Tuesday, November 27, 2018

History Journal lesson - Advice to South Korean Leadership?

There was an interesting discussion on the KBS History Journal recently about the so called Treaty of Eulsa signed by representatives of the Chosun dynasty on Nov. 17, 1905 which established the "protectorate" status of Korea under the Japanese Imperial government. It appears that one of arguments that led to the treasonous signing of the agreement was that Korea should leave foreign policy to the rich and powerful countries.

The discussion among the South Korean historians gave the impression, they were trying to make a point here about the dangers of giving up foreign policy to foreign powers. This as Secretary Mike Pompeo and his special representive to "North Korea," Stephen Biegun, and their working group with South Korean officials, attempt to restrict South Korean policy initiatives toward North Korea. This is the so called "no daylight" approach. The US is clearly trying to take control of South Korean policy after being caught flat footed by President Moon Jae In's numerous initiatives, political, cultural, economic, and military with North Korea. Whether it should be called foreign policy as it pertains to North Korea, could be said to be a matter of perspective. According to Pompeo and Biegun, the South Koreans shouldn't "get ahead of the US." The South Koreans and the US should "speak with one voice." Further according to the unofficial but connected spokespeople from the ultra conservative think tanks who typically appear on VOA broadcasts to Korea, our ally can be subjected to secondary sanctions and the US can even walk away from the alliance.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, Episode 197 11.25 ) Han Kyu Seol, bottom far right, wears traditional Korean attire. He was the only hold out, who didn't succumb to the Japanese arguments, financial inducements or physical threats to give up Korean sovereignty. It was said that there were five Eulsa traitors, a sixth Korea official was persuaded to abandon opposition at the meeting with Ito Hirobumi, the seventh came around to the pro-Japanese position at a later time. Han Kyu Seol, ultimately was the only steadfast opposition of the original group of Korean government officials. He was arrested immediately, and later stripped of his political position.

(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, Episode 197 11.25 )

This graphic represents the situation in 1905. England and Japan had a treaty in which Japan recognized UK rights in India and UK recognized Japan's dominance of Korea. This actually achieved Britain's goal of using Japan to check Russian power. US diplomats not only approved of the Portsmouth Treaty but negotiated secretly with Japan to recognize Japan's status in Korea, and in exchange Japan would respect the US colonization of the Philippines in the Katsura- Taft agreement. Similar great power gamesmanship in Northeast Asia affects the treatment of the Koreas today as they jockey for position around the North Korean denuclearization issue.

The great powers bargained away Korea's sovereignty to Japan to serve their own imperial interests. Russia actually was the only power to resist the Japanese, but that was because they wanted to make Korea their sphere of influence. They lost the Russo-Japanese War and had to sign the Portsmouth Treaty in which Japan's dominance in Korea was acknowledged. In September 1905, King Gojong still thought the US might be of help to avoid the Japanese takeover of Korea when Alice Roosevelt visited Korea.


(Source- KBS 1 History Journal, Episode 197 11.25 ) Teddy Roosevelt's daughter Alice is the woman on the left, center. She was treated like a queen by the Korean Royal family while she was in Korea. In the background is Empress Meongseong's grave. The Korean queen was assassinated by the Japanese in her quarters in the Kyongbok palace October 8, 1895. King Gojong's message to the Americans about Japan fell on deaf ears.

The History Journal participants in the program did not refer to current affairs in the broadcast, this is the author's opinion of what the implicit message was. The historians only suggested that given the decades long awful sequelae for Korea of the so called Eulsa "Treaty," one should keep in mind it's principal lesson.



Wednesday, November 21, 2018

ROK Soldier's Death at DMZ Guard Post

The tragic death last week of a South Korean soldier assigned to a guard post in the demilitarized zone in Yanggu, Kangwando, South Korea has sparked controversy and internet rumors in South Korea. A Liberty Party Korea (conservative opposition party) national assembly member, Bek Sung Ju, claimed that the military agreement signed by the two Korean states in September and put into effect November 1, contributed to the service member's death from a gun shot wound. Purportedly, a delay was caused by restrictions on the flight of military aircraft in the forty km zone around the DMZ in this part of Korea. It is claimed by conservatives that prior approval from North Korea was required before the medical evacuation helicopter could enter the zone to evacuate the severely wounded service member.

