Wednesday, December 30, 2020
훨훨훨 Wol Wol Wol
사랑도 부질없어 미움도 부질없어
Love is vain, hate too is futile
청산은 나를 보고 말없이 살라 하네
The green mountain, sees me, and says live quietly!
훨훨훨 훨훨 벗어 버려라 훨훨
Flutter, fly away, cast off, fly away
사랑도 미움도 버려라 벗어라 훨훨훨
Love too, hate too, throw off, fly away
아~ 아~ 물같이 바람같이 살라 하네
ahh, ahh, Like water and wind, live.
탐욕도 벗어 놓고 성냄도 벗어 놓고
Leave greed behind, too, and throw away anger
창공은 나를 보고 티없이 살라 하네
The blue sky, sees me, and says live simply!
훨훨훨 훨훨 벗어 버려라 훨훨
Flutter, fly away, cast off, fly away
탐욕도 성냄도 버려라 벗어라 훨훨훨
Greed, too, anger too, throw off, fly away
아~ 아~ 물같이 바람같이 살라 하네
ahh, ahh, Like water and wind, live.
물같이 바람같이 살라 하네
Like water and wind, live.
orig song: Kim Jong-im
Monday, December 28, 2020
Injunction blocks disciplinary action against South Korea's Prosecutor General
A South Korean court has created turmoil on the left by issuing a preliminary injunction against the disciplinary commmittee's judgement that Prosecutor General Yoon Seok-yeol, violated his professional duties by improperly investigating judges and failing to the maintain political independence of his office. Other specifications charging his interference in cases where he, his family or subordinates had an interest, and therefore a professional conflict of interest were not addressed by the disciplinary committee. Yoon's petition for a injunction was grounded on a contention that he could not be suspended or removed from office by this disciplinary procedure because the Prosecutor General's office was intended to be independent of outside political interference as a constitutional matter. So it appears that the Prosecutor General's office is now some kind of "fourth branch" of government in Yoon's view. Before the injunction was issued many legal scholars regarded the petition for injunction as unlikely to succeed, particularly because Yoon was only temporarily suspended from office for a short period, two months, and was not barred from reassuming his position as Prosecutor General. Some democratic representatives in the National Assembly and Justice Party representatives are now calling for Yoon's impeachment. Justice Minister Chu Mi-ae, who initiated the disciplinary proceeding, nominally Yoon's superior, is also calling for his impeachment.
Some of the ruling Democratic Party in the National Assembly (174 seats) are calling for the impeachment of Yoon Seok-yeol. Democratic Party leaders however are calling for adherence to the legislative plan to reform the criminal justice process and the offices of prosecutors and judges by implementing the Public Office Corruption Committee, and the separation of investigative and prosecution decisions in law enforcement. The fear is that judges would not confirm a bill of impeachment and that the democratic administration would end in a fiasco. The leaders also wish to stay focused on the worsening pandemic situation in South Korea.
Chu Mi-ae, the Justice Minister. tendered an offer to resign to President Moon Jae-in when the weak two month suspension decision against Yoon for professional misconduct came down from the disciplinary committee. Clearly, the administration was anticipating a stronger disposition such as dismissal from office. The disciplinary committee's determination suggests a compromise verdict acknowledging Yoon's professional misconduct but unwilling to take on the so called "cartel of special interests" dominating the prosecutorial and judicial branches. The committee left it to the courts to take on the so called "Yoon division," within prosecution offices, along with the media and chaebol interests on the right, supporting Yoon. Consequently, Yoon has returned to work and will continue his attack on the democratic administration by implementing new politically motivated investigations and prosecutions in the hope of toppling Moon Jae-in from power, and tarnishing any significant rival potentially running against him during the next presidential election.
