Former CIA analyst Ray MacGovern off base on the North Korean nuclear threat?
Ray appeared on Judge Napolitano's Judging Freedom September 6 to talk about North Korea, Russia, China, etc. He said the Russians "gave" North Korea their HS-18 missile. It's simply not true. There is a discussion of why it's not true on the 38 North web site. I've been following their reports on North Korea for years, especially on their nuclear and missile programs. It's unfortunate that because Russia has been renewing its relationship with North Korea recently, that everyone now fancies themselves an expert on North Korea and its relationships with China and Russia.
Col. Macgregor's September 6 interview with Napolitano on Russia, North Korea, China had some shortcomings as well, perhaps not as bad. There are certain misconceptions and bias factors to which people who do not study military and political affairs concerning Korean issues fall prey.
The Transfer of a Russian ICBM to North Korea?
August 17, 2023, by Theodore Postol
https://beyondparallel.csis.org/the-transfer-of-a-russian-icbm-to-north-korea/
A Renewed Axis: Growing Military Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia
September 6, 2023, by Victor Cha and Ellen Kim
https://beyondparallel.csis.org/a-renewed-axis-growing-military-cooperation-between-north-korea-and-russia/
Don’t Judge a Book by Its Cover: North Korea’s HS-18 Is Not a Russian ICBM
https://www.38north.org/2023/08/dont-judge-a-book-by-its-cover-north-kor...
The North Korean ICBM threat is being mischaracterized in the Judge Napolitano videos uploaded to youtube, September 6. North Korea already had the means to nuke a substantial number of targets in South Korea and Japan for a few years. Maybe Guam as well. North Korea doesn't need an ICBM to nuke Japan. The judge's guests are acting like something changed just recently because of the Russian Defense Minister's visit to Pyongyang in late July. This has been the threat for some time. This is why Trump's "sometimes you gotta walk stunt" in Hanoi was so misguided. The Russians are reacting to the US-Japan-South Korea diplomatic and military moves that keep escalating military tensions in the region.
Additionally, the ICBM threat from North Korea has been in the making for some time, and it is probably not perfected yet. If it has any realistic capability to attack the US, it would be unreliable, and with only one warhead on each missile in all likelihood. I've actually not seen any reports on successful reentry tests. Of course there can't be such a thing as a small nuclear threat, that's bad enough. But our posture in South Korea is making the situation worse.
This North Korean threat to North America is the kind of limited "rogue state" nuclear strike, the Ground Based Interceptor was designed to meet. Russia is in a position to advance weapons systems in North Korea. Whether they will do it with advanced ICBM and warhead technology is another matter entirely. The reason for this, is the modified preemptive nuclear strike doctrine of North Korea. The North Koreans have threatened to strike with nuclear weapons if they are attacked conventionally by the US and its allies. This is why there is general agreement, even among some neocons, that the so called "bloody nose" attack, or preemptive conventional decapitation attacks on North Korea are a bad idea.
Why does North Korea have a preemptive nuclear strike doctrine? Because the US consistently except for a short period during the Moon administration in South Korea, has been threatening North Korea with being obliterated and so on. The North Korea conventional forces are not up to the task of deterring a US led attack on North Korea. This is why they find the large joint military exercises in the region so threatening. Nuclear weapons give them a means to deter conventional attack. They are actually less expensive than maintaining, training, equipping and supplying large conventional forces. The US imposed embargo on North Korea makes this choice more likely. The US failed to follow through on a diplomatic strategy to lower the nuclear risk in the region achieved during the Trump administration and some earlier administrations. After the far right hard liner Yoon administration took office in South Korea, the US and ROK pursued an aggressive military posture simulating large attacks on North Korea that elicited the preemptive nuclear threat policy from them. Currently, the US, ROK, and Japan or at least their current administrations, have no negotiating strategy to lower tensions and the threat of war, and demonstrate no real intention to do so.
Russia is not going to buy into the NK policy of preemptive nuclear attack. They won't supply finished advanced nuclear missiles or warheads that they designed or made either. There is already a serious and substantial North Korean nuclear threat to military bases in Japan and South Korea, particularly the military bases used by US forces. There is a marginal nuclear threat to North America at present, if any, from North Korea. This will grow over time as the North Korean ICBM weapon system program developes and the support infrastructure to make it effective grow.
The ways to minimize the North Korean nuclear threats are: 1) Stop the huge military exercises, in and around Korea including ground forces and attack aircraft in the region; 2) Attempt to revive the status quo ante at Singapore achieved by Trump during the Moon administration; (do not bring strategic bombers and nuclear submarines into South Korea), and 3) resume diplomatic contact with North Korea, and negotiate from there by offering something for something, step by step, to build trust. The US obstinately refuses to do any of these things. It prefers brinkmanship, arms races, and military tensions. Also inventing new ABM defenses in the region nominally directed against North Korea provides the US with a forward posture to threaten China and Russia. The same goes for Japan.
Japan actually does quite a bit for the US-Japanese alliance in the Western Pacific. Probably more than any other country. To say that they don't is really misleading. What's worse, is that they are acquiring all kinds of offensive weaponry and intend to double their defense budget. Japan has a hard right ruling political party that wants to make Japan "great again." The US one party needs to be careful what they wish for. Colonel MacGregor indicated that Japan doesn't do enough.
The CSIS article
Read the article by Theodore Postol. The opinion article is actually posed in the conditional, with the question mark in the title, the use of the words if, potential, it appears, and if this is true. As the article and Ray note, to give North Korea highly sophisticated ICBM technology (if true), is completely inconsistent with prior Russian practice. Postol once he lays out the assumptions of his thesis, recommends policies. First, he advocates the implementation of a new airborne, anti ballistic system in the Korean theater. What a surprise coming from CSIS. Not.
Secondly, Postol recommends the UN authorizing the US and it allies to shoot down any further tests of its "Russian ICBM." How this is supposed to happen in view of who the permanent members of the UN Security Council are is beyond explanation. The normal sequence, after the expected veto or vetoes is for the US and perhaps its allies to proceed unilaterally. There could be a veto and abstentions. I had been concerned about this possibility of a warlike act after North Korean ballistic missile testing activity had resumed, and increased in frequency in violation of UN resolutions. Postol laid out the political posturing that would take place before what is essentially a US preemptive attack on the North Korean testing program. Postol compares not developing and deploying a new airborne ABM weapons system deployed to the Korean theater to reliance on an obsolete Maginot line.
I haven't changed my opinion after a close reading of Postol's article despite my high regard for his prior work. Notice that the 38 North rebuttal includes the likelihood of technology transfer during the turbulent period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is also the ever present possibility of North Korean hacking obtaining relevant technological secrets.
It's very unlikely the North Koreans have the full panoply of advanced Russian countermeasures and MIRV technology. There is simply no evidence for this. I note that the photograph in the Postol article ostensibly showing release of the "countermeasures cannister" is actually labeled "second stage separation" in Korean.