The Korean Defense Ministry flatly rejected the claim, and reported that the procedures for emergency medical evacuations from the DMZ have not changed from those in effect previously and were unaffected by the terms of the military agreement.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 11.21) Defense Ministry- South North, Evac helo entry first, notice later. (critics) 9.19 Military Agreement suspected cause of Army evac helo failed dispatch. Defense Ministry- we regret to say entirely untrue. Ex post facto phone report notifications to North Korea agreed. Emergency evac support requests and consent procedures are minimized. In this incident, preexisting evac helo mobilization procedures were used.

The consensus on the Top Ten program, was that the military agreement had no role in delay of the flight and that given standard procedures for medical evacuations, and the absence of landing facilities in the DMZ, timeliness was going to be an issue in evacuation in any case. Reference was made to the "golden rule" of one hour in traumatic gun shot cases. The shooting occurred at 5:03 pm. Request for evac was received at 5:19. The aircraft was ready for takeoff at 5:39. The soldier expired at 5:38.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 11.21) GP firearm accident, Emergency helo late lift off reason. Gunshot wound 5:03pm, Request for evac helo: 5:19; moved to transport vehicle for evac 5:24; death during transport 5:38; helo ready for take off 5:39; 20 minutes at least for helo ready for take off, Army manual provides for take off readiness within 20 minutes in daytime, 30 minutes at night.

Rumors that the soldier had been killed by a sniper were not indicated by the circumstantial evidence at the scene. The walls of the guard post were three meters high to block sniper fire. The CCTV showed the soldier in the bathroom area moments before the fatal wound from the gun shot. Video of the scene after the gunshot showed the expended empty shell case from the soldier's own weapon. The soldiers hand phone showed he had been viewing internet sites about suicide before he died.

Monday, November 19, 2018

CSIS corporate backers


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-nMMvY9zNrk

Tim Shorrock published an excellent analysis in The Nation magazine of the NY Times scare story on North Korean missile bases:

How ‘The New York Times’ Deceived the Public on North Korea
Stretching the findings of a think-tank report on Pyongyang’s missile bases is a reminder of the paper’s role in the lead-up to the Iraq War.
By Tim Shorrock NOVEMBER 16, 2018

https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-new-york-times-deceived-the-public-on-north-korea/

Friday, November 16, 2018

Simulated South Korean "Octagon" Military HQ reported in North Korea

(Source* Channel A News Top Ten youtube 11.16) North Korea- Gyeryong HQ replica set up for military exercise? Picture on left the North Korean model of the Gyeryong HQ (satellite image by Planet Labs); Right- image of actual ROK military HQ in Gyeryong. (google satellite image).

Channel A News Top Ten News reported today that the North Korean military has built a simulation of the ROK military services headquarters in Gyeryong, South Korea, at North Korean military training grounds in Yongbyun, North Korea, for military exercise purposes. Gyeryong is located just southwest of Daejun, in Chungcheongnam Provice. VOA broadcast the report on November 14 as reported in Chosun News. The location of the North Korean military training grounds where the structure was located was in Pyonganbuk provice, Yongbyon county, Goseong Ri (평안북도 영변군 고성리 ).

Cited by some analysts as further proof of North Korean hostile intent and duplicity, it is alleged that the target simulation was constructed during the period of improving relations and summits between North and South Korea. The viewers were reminded of the preparation of a similar target in North Korea during 2016 which simulated the Blue House during a time when discussions of "decapitation missions," by US and ROK special forces units against North Korea were common. The Channel A analysts varied in their commentary from views that the Moon administration was in denial of the North's true intentions, to references to periodic indications that major US-ROK joint military exercises could resume, the failure of the North to obtain sanctions relief and the recent US-ROK joint exercises near Pohang.


