There has been a notable lack of consistency in the US approach to North Korea since the Singapore Summit. There are two basic problems. The first is the domestic political problem inside the US government and political society represented by the usual domestic military interests, traditional anti-North Korean lobby groups and think tanks, and the strong political opposition to Donald Trump. The Trump administration appears incapable of carrying out an easing policy toward North Korea because of these opposed interests, not even in the tiniest material steps. Without those steps there can be no trust building leading to any kind of denuclearization or convergence of political interests with the traditional cold war era enemy, North Korea. The constellation of pro-military interests fostered under the post war system in the far east will not release its grip on US policy.
The second problem is that the Trump administration’s public stance of normalizing relations with North Korea in an effort to bring about denuclearization may be seen as a facade, perhaps better characterized as a deception plan, to mask the hybrid warfare (maximum pressure) strategy that it believes can achieve a strategic victory against North Korea and China, by bringing the regime down by economic, psychological, and covert means. Meanwhile, Japan seeing the far off prospect of a unified Korea, however achieved, as a political, economic and military threat, is carrying a policy aimed at bringing down the Moon administration and replacing it with a more pliable anti-communist and pro-Japanese satellite. Abe is moving within the space created by the almost pathological fear of rising Chinese power compelling the US policy establishment to ignore, if not encourage, the militarism implied in Abe’s drive to eliminate Article 9 constitutional limits on Japanese military operations. Abe is, to coin a phrase, going to “make Japan great again.” The anti-Korean impetus for this drive was evident since Abe came to power in 2012. It broke out into the open militarily during the prior maritime patrol incidents between Japanese military patrol aircraft and South Korean surface warships in the East Sea/ Sea of Japan in December 2018 and January 2019.
The missile tests by North Korea since May 2019, show that North Korea sees right through American intentions. Because of the general lack of public understanding and institutional bias in media and defense related analysis, the context of the otherwise inexplicably provocative launches is missed.
Pompeo made a statement which was televised on VOA Korea July 29, that sanctions would be maintained until final full denuclearization. This position is a compelling reason why there won’t be any meaningful negotiations. Pompeo facetiously maintained that this was the position of the UN, as if the opinion of the permanent security council members, China and Russia were irrelevant. If there were significant steps taken toward dismantlement of nuclear facilities in North Korea, the three largest permanent members of the security council could easily get approval for any partial sanctions relief. The sanctions relief commonly believed to be possible is the easing of sanctions for South Korean- North Korean economic cooperation at Kaseong joint industrial region and Gumgangsan resort.
As shown in the graphic above there is a context to the recent spate of missile launches by North Korea. The first is the introduction of F-35 stealth fighters to the South Korean Air Force in late March at Cheonju Air Base, 140 km south of Seoul. At the same time Japan achieved operational capability of its first F-35 squadron. South Korea will receive 40 F-35s and Japan is expected to receive 157 F-35s. After the first two North Korean launches on July 25th, South Korean analysts immediately noted the connection and surmised that the new Iskander type short range ballistic missile could reach the F-35 base in South Korea. Intercepting the weapon is problematic with its eccentric terminal flight phase. If the missile flies between 30 and 40 km in altitude this is another problem as some analysts maintain that there was an envelope gap between Patriot 3 and THAAD systems at these altitudes. One can assume that the latter problems could be resolved in due course. US and CFC authorities asserted readiness was not affected. There was a similar discussion of these issues after the May 2019 missile launches in North Korea.
Another issue is the successful Arrow Three intercept test in Alaska on July 28th. When Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin visited South Korea July 14, there had been some suggestion publicly, at least on Channel A News in South Korea, that there may have been discussion of Arrow 3 acquisition by South Korea. South Korea already has the Green Pine radar associated with the Arrow air defense system.
The latest launch, August 2, of an unknown type of short range missile by North Korea may have been hypersonic. The South Korean Channel A News Top Ten broadcast today reported that the missiles reached 6.9 mach presenting another intercept problem for South Korean missile defense resources. It appears that the intent of North Korea is to demonstrate that a military solution of the North Korean nuclear problem is not at hand and to emphasize that no solution exists outside of negotiations with real substance leading to normalization of relations, and creation of peaceful environment conducive to denuclearization of the peninsula. Both the US strategy of hybrid warfare/ maximum pressure designed to bring North Korea to its knees, and the North Korean asymmetric military response are less than perfect in their designed goals. Each has resulted in creating an instability in the region inducing a regional arms race, most recently manifested in a particularly disturbing new assertion of hegemonic ambition by Japan against South Korea.
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