expect major US-South Korean joint exercises to resume in the spring, the possibility of which was reported in the Japan Times today. It is unlikely President Moon will give up his life long political goals so easily.

Haley- US Won't Withdraw the Stick

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 11.9) US (Nikki) Haley, "We've given many carrots to North Korea...the stick will not be withdrawn."

Channel A News Top Ten presented a broad view of the situation in the North November 9. They talked about the suspension of the planned second US- North Korea summit negotiations and the reaction in the North Korean state run media to that, the US-ROK working group (mentioned in a previous Oct. 31 write up here), and the joint US-ROK marine exercises near Pohang. They discussed the serious deficiencies in crop yields in North Korea, after the drought, compounded by the effects of one of the typhoons which flooded farmlands and towns in Gangwon Do, North Korea. So this serious food supply problem in North Korea is reflected in renewed calls for self reliance and renewed efforts by the people in the official North Korean press. The Channel A analysts were speculating that between the bad harvest and the sanctions that there would be political unrest perhaps provoked by the forced state collection of cooperative farm output. It sounded like the levy was coming early in the harvest season to avoid pilfering and grey market activity. They mentioned that the jang ma dang, the informal private entrepreneurs would be adversely affected. All this could potentially result in political discontent in the population at large.


The North Korean press views expressed were along the lines that the joint marine exercises were not in the spirit of negotiations reflected in the Singapore summit, and that the people would have to be self sufficient and rely on their own resources to survive the international campaign against their government. ( a reference to the UN sanctions). As for Beigun's working negotiations group with the ROK it said that reflected US bad faith and a lack of regard for the South Korean sentiments. This is conservative coverage by a broadcaster in South Korea, Channel A reporting on North Korean perspectives reflected in official North Korean media. The Top Ten commentary was that the marine exercises were relatively small scale and the criticism seemed disproportionate. This may be so, but in an earlier broadcast Top Ten emphasized the presence of the most advanced US marine combat aircraft in the exercise.

The instant broadcast had video clips of US UN Ambassador Haley saying that the US had offered enough carrots and wouldn't give up the stick. One of the alleged statements in the Workers Daily, was "don't expect help from South Korea."

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 11.9)

This graphic says North Korea aims simultaneous bundle of criticism at the US and South Korea. The top North Korean publication referred to is Our People- "The ROK US working group, is an act of US arrogance." The second one is a publication apparently called Echo, which says "anachronistic military movements." The program analysts suggested that the suspension of joint military exercises and the withdrawal of strategic assets from the Korean area represented the carrots given by the US. Naturally, the limited joint marine exercises in the Pohang area, in conjunction with Secretary Mattis' recent statement about a determination concerning joint US-ROK military exercises for 2019 by December 1 imply that these "carrots" may be withdrawn very soon.

The entire thrust of the Top Ten presentation was to present an image of crisis in North Korea brought about the sanctions, the food shortages, and the US negotiating position. Joel Wit, a knowledgeable and experienced expert on North Korean negotiations was cited in a Washington Post article Nov. 7, saying, "...Washington is sticking to the 'old playbook,' one that has failed repeatedly, particularly in its insistence North Korea take the first steps such as denuclearization before the United States does anything." This broadcast suggests that the old regime change formulation is making a comeback.

General Vincent Brooks Departing Post as US Forces Korea Commander in South Korea

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 11.6) Partial to South Korea Brooks- successor, a hard liner. US-ROK relations how will they fare? Each time discord in the US-ROK relationship emerged, (Brooks) served as a friendly force.

General Vincent Brooks Commander of US Armed Forces Korea, the US-ROK Combined Forces Command, and the United Nations Command, gave a short speech acknowledging the challenges his command had overcome in changing circumstances, and encouraged subordinate commanders and troops to display the same resourcefulness in face of the hills and summits ahead. He said, "Now Mr President, we see ourselves at the crest of the mountain, but as we are in Korea, there is always another mountain, There is still hard work ahead of us, that still remains to be done, and with your leadership, we know we will be successful and we will be committed to achieving that success." General Brooks is regarded favorably in South Korea as a friend of the Korean people who made substantial efforts to smooth over recent rough spots in the relationship between the allies brought on by changes in the approach to North Korea in response to the nuclear crisis there. The successor commander, General Robert Abrams is regarded as a hard liner compared to Brooks, who was described as a dove by conservative analysts in the Channel A Top Ten report.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 11.6) About Abrams: "Suspension of US-ROK military exercises weakens preparedness against North Korea." Hardliner appearance.