(Source VOA 11.16) Stephen Beigun, US special envoy to North Korea. US- South Korean working group to meet next week.

Today's VOA program reported that Stephen Beigun's US-ROK working group rould have it's first meeting next week. The meeting of President Moon Jae In with Vice President Mike Pence at the Singapore ASEAN conference was also reported. CNN confirms that Pence said the US was "backing down" on a requirement for North Korea to provide a full list of nuclear and missile sites before a second meeting between Trump and Kim. This seems to present a misleading view of the Vice President's otherwise hard line position on negotiating with North Korea, especially on sanctions issues which are a sensitive point in connection with the Moon administration's plans for economic cooperation with North Korea. See my October 31 commentary - US "working group" to restrain ROK inter-Korean policy.


Wednesday, November 14, 2018

Undisclosed Missile Bases Report (continued)

(Source Channel A News Top Ten 11.14) Tactical missile belt 50-90km (from the DMZ/MDL) Scud class short range and mid range ballistic missile deployment; the operational belt 90-150 km north for Nodong class ballistic missile deployments; the strategic belt 150 km plus north- Hwasang, Taepodung class ICBMs expected. The primary source for the graphic is the CSIS study at beyondparallel.csis.org.

I'm not going to review all the tedious details of the Sakkanmol Missile Base report headline story. I read the CSIS reports, the NY Times Sanger/Broad framing of the Sakkanmol report and then looked for other press reactions from more responsible sources than the NY Times. The website 38North, likes to be described as "Informed analysis on North Korea," and it generally is. Leon Sigal published a commentary there today, November 13, titled the New York Times' Misleading Story on North Korean Missiles. It's definitely worth a read. The knowledgeable commentator on North Korean affairs characterized the NY Times article by David Sanger and William Broad as "tendentious hyperbole." Here's the link:

https://www.38north.org/2018/11/lsigal111318/

In South Korea, Channel A News Top Ten promoted the story again today, November 14, as it's number one discussion for its analysts. The consensus by the South Korean analysts seemed to be that the NY Times' article was a politically motivated hit piece as discussed yesterday in my interpretation of Shin In Kyun's presentation on Defense Daily and Channel A Top Ten. The most conservative Top Ten analyst somehow regarded the "deception" take as accurate citing Kim Jong Un's statements reflecting his intent to denuclearize. Do nations not attempt to keep their military resources secret and keep them in facilities that they regard as secure as they can obtain? Is this some sort of surprise? Were these bases previously unknown to US observers? At what point did the North Koreans promise to unilaterally give up these weapons without tangible acts of consideration or reciprocity from the US? Secretary of State Pompeo said himself not so long ago, without complete verifiable irreversible security (for the North Korean system) you won't get complete verifiable irreversible denuclearization.

So the focus of Top Ten today was away from the Sakkanmol Scud base facilities to the broader picture of ballistic missile threats in North Korea presented by the CSIS Nov 12 report. The information for the Top Ten graphic and their report came from the CSIS November 12, Beyond Parallel assessment, Undeclared North Korea: Missile Operating Bases Revealed.

https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-koreas-undeclared-missile-operating-bases/


Although there has been a lot of discussion about how medium range missiles could possibly be deployed to the Sakkanmol facilities, one has to wonder at the wisdom of moving more valuable assets to a more vulnerable position. In fact the Top Ten graphic presentation shows what has been the view on ballistic missile positioning for quite some time. The greater the missile's range, the further away its deployment from the DMZ to more remote locations. There will be disputes about facilities that allegedly don't fit the rule, like the purported Kangson missile production facility alleged to be operating just south of Pyongyang. There is also the contention about detection times being reduced by placing medium range ballistic missiles closer to the DMZ and so on. However the graphic above shows this: scuds deploy in the southern belt closest to the DMZ; medium range missile bases in the middle belt, further away; and, icbm's based in the most remote northern zone. The Top Ten graphic based on the CSIS report allows for the possibly deployment of medium range missiles to the "tactical" belt. In the November 12, Sakkanmol report, the CSIS author Joseph Bermudez acknowledges that, "...some of the information used in the preparation of this study may eventually prove to be incomplete or incorrect..."