Yoon has stated he is not by any means inclined to resign before the last day of his term of office as Prosecutor General in July 2021. His attorneys in the pending court litigation over the substance of the diciplinary decision said they would try to have it decided on the merits within four months. The timing is interesting because newly proposed legislation creating a cooling off period for judges and prosecutors of one year before they can run for office has been introduced in the legislature. So this would mean Yoon would have to resign by April, in order to run as the conservatives candidate for president in April 2022 if the law becomes effective. Also, Yoon's office intends to continue investigate and prosecute cases in which he has a conflict of interest, such as the Optimus and Lime Fund scandals. He also stated he will prosecute a politically motivated case challenging an agency decision to close a nuclear power facility as an abuse of power within the Moon administration. Supporters of the Moon government regard the nuclear power regulatoy decision as a discretionary function with no outward signs of impropriety, being used as part of a continuing course of conduct by Yoon to topple the democratic administration and in the interim to hamper its abilities to implement criminal justice reforms.
An article in Donga Ilbo, a conservative media source, loyal to Yoon, has alluded to Yoon's apparent "appreciation" for the judicial community's "unbiased decisions" despite Yoon's earlier work removing the Chief of the Supreme Court, Yang Seung-tae, for abuse of power related to former president Park Geun-hye's impeachment scandal.* It is equally as likely that judges and justices are intimidated by Yoon who has the backing of some of the most powerful chaebol leaders in South Korea, who themselves have been protected by Yoon's office from prosecution for various illegal acts and scandals. Among these are CEOs from the leading media cartels and industry. So the observation could also be construed a veiled threat, prominently displayed before the affair is concluded.
*윤 총장은 서울중앙지검장 시절 양승태 전 대법원장 등 고위 법관들이 연루된 이른바 사법행정권 남용 의혹 수사를 직접 지휘했는데도 법원이 집행정치 사건에서 두 차례나 선입견없이 판단을 해준 것을 놓고 주변에 사법부에 대한 고마움을 표시했다고 한다. 윤석열 “내년 7월 임기때까지 물러날 생각 없어”…소송 준비 만전; https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20201227/104653420/1
The trial of former Justice Minister Cho Guk and his family in the courts by Yoon's office is one of several examples of cases initiated and manipulated for political reasons in ways that are outside the scope of normal investigative and judicial processes. For example, Cho Guk's wife was indicted shortly after he was appointed Justice Minister with a mandate to reform the prosecution of political figures and senior government officials in South Korea to eliminate documented prior prosecutorial abuses. For this political reason both he and his wife were indicted. His wife, Chung Kyung-shim, a college professor with a serious disability, was jailed pending trial for six months. She was found innocent of four charges against her in the initial indictment filed in September 2019, which was issued without a formal prior investigation. Then last December after months of litigation, when she was found not guilty, the prosecution submitted a second indictment, based upon many of the same operative material facts. The protracted "first trial" ended last week with Professor Chung Kyung-shim found guilty last week of eleven charges in the "second indictment" in a stunning reversal. The case was manipulated at the whim of the prosecution as the defense raised effective defenses as to the state's case. The only bump in the road was the release of Chung from jail pending trial after six months when the court felt pre-trial confinement could no longer be justified. She is now again in confinement after the sentence of four years announced last week. One doesn't need to speculate much on what sort of pressures Yoon's office can bring to bear on judges who don't rule in the manner desired. The principal charge in Yoon's disciplinary proceeding was based on evidence he condoned unauthorized and unwarranted investigations into the backgrounds and personal and financial circumstances of sitting South Korean judges. Observers noted a similar practice during the dictatorship period of South Korean history.
It isn't a leap to view these developments as a prelude to a dictatorial rule by Yoon Seok-yeol in the not too distant future. But for the covid pandemic and the public health restrictions on political assemblies, hundreds of thousands of democratic supporters would be in the streets every weekend demanding Yoon's impeachment. The failure, thus far, to achieve or even recognize a legal limit on Yoon's power or the systemic social and political corruption it represents bodes ill for the future of the South Korean government. It is clearly headed down an authoritarian right wing path. Nevertheless, South Korean establishment right wing media cartels insist in an Orwellian twist, that these developments represent a warranted judicial response to democratic President Moon Jae-in's "despotism."