It was noted that General Brooks had previously served in South Korea, had studied the Korean language, and was very interested in Korean culture. He seemed an especially articulate man, almost a politician was another comment offered. Brooks is expected to depart Korea on November 8. Some uncertainty was expressed about the arrival of General Abrams on the political scene and how he would respond to any tensions in the alliance.

DPRK Delegation Arrival Imminent- More scare reports emerge on schedule.

(Source Channel A News Top Ten 11.6) North Korea- greatest uranium mine production in progress. With nuclear negotiations ahead what is the reason for North Korea's uranium mine operation? Getting prepared for a break in the talks? Strengthening nuclear weapons power? A card to enhance pressure at denuclearization negotiations?


The excepts below from the Middlebury Institute estimate of North Korean Uranium ore output are being used as a basis to alarm the public about North Korean intentions. Although the work of the Middlebury Institute is typically produced along with appropriate caveats as to limitations on their sources and methods, such characterizations are missing from popular media accounts which are directed at producing a political impact rather than advances in knowledge or understanding of issues. The information below is taken from the CNS report recently produced concerning possible production levels at the North Korean facility in Pyongsan:


Monitoring Uranium Mining
and Milling in China and
North Korea through Remote
Sensing Imagery

Melissa Hanham, Grace Liu, Joseph Rodgers,
Mackenzie Best, Scott Milne, and Octave Lepinard

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional paper No. 40. October 2018


https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/op40-monitoring-uranium-mining-and-milling-in-china-and-north-korea-through-remote-sensing-imagery.pdf

The two mines referenced are likely Pyongsan and Pakchon, given that
North Korea did not likely build new mines or mills between 1979 and 1992. The larger Pyongsan
site is a better candidate for the .26 percent ore figure than Pakchon (.086 percent), since North Korea likely would
have built its larger mine and mill at a site with higher quality ore.

In North Korea, the varying production estimates for Pyongsan are as follows:23
• Two CCDs processing ore at 0.8%U: 456 tU/year
• Four CCDs at 0.8%U: 886 tU/year
• Two CCDs processing ore at 0.26%U: 273 tU/year
• Four CCDs processing ore at 0.26%U: 529 tU/year

?

The footnote explains:

23 The 0.8%U figure comes from a widely-cited defector, and the 0.26%U figure comes from the authors’
inference (see “Estimating Pyongsan’s Production,” above).

Not very scientific is it? In other words, they're guessing, and plugging in uncorroborated information to outline a worst case scenario.

The recent Nov. 2 article from 38north.org says this, "A future denuclearization agreement will require North Korea not to acquire natural uranium, a key material in the process to produce highly enriched uranium for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program." This is an overbroad recommendation. The information cutoff date on the imagery appears to be May 26, 2018.

Pompeo to meet Kim Yong Chol in NYC November 7-8

(Source- SBS News Nov. 4)

SBS News reports that diplomatic sources have confirmed that Vice Chairman Kim Yong Chol will travel to New York to meet with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to negotiate the details of a possible second summit meeting between Kim Jong Un and President Trump. They will have a dinner meeting on November 7, with full talks on November 8. An anonymous diplomatic source in South Korea suggested that Choi Son Hee, a North Korean Foreign Officer with extensive experience negotiating with Americans concerning nuclear issues may accompany Kim Yong Chol. Further, that efforts to schedule the first meeting of the US and North Korean working level negotiators, Stephen Beigun and Choi Son Hee, which has been delayed, are also in progress.

(Source- SBS News Nov. 4) It is likely, according to a diplomatic source, that "plus alpha" character Choi Son Hee may emerge at the New York negotiating table.