Some thoughts on Panmunjom summit meeting

I'll believe there is a shift in the US position when I see it. The problem isn't just a couple of personalities like Bolton and Pompeo. Biegun is not that reliable and issues vague and contradictory statements. He showed limited flexibility before the Hanoi summit and then after went hard line when his bosses failed to negotiate. (See the prior blog entry "Who is Stephen Biegun's Counterpart?"). Now he allegedly is flexible again. An informed observer can only agree with Tim Shorrock's assessment of Biegun's so called flexibility after reading the recent article about his June 30 statements published in the Hankyoreh.

If Biegun favors a step by step approach to the DPRK talks, there's still no sign of it in his public statements. "Biegun says US will maintain sanctions until N. Korea completely denuclearizes."

See http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/900545.html

One can't help but note that Biegun's recent "off the record" statements seem to parallel Mr. Bolton's expansive demands at Hanoi, calling for the removal of all missiles, and all weapons of mass destruction, the favored lexicon of US middle eastern war making. Such an expansion of categorical demands make resolution of nuclear issues all the more unlikely.

The resistance to negotiation with North Korea is institutional and permeates the very structure of the US. It includes Congress, the UN apparatus, the state department, and the cottage industry of pundits, experts, and "scholars" in academia and non-profits, representing their defense industry sponsors who flood the media with the never ending propaganda against negotiations with North Korea 24-7.

It was just the media choreography of the Moon-Kim meeting that Trump sought to copy. He has yet to demonstrate the political will to engage in reciprocal confidence building measures at the negotiating table. The fiasco at Hanoi proved this.

President Moon's meeting with Kim at Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, captured the media world wide and stimulated speculation about what could be.

The very steps and gestures that Moon took that day with Kim Jong Un were carefully mimicked by Trump at Panmunjom with Kim. While this media buildup about "love letters" and the impending visit to the DMZ was unfolding (similar in nature to the prelude of the unveiling of Al Capone's vault), US diplomats were still twisting the knife in North Korea's back at the UN. While Trump feigned friendship for the North Korean leader, the US delegation at the UN were seeking reduction of refined fuel exports to the DPRK to zero, and encouraging the members to comply with repatriation of North Korean workers abroad as scheduled by a previous UN resolution. This is the two sided face of US diplomacy referred to by South Korea's former Unification Minister Chong Se Hyun as the policies of an "Indian killing long haired white general," after Hanoi.

Thae Yong Ho, the right wing pundit and North Korean defector, says that Trump was trying to emulate Nixon's historic visit to China. This is nonsense. No credit could ever be given by the South Korean right to President Moon Jae In's leadership in his approach to North Korea and Kim Jong Un. Trump never could get the imagery from the Moon Kim Panmunjom summit out of his mind. The significance of Trump stepping on the North Korea side of the military demarcation line really doesn't mean much if anything. President Moon's gesture was far more meaningful. It meant "We are one people." For Trump it meant nothing but a campaign media stunt, to show he could compete with Xi Jinping, among others.