Monday, December 21, 2020
Biegun's last tour in Seoul characterized by self serving posture; US media's flaky leaflets campaign
In a December 10 article Yonhap News Agency described a talk given, in Seoul, by Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun who played a significant role as the US envoy for negotiations with North Korea. In the talk Biegun made self serving remarks blaming North Korea for the failure of nuclear talks with the US to go forward:
*Biegun says diplomacy 'best' and 'only' course to resolving N.K. challenges, Yonhap News, Dec. 10; https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201210007900325
Let's look at how Reuters characterized the state of negotiations between the US and North Korea on Dec. 4, 2020:
*U.S. envoy to visit South Korea next week: sources, Reuters staff, Dec. 4, 2020: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-northkorea-biegun/u-s-envoy-to-visit-south-korea-next-week-sources-idUSKBN28E1Y7
Note the use of the passive voice, talks "which ended with no deal," rather than the US walked out of the Hanoi Summit in a stunt designed for world wide media play. The US showed up at Hanoi to present a list of expanded demands not previously discussed, basically throwing Beigun's hints at a flexible negotiating posture out the window. The US posture presented a transparent bait and switch manuever designed to bring Kim Jong Un to the table for another momentous photo op for Trump with no substance. The US walk out embarrassed and humiliated the North Korean leader and gave the leadership group in North Korea a lesson in US duplicity it will likely never forget. The following June 2019 summit at Panmunjom was similar media stunt less embarrassing for Kim, but similarly conducted on the US side as a media event for Trump with no substance. Clearly Beigun bears some responsibility for this.
Beigun's role as the head of the US negotiating working group which ostensibly was to lay the groundwork for negotiations with North Korea, essentially devolved to blocking or otherwise frustrating South Korean initiatives with North Korea. The South Koreans were warned "not to get too far out in front," and "to get on the same page," as the US. US envoys said there can be "no daylight" between US and South Korean approaches. South Korean initiatives to open the liaison office with North Korea, and their military agreements to lower tensions along the DMZ, Joint Security Area, and Northern Limit Lines were criticized. North-South plans to survey, restore, and use the east coast and west coast railways were effectively blocked by US sanctions threats. Obviously, South Korea wanted to reopen the joint production facility at Kaesong, and the Geumgansan resort in North Korea. At one point a South Korean envoy was told by Washington, "don't bother coming to Washington" if you are going to bring up these plans.
The current wave of US "human rights" manufactured propaganda aimed against North Korea, and indirectly at South Korean diplomatic initiatives that present the prospect of success in relations with North Korea, involves US dismay that the North Korean defectors it sponsors in South Korea can no longer send balloons, drones, or other materials over the DMZ to North Korea. According to US propaganda, the prohibition on these dangerous activities impairs the "free speech" of South Koreans in general. This is absurd. No one has the right to go to the JSA and yell or otherwise transmit their personal political messages to North Korea. One could imagine the response of guards at the JSA to such activities. Is that restriction a "free speech" violation? Obviously not. Military and civilian activities along the DMZ and NLL are subject to severe restrictions. All flights within 20 km of the DMZ are restricted, and in the Eastern region of the DMZ the restrictions are extended to 40 km.
The notion that private individuals have a right to send airborne objects over the DMZ is absurd and militarily provocative. One cannot use their own loudspeakers along the DMZ either. Neither can the South Korean government according to the agreements it has made with the North. These are reasonable time, place and manner restrictions rather than an encroachment on free speech. These restrictions were negotiated by the freely elected government of South Korea and the criminal offenses related to these acts were legislated by the National Assembly. These laws serve the end of reducing the tensions along the DMZ and reducing the chance of incidents that may result in deadly escalations. US criticism in the Congress, executive branch, VOA and other venues represents blatant US interference in South Korean sovereignty.