Who knew? The North Koreans have ballistic missiles.





Tuesday, November 13, 2018

The "Undisclosed Missile Bases" Report

The New York Times version of the undisclosed missile base story is being promoted by VOA in Asia, and a phalanx of actors from the press and think tanks in the English speaking world promoted as "analysts" and "experts."

The CNN article, When it Comes to North Korea Who's Really Being Deceptive? is surprisingly good. The author Will Ripley's bio says he's been to NK 19 times. His article explains the differences in negotiating styles and positions of the two sides, and how the NK position actually makes sense in light of US politics. Further he describes the Blue House reaction to the misleading characterizations in the New York Times' Sakkanmol missile base story.

The Blue House said Tuesday the existence of the missiles sites was "nothing new" and rejected the use of the word "deception" by the Times and similar framing of the story by other news outlets, including CNN, citing a risk of undermining sensitive talks.

"Talk of 'secrets' or 'undeclared' or 'deception' can possibly bring misunderstanding at this moment when there is a need for US North Korea dialogue, because it can block the talks and undermine the opening of negotiation," the Blue House official said.

https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/13/asia/north-korea-missile-bases-analysis-intl/index.html

In fact, the existence of the Sakkanmol missile base has been known since its construction was observed two decades ago. The whole intent of the report and its framing is obviously to discourage the resumption of negotiations with the North. Another key aspect is the base chosen, one out of thirteen locations known to the US. The Sakkanmol missile base is 85km north of the DMZ and only 135km from Seoul. So the story is intended to impact South Korean political opinion, particularly that in Seoul.

Source Channel A News Top Ten 11.13

Shin In Kyun 신인균, the military analyst who does so much work for Channel A Top Ten, is saying the US electoral politics are driving US policy toward North Korea to the hardline position. (트럼프의 큰그림에 낚인 민주당, 북폭으로 가나?) Democratic Party, hooked by the Trump big picture, heading to an explosion in North Korea? That's the title of his presentation. (Buk Pok appears to a contraction for bukhan pokkiak, north korea bombing attack.)

In other words, Democrats, "hooked by the Trump big picture," are hardliners. He begins his report with the Sakkanmol missile base story by the New York Times and the reported 13 "undisclosed missile bases," the US knows about but there are others alleged up to a total of 20. He then goes on to describe how this coverage and other coverage by the NY Times and other media are designed to support the Democratic Party officials by repeated reports criticizing Trump.

Shin calls it hooked by the Trump big picture, we call it Trump derangement syndrome. It plays right into the hands of the hardliners inside the beltway, State Department, and "national security" community who simply don't know what they are doing other than promoting as many military threats as they can to protect their budget and acquisition plans.

In any case, the election results forced the postponement of the Kim Yong Chol trip to NYC more than anything else. Shin cites Senator Markey as an example of the Trump syndrome driving the Democratic hardliners.

(Source 신인균의 국방TV Nov 13, 2018 youtube) Sen Edward Markey East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee- Trump is being played by Kim Jong Un. Nuclear and Missile program suspension doesn't include any concrete measures, talks are inappropriate.

Shin asserted that Markey stated not only that Trump should not have a second summit with North Korea but that the State Department shouldn't negotiate with North Korea either. According to Shin, people in the US establishment think that this strategy intended to get the North Koreans to think that they may be attacked preemptively at any time, is going to get them to make the concessions along the lines desired by the US hardliners. The atmosphere it creates in the north, especially under current unstable conditions there, makes such a reaction unlikely. He does expect major US-South Korean joint exercises to resume in the spring, the possibility of which was reported in the Japan Times today. It is unlikely President Moon will give up his life long political goals so easily.









Friday, November 9, 2018

Haley- US Won't Withdraw the Stick

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 11.9) US (Nikki) Haley, "We've given many carrots to North Korea...the stick will not be withdrawn."