The notion that the US knows better how to reach to North Korean people, or even that it cares about the North Korean people is simply not credible. In any case, no one is stopping the US from broadcasting its incessant propaganda to North Korea via VOA Korea or RFA. Worse, the US position on this issue, presumes that it and its paid North Korean defector NGOs know better how to negotiate with North Korea than the freely elected government of South Korea. Direct contact with South Korea and South Koreans, through diplomatic channels, limited economic projects, tourism, cultural exchanges, sports events, humanitarian aid, and public health cooperation, represent the best way to open North Korea to initiatives to encourage peace, prosperity, human rights and a path to denuclearization in the North. This is obviously the preferable course rather than the coercive US maximum pressure approach which punishes the North Korean people, encourages hostility, and has as its ultimate object, regime change. One thing the Hanoi summit clearly demonstrated is that the US has no genuine interest in negotiation but essentially is stalling for time while praying the North Korean communist regime will collapse from the "maximum pressure" being applied.
The blog has reviewed in several instances the "step by step approach" to negotiations favored by four of the original six parties, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and China. Reciprocity in step by step negotiations builds mutual trust in contrast to the all or nothing, "one bundle" or so called "Libyan approach" favored by the US and Japan. The outcome of the Libyan approach is demonstrably predictable. Mr. Biegun's feigned US flexibility portrayed in his public statements proved to be little more than window dressing for a hypocritical US regime change policy of maximum pressure. Blaming North Korea is the go to position for failed US negotiators.
Addendum 12.22
Ironically 38North.org published an article by Olli Heinonen Dec. 18, disputing the contention that there is a Uranium enrichment facility at Kangson. The article suggests the facility could be for manufacturing centrifuge components but is not an enrichment facility. Oddly, the article states in an aside that there must be such a "third facility" somewhere, but doesn't provide a basis for this assumption.*
New Evidence Suggests Kangson Is Not a Uranium Enrichment Plant, OLLI HEINONEN, Dec. 18; https://www.38north.org/2020/12/kangson201217/
I'm taking note of the article because according to Thae Yong-ho a well known North Korean defector in South Korea, and now a conservative National Assembly representative, the existence vel non of the so called Kangson secret enrichment facility was a dealbreaker at Hanoi. (See our discussion: Thae Yong Ho Says Secret Uranium Enrichment Facility Dealbreaker in Hanoi, March 14, 2019). In Beigun's January 31, 2019, presentation at Stanford, during the question and answer period, Beigun noted the pitfalls of confusing intelligence assessments and priorities with diplomatic policy goals. Noting the potential problem beforehand seemingly had no impact on the outcome of the summit. Allegedly, the US side's eagerness to test a dubious intelligence theory nevertheless resulted in the Hanoi Summit's theatrical denouement.
Reflecting on the deadlocked negotiation process, he expressed regrets over North Korean counterparts missing opportunities just in "search for obstacles."
"Regrettably, much opportunity has been squandered by our North Korean counterparts over the past two years, who too often have devoted themselves to the search for obstacles to negotiations instead of seizing opportunities for engagement," he said.*
*Biegun says diplomacy 'best' and 'only' course to resolving N.K. challenges, Yonhap News, Dec. 10; https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201210007900325
Let's look at how Reuters characterized the state of negotiations between the US and North Korea on Dec. 4, 2020:
Talks over reducing international sanctions on North Korea in return for concessions from Pyongyang broke down in the wake of a summit between Trump and Kim in Vietnam in February 2019, which ended with no deal.
Biegun’s visit comes as incoming U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has promised to reset relations with Seoul, which have been strained by Trump’s demand that South Korea pay billions of dollars more for maintaining the U.S. troop presence on the peninsula.
Relations between the allies were also complicated by South Korean frustrations with U.S. objections to some of its efforts to engage with North Korea.*
*U.S. envoy to visit South Korea next week: sources, Reuters staff, Dec. 4, 2020: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-northkorea-biegun/u-s-envoy-to-visit-south-korea-next-week-sources-idUSKBN28E1Y7
Note the use of the passive voice, talks "which ended with no deal," rather than the US walked out of the Hanoi Summit in a stunt designed for world wide media play. The US showed up at Hanoi to present a list of expanded demands not previously discussed, basically throwing Beigun's hints at a flexible negotiating posture out the window. The US posture presented a transparent bait and switch manuever designed to bring Kim Jong Un to the table for another momentous photo op for Trump with no substance. The US walk out embarrassed and humiliated the North Korean leader and gave the leadership group in North Korea a lesson in US duplicity it will likely never forget. The following June 2019 summit at Panmunjom was similar media stunt less embarrassing for Kim, but similarly conducted on the US side as a media event for Trump with no substance. Clearly Beigun bears some responsibility for this.
Beigun's role as the head of the US negotiating working group which ostensibly was to lay the groundwork for negotiations with North Korea, essentially devolved to blocking or otherwise frustrating South Korean initiatives with North Korea. The South Koreans were warned "not to get too far out in front," and "to get on the same page," as the US. US envoys said there can be "no daylight" between US and South Korean approaches. South Korean initiatives to open the liaison office with North Korea, and their military agreements to lower tensions along the DMZ, Joint Security Area, and Northern Limit Lines were criticized. North-South plans to survey, restore, and use the east coast and west coast railways were effectively blocked by US sanctions threats. Obviously, South Korea wanted to reopen the joint production facility at Kaesong, and the Geumgansan resort in North Korea. At one point a South Korean envoy was told by Washington, "don't bother coming to Washington" if you are going to bring up these plans.
The current wave of US "human rights" manufactured propaganda aimed against North Korea, and indirectly at South Korean diplomatic initiatives that present the prospect of success in relations with North Korea, involves US dismay that the North Korean defectors it sponsors in South Korea can no longer send balloons, drones, or other materials over the DMZ to North Korea. According to US propaganda, the prohibition on these dangerous activities impairs the "free speech" of South Koreans in general. This is absurd. No one has the right to go to the JSA and yell or otherwise transmit their personal political messages to North Korea. One could imagine the response of guards at the JSA to such activities. Is that restriction a "free speech" violation? Obviously not. Military and civilian activities along the DMZ and NLL are subject to severe restrictions. All flights within 20 km of the DMZ are restricted, and in the Eastern region of the DMZ the restrictions are extended to 40 km.
The notion that private individuals have a right to send airborne objects over the DMZ is absurd and militarily provocative. One cannot use their own loudspeakers along the DMZ either. Neither can the South Korean government according to the agreements it has made with the North. These are reasonable time, place and manner restrictions rather than an encroachment on free speech. These restrictions were negotiated by the freely elected government of South Korea and the criminal offenses related to these acts were legislated by the National Assembly. These laws serve the end of reducing the tensions along the DMZ and reducing the chance of incidents that may result in deadly escalations. US criticism in the Congress, executive branch, VOA and other venues represents blatant US interference in South Korean sovereignty.
The notion that the US knows better how to reach to North Korean people, or even that it cares about the North Korean people is simply not credible. In any case, no one is stopping the US from broadcasting its incessant propaganda to North Korea via VOA Korea or RFA. Worse, the US position on this issue, presumes that it and its paid North Korean defector NGOs know better how to negotiate with North Korea than the freely elected government of South Korea. Direct contact with South Korea and South Koreans, through diplomatic channels, limited economic projects, tourism, cultural exchanges, sports events, humanitarian aid, and public health cooperation, represent the best way to open North Korea to initiatives to encourage peace, prosperity, human rights and a path to denuclearization in the North. This is obviously the preferable course rather than the coercive US maximum pressure approach which punishes the North Korean people, encourages hostility, and has as its ultimate object, regime change. One thing the Hanoi summit clearly demonstrated is that the US has no genuine interest in negotiation but essentially is stalling for time while praying the North Korean communist regime will collapse from the "maximum pressure" being applied.
The blog has reviewed in several instances the "step by step approach" to negotiations favored by four of the original six parties, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and China. Reciprocity in step by step negotiations builds mutual trust in contrast to the all or nothing, "one bundle" or so called "Libyan approach" favored by the US and Japan. The outcome of the Libyan approach is demonstrably predictable. Mr. Biegun's feigned US flexibility portrayed in his public statements proved to be little more than window dressing for a hypocritical US regime change policy of maximum pressure. Blaming North Korea is the go to position for failed US negotiators.