Channel A News Top Ten presented a broad view of the situation in the North November 9. They talked about the suspension of the planned second US- North Korea summit negotiations and the reaction in the North Korean state run media to that, the US-ROK working group (mentioned in a previous Oct. 31 write up here), and the joint US-ROK marine exercises near Pohang. They discussed the serious deficiencies in crop yields in North Korea, after the drought, compounded by the effects of one of the typhoons which flooded farmlands and towns in Gangwon Do, North Korea. So this serious food supply problem in North Korea is reflected in renewed calls for self reliance and renewed efforts by the people in the official North Korean press. The Channel A analysts were speculating that between the bad harvest and the sanctions that there would be political unrest perhaps provoked by the forced state collection of cooperative farm output. It sounded like the levy was coming early in the harvest season to avoid pilfering and grey market activity. They mentioned that the jang ma dang, the informal private entrepreneurs would be adversely affected. All this could potentially result in political discontent in the population at large.


The North Korean press views expressed were along the lines that the joint marine exercises were not in the spirit of negotiations reflected in the Singapore summit, and that the people would have to be self sufficient and rely on their own resources to survive the international campaign against their government. ( a reference to the UN sanctions). As for Beigun's working negotiations group with the ROK it said that reflected US bad faith and a lack of regard for the South Korean sentiments. This is conservative coverage by a broadcaster in South Korea, Channel A reporting on North Korean perspectives reflected in official North Korean media. The Top Ten commentary was that the marine exercises were relatively small scale and the criticism seemed disproportionate. This may be so, but in an earlier broadcast Top Ten emphasized the presence of the most advanced US marine combat aircraft in the exercise.

The instant broadcast had video clips of US UN Ambassador Haley saying that the US had offered enough carrots and wouldn't give up the stick. One of the alleged statements in the Workers Daily, was "don't expect help from South Korea."

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 11.9)

This graphic says North Korea aims simultaneous bundle of criticism at the US and South Korea. The top North Korean publication referred to is Our People- "The ROK US working group, is an act of US arrogance." The second one is a publication apparently called Echo, which says "anachronistic military movements." The program analysts suggested that the suspension of joint military exercises and the withdrawal of strategic assets from the Korean area represented the carrots given by the US. Naturally, the limited joint marine exercises in the Pohang area, in conjunction with Secretary Mattis' recent statement about a determination concerning joint US-ROK military exercises for 2019 by December 1 imply that these "carrots" may be withdrawn very soon.

The entire thrust of the Top Ten presentation was to present an image of crisis in North Korea brought about the sanctions, the food shortages, and the US negotiating position. Joel Wit, a knowledgeable and experienced expert on North Korean negotiations was cited in a Washington Post article Nov. 7, saying, "...Washington is sticking to the 'old playbook,' one that has failed repeatedly, particularly in its insistence North Korea take the first steps such as denuclearization before the United States does anything." This broadcast suggests that the old regime change formulation is making a comeback.


Tuesday, November 6, 2018

General Vincent Brooks Departing Post as US Forces Korea Commander in South Korea

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 11.6) Partial to South Korea Brooks- successor, a hard liner. US-ROK relations how will they fare? Each time discord in the US-ROK relationship emerged, (Brooks) served as a friendly force.

General Vincent Brooks Commander of US Armed Forces Korea, the US-ROK Combined Forces Command, and the United Nations Command, gave a short speech acknowledging the challenges his command had overcome in changing circumstances, and encouraged subordinate commanders and troops to display the same resourcefulness in face of the hills and summits ahead. He said, "Now Mr President, we see ourselves at the crest of the mountain, but as we are in Korea, there is always another mountain, There is still hard work ahead of us, that still remains to be done, and with your leadership, we know we will be successful and we will be committed to achieving that success." General Brooks is regarded favorably in South Korea as a friend of the Korean people who made substantial efforts to smooth over recent rough spots in the relationship between the allies brought on by changes in the approach to North Korea in response to the nuclear crisis there. The successor commander, General Robert Abrams is regarded as a hard liner compared to Brooks, who was described as a dove by conservative analysts in the Channel A Top Ten report.