Addendum 12.22
Ironically 38North.org published an article by Olli Heinonen Dec. 18, disputing the contention that there is a Uranium enrichment facility at Kangson. The article suggests the facility could be for manufacturing centrifuge components but is not an enrichment facility. Oddly, the article states in an aside that there must be such a "third facility" somewhere, but doesn't provide a basis for this assumption.*
New Evidence Suggests Kangson Is Not a Uranium Enrichment Plant, OLLI HEINONEN, Dec. 18; https://www.38north.org/2020/12/kangson201217/
I'm taking note of the article because according to Thae Yong-ho a well known North Korean defector in South Korea, and now a conservative National Assembly representative, the existence vel non of the so called Kangson secret enrichment facility was a dealbreaker at Hanoi. (See our discussion: Thae Yong Ho Says Secret Uranium Enrichment Facility Dealbreaker in Hanoi, March 14, 2019). In Beigun's January 31, 2019, presentation at Stanford, during the question and answer period, Beigun noted the pitfalls of confusing intelligence assessments and priorities with diplomatic policy goals. Noting the potential problem beforehand seemingly had no impact on the outcome of the summit. Allegedly, the US side's eagerness to test a dubious intelligence theory nevertheless resulted in the Hanoi Summit's theatrical denouement.
Tuesday, December 15, 2020
Prosecutor General Yoon Seok-yeol suspended for 2 months by Discipline Committee
Yoon Seok-yeol was suspended for two months by a Disciplinary Committee appointed by the Ministry of Justice after a hearing of two days. Justice Minister Chu Mi-ae referred six allegations of professional misconduct to the committee for disposition. The committee found grounds to support four of six charges of misconduct against South Korea's top prosecutor. Some of these six allegations pertained to his earlier service as the Chief of the Seoul Central District Branch Office. The decision to discipline Yoon, the sitting Prosecutor General of South Korea was described as "unprecedented" by YTN news in their brief news bulletin and video. Which of the six charges of misconduct were recognized by the committee was unclear.
Both before and after each of the two days of hearings at which testimony was adduced, Yoon's attorney's moved to cancel the hearing based on a contention that the committee's authority over the prosecutor general was unfounded and unconstitutional. Additionally Yoon asserted in one motion that the hearing officials all had conflicts of interest. According to one report, discussions with Yoon's representatives resulted in three officials being replaced by alternate committee members. A renewed motion on the second day of hearings, was summarily dismissed. Yoon doesn't recognize the committee's standing or decision and intends to challenge the determination in court. The Ministry of Justice indicated that the decision will be forwarded to the Blue House for approval or denial as soon as possible. News accounts concerning the committee hearing process indicated that President Moon's office would or could not modify the decision but only approve or disapprove it.
It’s fair to say that democratic and progressive elements in South Korea are disappointed by the decision having looked forward to Yoon’s dismissal from office and perhaps other administrative sanctions. Reportedly, there were lengthy deliberations among the board members keeping them up virtually all night until the decision was announced at approximately four am, Seoul time. It does have the appearance of what we in the US call a “compromise verdict.” As an administrative disciplinary board, it is likely that some members did not feel comfortable treating Yoon Seok-yeol’s transgressions in more decisive fashion. Yoon is currently considered the leading conservative candidate for the next presidential election in South Korea in 2022. An outright dismissal from office would have rocked the South Korean political world. The equivocal nature of the decision ensures the ongoing political controversies and legal maneuvers, concerning alleged criminal acts by Yoon, his wife, and mother in law will continue. Yoon’s critics will point to the anticipated opening of the Public Official Corruption Committee which is a new body appointed by the 20th Session of the National Assembly. This body has the authority to hear criminal corruption cases referred for criminal prosecution. Yoon’s critics want his case to be the first case heard by the new body. Critics also call for his impeachment by the National Assembly.
Incidentally, the National Assembly introduced a proposed election law requiring prosecutors and judges who wished to run for electoral office to leave their office at least one year before registering as a candidate. This law if enacted would require Yoon to resign in March 2021 in any case if he wishes to run for office.
Addendum Dec. 16: Some clarification from an SBS report on the "four out of six" specifications or charges against Yoon found to be supported by the disciplinary committee are portrayed in this graphic:
Four specifications were found to be substantiated by the disciplinary committeee. The first substantiated charge deals with the creation and distribution of results of unwarranted investigation into judges in the Justice Department. Two other specifications dealt with the so called Channel A News incident, in which a reporter for Channel A, Lee Dong-jae, corresponded with a defendant in jail for financial crimes and threatened the defendant or otherwise improperly attempted to induce him either directly or through his agent mulitple times to commit perjury to incriminate Yoo Shi-min, a well known liberal media pundit and director from the No Mu-hyun foundation. It is alleged that the Yoon's close subordinate Han Dong-hun coordinated these unlawful activities with the Channel A reporter. Subsequently, Lee and Han were placed under investigation. The two specifications charged that Yoon interfered with prosecutors investigating the Channel A incident, and interfered with the investigation itself. The fourth charge found to be supported by the committee was that Yoon harmed the political independence of the prosecutors office.
Two specifications of misconduct of the six were not found by the court. The findings appear not to have been addressed rather than a finding of no misconduct. Number five alleged improper meeting with owners of the media (subject to investigation or litigation at the time). Number six involved interference with prosecutors investigating his own conduct.
Sunday, December 6, 2020
South Korea's Prosecutor General seeks to avoid Disciplinary Committee hearing
South Korea's highest prosecutor is trying to avoid a professional disciplinary hearing scheduled for December 10 by filing a petition with South Korea's Constitutional Court claiming that the process is unfair, violates the law concerning investigation of prosecutors, and is subject to undue influence from the Ministry of Justice which filed the complaint against Yoon.
(Image source- YTN 12.5) Prosecutor General Yoon Seok-yeol, "there's a problem with the prosecutor disciplinary law;" Yoon files petition with Supreme Court and seeks injunction.
The disciplinary complaint filed against Yoon by Justice Minister Chu Mi-ae’s office alleges six instances of professional misconduct by Yoon. Perhaps the trickiest charge among them is that he ordered improper investigations of sitting judges, in light of Yoon’s strategy of attempting to obtain early judicial intervention. Justice Minister Chu told reporters that the investigation of judges at Yoon’s direction was clearly unlawful. Other charges involve alleged obstruction of investigations or proceedings in which he had a conflict of interest (these potentially could involve himself, his family members or his subordinates); leaking information to the press (press-prosecution collusion); unethical contact with parties related to ongoing investigations or litigation (also involving the press), and politicizing the prosecution function (targeting high profile political figures on the left for prosecution and declining to prosecute figures from the right). Pending the investigation Yoon has been suspended from his duties. Yoon is also seeking an injunction to stop the disciplinary proceedings, and potentially his suspension, as well, presumably while the Constitutional Court addresses the substance of legal issues raised in his petition. Experts differ in their expectation of what the Constitutional Court might do.
Today there is an unrelated general meeting of representative judges scheduled and the question is whether or not the gathered jurists would add the issue of Yoon’s alleged surveillance of judges to their agenda. There is clearly not a formal procedure or enough time for the judges meeting to adequately consider the issues raised by Yoon’s claims of constitutional issues or any of the other procedural issues or specific charges against him. YTN reported that if ten jurists attending the professional gathering of judges requested it be placed on the agenda it could be added. Yet, such consideration would render little more than the judges opinions or bias in relation to the issues or matters raised, unless the agenda item or items were narrowly construed. A fear is that such consideration might influence the disciplinary hearing on December 10. Conceivably the Supreme Court itself might be influenced by any relevant pronouncements by the judicial community that emerge from the meeting.