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 11.6) About Abrams: "Suspension of US-ROK military exercises weakens preparedness against North Korea." Hardliner appearance.

It was noted that General Brooks had previously served in South Korea, had studied the Korean language, and was very interested in Korean culture. He seemed an especially articulate man, almost a politician was another comment offered. Brooks is expected to depart Korea on November 8. Some uncertainty was expressed about the arrival of General Abrams on the political scene and how he would respond to any tensions in the alliance.

DPRK Delegation Arrival Imminent- More scare reports emerge on schedule.

(Source Channel A News Top Ten 11.6) North Korea- greatest uranium mine production in progress. With nuclear negotiations ahead what is the reason for North Korea's uranium mine operation? Getting prepared for a break in the talks? Strengthening nuclear weapons power? A card to enhance pressure at denuclearization negotiations?


The excepts below from the Middlebury Institute estimate of North Korean Uranium ore output are being used as a basis to alarm the public about North Korean intentions. Although the work of the Middlebury Institute is typically produced along with appropriate caveats as to limitations on their sources and methods, such characterizations are missing from popular media accounts which are directed at producing a political impact rather than advances in knowledge or understanding of issues. The information below is taken from the CNS report recently produced concerning possible production levels at the North Korean facility in Pyongsan:


Monitoring Uranium Mining
and Milling in China and
North Korea through Remote
Sensing Imagery

Melissa Hanham, Grace Liu, Joseph Rodgers,
Mackenzie Best, Scott Milne, and Octave Lepinard

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional paper No. 40. October 2018


https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/op40-monitoring-uranium-mining-and-milling-in-china-and-north-korea-through-remote-sensing-imagery.pdf



The two mines referenced are likely Pyongsan and Pakchon, given that
North Korea did not likely build new mines or mills between 1979 and 1992. The larger Pyongsan
site is a better candidate for the .26 percent ore figure than Pakchon (.086 percent), since North Korea likely would
have built its larger mine and mill at a site with higher quality ore.

In North Korea, the varying production estimates for Pyongsan are as follows:23
• Two CCDs processing ore at 0.8%U: 456 tU/year
• Four CCDs at 0.8%U: 886 tU/year
• Two CCDs processing ore at 0.26%U: 273 tU/year
• Four CCDs processing ore at 0.26%U: 529 tU/year

?

The footnote explains:

23 The 0.8%U figure comes from a widely-cited defector, and the 0.26%U figure comes from the authors’
inference (see “Estimating Pyongsan’s Production,” above).


Not very scientific is it? In other words, they're guessing, and plugging in uncorroborated information to outline a worst case scenario.

The recent Nov. 2 article from 38north.org says this, "A future denuclearization agreement will require North Korea not to acquire natural uranium, a key material in the process to produce highly enriched uranium for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program." This is an overbroad recommendation. The information cutoff date on the imagery appears to be May 26, 2018.

Sunday, November 4, 2018

Pompeo to meet Kim Yong Chol in NYC November 7-8

(Source- SBS News Nov. 4)

SBS News reports that diplomatic sources have confirmed that Vice Chairman Kim Yong Chol will travel to New York to meet with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to negotiate the details of a possible second summit meeting between Kim Jong Un and President Trump. They will have a dinner meeting on November 7, with full talks on November 8. An anonymous diplomatic source in South Korea suggested that Choi Son Hee, a North Korean Foreign Officer with extensive experience negotiating with Americans concerning nuclear issues may accompany Kim Yong Chol. Further, that efforts to schedule the first meeting of the US and North Korean working level negotiators, Stephen Beigun and Choi Son Hee, which has been delayed, are also in progress.

(Source- SBS News Nov. 4) It is likely, according to a diplomatic source, that "plus alpha" character Choi Son Hee may emerge at the New York negotiating table.