Critics on the left note the hypocritical clamor from the established media regarding Yoon’s alleged independence as a guarantor of constitutionalism is to be expected. The three largest media cartels Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, and Donga media are implicated in issues raised by instances of Yoon’s alleged misconduct. Observers note the prospect of the Constitutional Court allowing a preliminary injunction to preclude the disciplinary hearing from taking place would establish a precedent for prospective judicial interference in disciplinary procedures involving government attorneys. Justice Minister Chu stated there is nothing improper about the disciplinary process. Finally, pundits observe the legal challenge in the Constitutional Court to the disciplinary hearing process by Yoon is a stalling tactic by a desperate man, who although accustomed to stalling litigation he doesn’t like until it dies from change of administration or the statute of limitations, is running out of options. Once his removal from office is obtained, pending collateral investigation and litigation against Yoon’s family, subordinates, and economic interests he has been protecting up till now could potentially proceed unimpeded. President Moon Jae-in stated he will follow the determination of the disciplinary hearing with respect to Yoon’s dismissal.
Note: the original publication of this post incorrectly identified the Supreme Court as the venue for the substantive appeal of the disciplinary hearing determination against Yoon Seok-yeol. The appropriate jurisdiction was the Constitutional Court. 6.28.21
The disciplinary complaint filed against Yoon by Justice Minister Chu Mi-ae’s office alleges six instances of professional misconduct by Yoon. Perhaps the trickiest charge among them is that he ordered improper investigations of sitting judges, in light of Yoon’s strategy of attempting to obtain early judicial intervention. Justice Minister Chu told reporters that the investigation of judges at Yoon’s direction was clearly unlawful. Other charges involve alleged obstruction of investigations or proceedings in which he had a conflict of interest (these potentially could involve himself, his family members or his subordinates); leaking information to the press (press-prosecution collusion); unethical contact with parties related to ongoing investigations or litigation (also involving the press), and politicizing the prosecution function (targeting high profile political figures on the left for prosecution and declining to prosecute figures from the right). Pending the investigation Yoon has been suspended from his duties. Yoon is also seeking an injunction to stop the disciplinary proceedings, and potentially his suspension, as well, presumably while the Constitutional Court addresses the substance of legal issues raised in his petition. Experts differ in their expectation of what the Constitutional Court might do.
Today there is an unrelated general meeting of representative judges scheduled and the question is whether or not the gathered jurists would add the issue of Yoon’s alleged surveillance of judges to their agenda. There is clearly not a formal procedure or enough time for the judges meeting to adequately consider the issues raised by Yoon’s claims of constitutional issues or any of the other procedural issues or specific charges against him. YTN reported that if ten jurists attending the professional gathering of judges requested it be placed on the agenda it could be added. Yet, such consideration would render little more than the judges opinions or bias in relation to the issues or matters raised, unless the agenda item or items were narrowly construed. A fear is that such consideration might influence the disciplinary hearing on December 10. Conceivably the Supreme Court itself might be influenced by any relevant pronouncements by the judicial community that emerge from the meeting.
Critics on the left note the hypocritical clamor from the established media regarding Yoon’s alleged independence as a guarantor of constitutionalism is to be expected. The three largest media cartels Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, and Donga media are implicated in issues raised by instances of Yoon’s alleged misconduct. Observers note the prospect of the Constitutional Court allowing a preliminary injunction to preclude the disciplinary hearing from taking place would establish a precedent for prospective judicial interference in disciplinary procedures involving government attorneys. Justice Minister Chu stated there is nothing improper about the disciplinary process. Finally, pundits observe the legal challenge in the Constitutional Court to the disciplinary hearing process by Yoon is a stalling tactic by a desperate man, who although accustomed to stalling litigation he doesn’t like until it dies from change of administration or the statute of limitations, is running out of options. Once his removal from office is obtained, pending collateral investigation and litigation against Yoon’s family, subordinates, and economic interests he has been protecting up till now could potentially proceed unimpeded. President Moon Jae-in stated he will follow the determination of the disciplinary hearing with respect to Yoon’s dismissal.
Note: the original publication of this post incorrectly identified the Supreme Court as the venue for the substantive appeal of the disciplinary hearing determination against Yoon Seok-yeol. The appropriate jurisdiction was the Constitutional Court. 6.28.21
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